Le 12-déc.-06, à 13:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>> Le 12-déc.-06, à 03:58, 1Z a écrit :
>>> 1Z wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem
>>>>> Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
>>>>> current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory.
>>> both of these easily answer the problem Of Evil
>>> if you treat them as Theories of Everything (and not just Everything
>> I was "kind" enough to consider them as theories as everything indeed,
>> but then it is an obvious fact that Loop Gravity (LG) and String
>> Theories (ST) does not even address the question, nor any qualia
>> question. Of course, LG and ST, like all physicalist approaches, rely
>> on an implicit materialist theological doctrine.
> Haven't you said in the past that science is silent on the question of
> whether there is
> a real material universe?
When approaching rather subtle point, I think it could be misleading to
use the term "science" like if science was a person saying things.
What I said was that lobian machine cannot prove that there is a
reality, because that would be equivalent as proving their own
consistency, and that would contradict the second incompleteness
theorem. So "lobian science" cannot say that there is a universe or a
reality, material or not. Now, what *I* say is that IF there is a
reality and IF comp is correct (classical or platonist comp: I allow
the use of the excluded middle principle) THEN that reality cannot be
material (or more precisely the assumption of matter cannot be related
with the observation of matter so that with the usual occam razor the
(aristotelian) concept of primary matter loses its explanation power.
> It is assumed by most scientists, as by most people, but it is
> not actually one of the testable predictions of the scientific theory.
OK. That is why, for lobian machine, to believe in a reality is already
Most probably, humans (if not most animals) have such a "theology"
buried in their genes. The cat believes in the mouse.
>>> The Problem of Evil is the Problem of reconciling a good God with a
>>> suffering world.
>> No. This is only a version of "the problem of Evil" in christian
>> theologies. In Buddhism, the "problem of evil" can arguably be
>> translated into the problem of finding the roots of suffering (and how
>> to cut them). In non-eliminative materialism the problem of evil is
>> problem of why and how information processing by neurons does make a
>> first person feeling pain, etc.
> OK, but if you just say "problem of evil" it generally means what
> Peter has said above
> to most people who have heard of the term.
Thanks for reminding this to me. (But I thought it was clear I do take
some distance from materialist christian sciences and theology).
Of course I have to be clear if I address some new audience.
>> Here I was alluding to the quasi trivial fact that to get a
>> "scientific" theory of "suffering" (and thus more generally evil) we
>> need a theory of qualia before.
> But even such a theory (if possible) would not explain what evil is
> any better than saying
> that it is suffering, or some variation on this.
Of course. Darwinianly (if I may say) suffering is good. It has
obvious survival value. People lacking pain receptor survive with
difficulties. It less clear "evil" is necessary where evil could be
*defined* by the useless suffering humans makes on itself ..., or pain
during agony (what is the use?). Perhaps the word has no meaning at all
>>> there is no God in either theory, the problem does not arise.
>> Which illustrates that ST and LG are not theory of everything (unless
>> we take the materialist doctrine, but then comp is wrong, or my
>> argument UDA is incorrect, ...)
>> But evil exists, (no?), if only through the existence of suffering
>> (although "evil" is a notion arguably far more complex than "just"
>> suffering (hope you grant a relation between suffering and evil)).
>> Of course, from a comp point of view, LG and ST address only the
>> hypostases (Z1 and Z1*, perhaps S4Grz1 and the X logics too). And they
>> does not try to distinguish between the communicable and the non
>> communicable part of it.
> I don't see how it's such a big problem. Consciousness exists,
> therefore feelings exist,
> and some of these feelings are unpleasant ones. Explaining
> consciousness is difficult,
> but once granted, you don't need an extra theory for every different
> type of feeling.
We certainly need either extra axioms or extra definition. An
explanation of consciousness will not necessarily provide by itself an
explanation of all accessible state of consciousness.
>> BTW you are quick saying there is no "God" in LG and in ST, is that a
>> theorem? I don't see the question addressed in those theories except
>> perhaps somehow by Hawking ...
> LG and ST do not specifically discuss elephants and are not dependent
> on the existence
> or nonexistence of elephants for validity. It is possible that without
> God the universe
> would not have come about, but the same is true for elephants.
And I would have make the same remark in case 1Z would have told me
that there is no elephant in LG or in ST. But he told me there is no
god in LG and ST (that it is not even wrong).
I must go. Perhaps I miss something. Of course when I make comments
(like my answer to Tom) I recast and reinterpret all terms in the comp
frame where grosso modo science = G and (pure) theology = G* (minus G).
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