Bruno, that was quite a response. Let me just include those part to which I
have something to say - in most cases your 'half-agreement' cuts my guts.
==============
"...I like very much David Deutsch's
idea that if we are scientist we are in principle willing to know that
our theory is wrong, but to discover this we have to take them
seriously enough."

I never said I am a scientist, I just speculate (and allow to change my
mind). What I brought together is in my distsinction a 'narrative', not a
theory, not even a hypothesis.

"(JM)> And i still did not get an acceptable explanation why 'numbers' are
> the basics of everything (and WHAT they may be).
(BM) Nobody can KNOW that. The fact is that ONCE you take the comp hyp
seriously enough into consideration, then you can, by work, be
eventually convince that our own immateriality (which follows easily by
comp) has to be "contagious" on our possible neighborhoods."<

(JM):
Why don't I take the 'comp hyp (whatever it is) seriously BEFORE I know
about numbers?
I see it circular: unless 'comp' has nothing to do with numbers. I cannot
take seriously a 'thing' to get to that 'thing'. As you wrote:

(BM):
"...we are not talking about those numbers humans
(re)invented, but on those which have to exist independently of us once
we accept some minimal amount of computer science, without which we
could infer nothing fron comp (our, well mine, working hypothesis)...."

(JM):  -RE-invented? if we agreed (D. Bohm) that the numbers we use as
numbers
are human inventions, how did they exist independentloy of us?
Is even the 'littlest' computer science feasible without numbers?
And I would not accept something to exist before it came into existence just
to make
a 'hyp' workable - which I don't see feasible without such circularity.

BM:  (Bohm) denies comp -
(JM): I do not. I don't know what it is. I hope it is not that embryonic
digitality-churner we have on our desk (don't even mention 'binary'), but if
it is named ptoperly (comp?) it has 'something' to do with computationality
(involving numbers to handle). Now this may be your mystical unknowable
'number' what I was willing to call (not condoning) the Almighty Creator, or
anything else - of course not emulable by an (embryonic level) Turing
machine.
 I just wonder WHY NUMBER? because Plato talked numbers? That was 2500 years
ago at the epistemic cognitive level of that time!  OK, our mind is still
not capable of thinking beyond the level it can think, but to substitute the
ORIGIN by something invented in the course much much later on, because we
have some idea about THAT, does not seem to me 'scientific' enough.
Unless you give me a better explanation - if you care.

(BM):
All proof in math are particular case of thought experiments. In
philosophy-of-mind, theology, theoretical physics and math, the only
tools available are the thought experiments.

(JM):
(I wrote: > I also keep away from ANY thought experiences, they are products
of
> OUR state of the mind at the time they are 'invented'....<
in which "experience" is a typo, it should read "experiment". Sorry about
it)

I was referring to those 'thought experiments' (EPR, teleportation etc.)
which imagined physical tests on imaginary (unreal?) circumstances to prove
a position. To "test" ideas
in mental domains is a mental  effort, not what I would call a 'thought
experiment'.

(JM):
> I am in subconscious trouble with the machine, which is differently
> identified by Robert Rosen and I find a lot acceptable in his ideas.
(BM):
Imo, Rosen is wrong on Church thesis. But this could wait when I
succeed to explain more about CT later ..
(JM):
I was referring to his nomenclature of the 'formal' (reductionist,
conventional) terms vs his tems in the impredicative view of the total
interconnective 'cpmplexity'. "His" machine is computer-emulable while his
'natural systems' always have noncomputable elements.
I consider the latter as part of the world, while the restricted view -
mostly topically selected within boundaries we set for our presently
accessible observations - is what I call  "model", encompass the
conventional sciences. He worked in math and theor. biology as well.
(I am looking forward to reading your explanatory piece about the CT. )
Interesting match in your par:
"Just keep track of the definitions. By angels and gods (note the
plural) I mean things which are not turing-emulable, or if you prefer,
any entities which are provably not machines."
(JM):
"provably" is ambiguous. i would accept "per definitionem".

(BM): What is conventional sciences.
(JM): basically: what you and Nietzsche described. I consider it the
historical figment of the ever changing (advancing?) observational skills
and explanational levels, built upon the previous flight of knowledge-base
in the human (scientific) establishment. It applies math to calfculate the
quantities deduced from the developing observations on the 'model-view' (see
above). Such incomplete information may lead to paradoxes. Thinking is
'reduced' to the actual level of epistemic content viewed as "all that there
is".
I call it reductionistic, (the only way we can think!) building an ingenious
edifice of a physical world and its mental attributes. I disagree with
conclusions drawn from 'within boundaries' (i.e. models) and applied to
'beyond boundaries' (the 'totality?) - what (conventional science) has a
habit to do.

(BM):
Science = doubt and modesty. When scientist
pretend to know the truth, they are mad, that's all.

(JM): i think - while doubt and modesty are good attributes - there must be
some more to it. I could not identify, what, but some understanding and
ordering of signs(?) we perceive
(and i am also realist enough to believe in such) has also its place in it.
There is no "truth" only "my truth" or "your truth". Experience is (1P)
interpretation, even 3P communication.

(BM): (on atoms - molecules):
"Plotinus (+300) did already understand that such notions were inconsistent
with the
more primitive platonic ideas. Now, I could accept that atoms (the modern
one), like the spherical hypothesis about the earth are excellent local
theories.

(JM):
I try to keep out of comparisons in long obsolete levels in
knowledge-development. Those elements I try to think within are products of
the most recent advancement. In old times the guys were smart, logical, even
wise and their underdeveloped circumstances may disturb our mind in
speculations in novelties FOR the future development.
I ;ove your distinction of the "local theories" - it may save our sanity.

The requested URL: http://www.kjf.ca/62-TAMIK.htm
(I had troubles bringing it in. If you cannot get it, I may attach the text
in a private e-mail)

John



On 9/12/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
> Le 12-sept.-07, à 00:41, John Mikes a écrit :
>
> ...some quotes above
>
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>

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