Bruno Marchal writes (quoting Tom Caylor):
> > In my view, your motivation is not large enough. I am also motivated
> > by a problem: the problem of evil. I don't think the real problem of
> > evil is solved or even really addressed with comp. This is because
> > comp cannot define evil correctly. I will try to explain this more.
> I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
> Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
> current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With
> that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of
> course those "light" are of the platonic-plotinus type where the notion
> of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say more
Surely you have to aknowledge that there is a fundamental difference
between matters of fact and matters of value. Science can tell us how to
make a nuclear bomb and the effects a nuclear explosion will have on people
and the environment, but whether it is "good" or "bad" to use such a weapon
is not an empirical question at all.
You could say that "I believe blowing people up is bad" is a statement of
empirical fact, either true or false depending on whether you are accurately
reporting your belief. However, "blowing people up is bad" is a completely
different kind of statement which no amount of empirical evidence has any
bearing on. If you survey a million people and all of them believe that
up people is bad", you have shown that "most people believe that blowing up
people is bad", but you have not shown that "blowing up people is bad". If you
a message from God stating that "blowing up people is bad" then you have shown
that "God believes that blowing up people is bad (and perhaps will send you to
hell if you do it)", but you have not shown that "blowing up people is bad".
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