Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 12-déc.-06, à 03:58, 1Z a écrit :
> > 1Z wrote:
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>> I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
> >>> Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
> >>> current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory.
> >> !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
> > To expand a bit,
> Well, thanks.
> > both of these easily answer the problem Of Evil
> > if you treat them as Theories of Everything (and not just Everything
> > Physical).
> I was "kind" enough to consider them as theories as everything indeed,
> but then it is an obvious fact that Loop Gravity (LG) and String
> Theories (ST) does not even address the question,
They do address the "reconciling" aspect of the question. There is
nothing to reconcile Evil with if there is no God. The
rest of the question is the question of qualia, which is a different
> nor any qualia
> question. Of course, LG and ST, like all physicalist approaches, rely
> on an implicit materialist theological
Yes, that is the point. The existence or otherwise of god is not
a specific theory. the non-existince of God is a doctrine
of physicalism rather than physics. That's why your comment about
ST and LQG reads so strangely.
> > The Problem of Evil is the Problem of reconciling a good God with a
> > suffering world.
> No. This is only a version of "the problem of Evil" in christian
That is *the* problem of evil. It doesn't arise under other theologies.
> In Buddhism, the "problem of evil" can arguably be
> translated into the problem of finding the roots of suffering (and how
> to cut them).
There is no reason why a physical theory shoud even attempt
to address that.
> In non-eliminative materialism the problem of evil is the
> problem of why and how information processing by neurons does make a
> first person feeling pain, etc.
That is the problem of qualia. Pain and suffering have no special
> Here I was alluding to the quasi trivial fact that to get a
> "scientific" theory of "suffering" (and thus more generally evil) we
> need a theory of qualia before.
If qualia can be explained by
computationalism, they can be explained by materialism,
since materialism and computationalism *are* compatible
in the absence of Platonism.
> > Since
> > there is no God in either theory, the problem does not arise.
> Which illustrates that ST and LG are not theory of everything (unless
> we take the materialist doctrine, but then comp is wrong, or my
> argument UDA is incorrect, ...)
It just illustrates that they are physics.
> But evil exists, (no?), if only through the existence of suffering
> (although "evil" is a notion arguably far more complex than "just"
> suffering (hope you grant a relation between suffering and evil)).
Lots of things exist. That isn't a problem. It is only a problem
if you have some reason to expect them not to exist.
The hypothesis of a good god is a reason not to expect
evil/suffering to exist. (But has no impact on pleasure/good.
Hence the classic, JudaeoChristian Problem of Evil
is quite different to the problem of qualia).
> Of course, from a comp point of view, LG and ST address only the fourth
> hypostases (Z1 and Z1*, perhaps S4Grz1 and the X logics too). And they
> does not try to distinguish between the communicable and the non
> communicable part of it.
> BTW you are quick saying there is no "God" in LG and in ST, is that a
No. Physics doesn't deal in theology. "There is no god in LQG"
is "not even wrong".
> I don't see the question addressed in those theories except
> perhaps somehow by Hawking ...
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at