Le 21-oct.-06, à 21:52, Charles Goodwin a écrit :

>    [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Peter D 
> Jones
>> The problem is not that there are no such  resemblances in a
>> Multiverse, it is that ther are far too many. How does one
>> distinguishing "real" ones from "coincidental" ones. How does a Harry
>> Potter film differ from a documentary?
> The only way I know of that the MWI distinguishes these is that the
> "measure" of the "real ones" is Vastly larger than the "measure" of the
> rest. But that is just restating things.

Except, I would say that QM-without-collapse + decoherence theory 
explains the measure of the real one is vaster than the measure of the 
Harry-Potter (HP) stories, and, as DD said himself, why the probability 
to remains in a Harry Potter story is negligible.

In a a-la-Feynman nutshell: QM entails a phase randomization making the 
HP story amplitude of probabilities self-destroying.

But now, most presentation of QM-without collapse assumes the classical 
turing emulability of the observer. Then, (it is my main point), it 
remains to explain why we are not confronted with the classical HP 
stories, which, at least at first sight, have purely additive 
probabilities and no phase randomization to eliminate the HP one.

The high non triviality of the classical turing emulability of the 
observer hypothesis (computatiionalism), forces to justfify the 
appearance of

  (which btw remains true in the Hamerov doctrine where the brain is a 
quantum machine, it is only false in Penrose doctrine where 
consciousness is supposed to be both physical and non turing emulable)


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