Le 27-oct.-06, à 13:04, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :

> Hi Stathis,
> Le Vendredi 27 Octobre 2006 12:16, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>> Here is another thought experiment. You are watching an object moving
>> against a stationary background at a velocity of 10 m/s. Suddenly, the
>> object seems to instantly jump 10 metres in the direction of motion, 
>> and
>> then continues as before at 10 m/s. You are informed that one of the
>> following three events has taken place:
>> (a) your consciousness was suspended for 1 second, as in an absence
>> seizure;
>> (b) you were scanned, annihilated, and a perfect copy created in your 
>> place
>> 1 second later;
>> (c) nothing unusual happened to you, but the object you were watching 
>> was
>> instantly teleported 10 metres in the direction of motion.
>> Would you be able to guess which of the three events took place?
>> Stathis Papaioannou
> The problem with these kind of thoughts experiments is that we don't 
> know how
> consciousness "works", we don't know if we can make a "perfect copy", 
> we
> can't know (currently) if such a copy would be conscious as we don't 
> know how
> conscious experience arise.

That is why we are proposing theories. It seems to me that the 
computationalist hypothesis entails the answer "no" to Stathis 
Are you OK with this? (Of course, other hypotheses (like some weakening 
of comp for example) could also lead to the answer no.

> Taking the premises of the problem you gave, it
> is impossible to give a (right) answer (if there is one...). You 
> presupose
> too much on what is consciousness and how it works (not that it is a 
> bad
> thing, but I think these examples won't convince someone who have not 
> the
> same view on you about what is consciousness and how it works).

I think that the point of Stathis was illustrating comp or some 
weakening of it.

Is there someone in the list who find simultaneously both comp *and* a 
"yes" answer to Stathis' question plausible?



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