On 28/06/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
BM: I agree completely.....
DN: A good beginning!
BM: .....but I am not yet convinced that you appreciate my
methodological way of proceeding.
DN: That may well be so. In that case it's interesting that we reached the
BM: Anyway I will take some time to read yours'
and the others' posts before asking for questions that others have
perhaps asked and that you have perhaps already answered.
DN: I'm at your disposal.
> Le 17-juin-07, à 18:28, David Nyman a écrit :
> > IMHO this semantic model gives you a knock-down argument against
> > 'computationalism', *unless* one identifies (I'm hoping to hear from
> > Bruno on this) the 'primitive' entities and operators with those of
> > the number realm - i.e. you make numbers and their relationships the
> > 'primitive base'. But crucially, you must still take these entities
> > and their relationships to be the *real* basis of personal-world
> > 'grasp'. If you continue to adopt a 'somethingist' view, then no
> > 'program' (i.e. one of the arbitrarily large set that could be imputed
> > to any 'something') could coherently be responsible for its personal-
> > world grasp (such as it may be). This is the substance of the UDA
> > argument. All personal-worlds must emerge internally via recursive
> > levels of relationship inherited from primitive grasp: in a
> > 'somethingist' view, such grasp must reside with a primitive
> > 'something', as we have seen, and in a computationalist view, it must
> > reside in the number realm. But the fundamental insight applies.
> I agree completely, but I am not yet convinced that you appreciate my
> methodological way of proceeding. I have to ask you questions, but I
> see you have been prolific during the Siena congress, which is not
> gentle for my mailbox :). Anyway I will take some time to read yours'
> and the others' posts before asking for questions that others have
> perhaps asked and that you have perhaps already answered.
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