Bruno Marchal writes:

Le 02-janv.-07, à 08:07, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

> You could speculate that the experience of digging holes involves the > dirt, the shovel, robot sensors and effectors, the power supply as > well as the central processor, which would mean that virtual reality > by playing with just the central processor is impossible. This is > perhaps what Colin Hales has been arguing, and is contrary to > computationalism.

Again, putting the environment, with some level of details, in the "generalized brain" is not contrary to comp. Only if you explicitly mention that the shovel, or the sensors, or the power supply, .... are not turing emulable, then that would be contrary to comp.

That's what I meant: an emulated shovel would not do, because the robot would somehow know if the data telling it it was handling a shovel did not originate in the real world, even if the sensory feeds were perfectly emulated. In the robot's case this would entail a non-computationalist theory of computer consciousness!
Stathis Papaioannou
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