As I see it, compatibilism changes the definition of free will from a
metaphysical to a psychological one. So, I am probably a compatibilist
according to the compatibilist definition of free will, which is not
my own.


On Jul 6, 2:00 pm, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Jul 5, 2:14 pm, LauLuna <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > I don't see how to reconcile free will with computationalism either.
> It seems like you are an incompatibilist concerning free will.
> Freewill can be reconciled with computationalism (or any deterministic
> system) if one accepts compatabilism 
> (
> ).  More worrisome than determinism's affect on freewill, however, is
> many-worlds (or other everything/ultimate ensemble theories).  Whereas
> determinism says the future is written in stone, many-worlds would say
> all futures are written in stone.
> Jason

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