Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > Russell Standish writes: > > > > > > > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments, > > > > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to > > > > consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information > > > > that can be extracted from observation. > > > > > > Functionalism explicitly allows that different physical states may > > > implement > > > the same observer moment. For example, OM1 could be implemented on a > > > computer running Mac OS going through physical state S1, or by an > > > equivalent > > > program running on the same computer emulating Windows XP on Mac OS > > > going through state S2. In this way, there is potentially a large number > > > of > > > distinct physical states S1, S2... Sn on the one machine all implementing > > > OM1. > > > > > > Is there any reason to suppose inclusion of a physical state in this set > > > S1... Sn > > > prevents it from implementing any OM other than OM1? > > > > If "this set" is the set of all phsyical states that possibly implement > > OM1, the any physical state either in the set, or doesn't belong there. > > But does that mean that a physical state which belongs in this set implements > OM1 > and only OM1, or is it possible that a physical state may implement more than > one > OM?
Under physicalism, one physical state corresponds to one total conscious state. I suppose it is possible, even under constraints which exlude baroque re-intrerpretations, for one physical state to implement more than one computational state. A computational state is basically a subset of a physical state. A physical state could have two disjoint computational subsets. This is just "parallel processing". I suppose the human equivalent would be patients who have had "split brain" surgery for epilepsy. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
