I suppose it depends on what is covered by the term "metaphysics". Theists
sometimes profess absolute certainty in the face of absolute lack of
evidence, and are proud of it. I wouldn't lump this in together with the
interpretation of quantum mechanics (I'm sure you wouldn't either, but I
thought I'd make the point).

On 2/24/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 2/24/07, *Tom Caylor* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
> >
> >
> >     On Feb 23, 3:59 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >     <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
> >      > On 2/23/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >     <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
> >      >
> >      > > My point in quoting Kronecker was to simply to allude to the
> >     fact that
> >      > > the foundations of mathematics are axiomatic in a similar way
> that
> >      > > ultimate meaning is ultimate.  We have a feeling that the
> >     foundation
> >      > > of math is ultimately right, even though we can't prove it.  In
> my
> >      > > "logical reason" (reason #1 a few posts back), I am simply
> >     arguing for
> >      > > realism (vs. positivism).  Your arguments that you are trying
> to
> >      > > enforce here would apply equally well (if valid) to realism in
> >     general
> >      > > (not just God), and therefore put you in the positivist camp.
> >      >
> >      > > Tom
> >      >
> >      > Positivists don't like metaphysics, but even if you allow that
> >     metaphysics
> >      > isn't all just nonsense, you have to maintain some sort of
> >     standards. How do
> >      > you weed out those metaphysical beliefs which *are* just
> nonsense?
> >      >
> >      > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
> >     I agree that positivists don't like metaphysics, and they actually
> >     don't believe in it either.  The problem with this is that science
> is
> >     ultimately based on (and is inescapably in the context of) some kind
> >     of metaphysics, since it is in the context of the universe as a
> whole.
> >
> >     There are some ways of sorting out metaphysics.  In fact these
> >     criteria are mostly the same as how we sort out science (since,
> again,
> >     science is based on metaphysics).  These are such things as
> >     fundamentality, generality and beauty.  However, the fact that
> science
> >     conventionally has been limited to the "material" (whatever that
> >     means!) implies that the criteria of naturality (a viscious circle
> >     actually!) and reproducibility (another vicious circle) that we have
> >     in science cannot be applied to the universe as a whole or to
> >     metaphysics.
> >
> >     [Side note: But even more important is to recognize that
> metaphysics,
> >     as well as science, is filtered for us: we are part of the universe
> >     and we are limited.  So this filters out almost everything.  This
> >     limits more than anything the amount of "sense" we can make out of
> >     Everything.]
> >
> >     However the criterion that you are trying to enforce, that of all
> >     things having a cause even in the context of Everything and
> Everyone,
> >     is a positivist criteria, treating metaphysics as science.  It
> assumes
> >     that Everything has to be part of this closed system of cause and
> >     effect.  There are plenty of criteria to sort out Everything (as
> I've
> >     mentioned above) without getting into the positivist viscious
> circle.
> >
> >
> > The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us. All we
> > can do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make a
> > best guess as to what's going on. Science is just a systematisation of
> > this process, with guesses taking the form of models and theories.
> > However, it's all tentative, and the scientific method itself is
> > tentative: tomorrow pigs might sprout wings and fly, even though this
> > has never happened before. I would bet that pigs will still be
> > land-bound tomorrow, because there is no reason to think otherwise, but
> > I have to stop short of absolute certainty. A metaphysical position
> > would be that flying pigs are an absurdity or an anathema and therefore
> > pigs absolutely *cannot* fly. But it is arrogant as well as wrong to
> > create absolute certainty, absolute meaning, or absolute anything else
> > by fiat, just because that's what you fancy. If there are some things we
> > can't know with certainty or can't know at all, that may be unfortunate,
> > but it's the way the world is.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> You seem to take metaphysics to be an absolutist theory.  Maybe Tom does
> too.  But I think of metaphysics to be the interpretation we put on top of
> our mathematical theories, e.g. Bohm's pilot wave and Feynman's multiple
> particle paths are two different metaphysics we can use to explain what the
> formalism of quantum mechanics refers to.  But we're *less* certain about
> them than about the formalism.  In fact they don't even matter in
> applications.  Their usefulness, if they have any, is in suggesting
> extensions to the theory.
>
> Brent Meeker
>
> >
>

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