On 26 Sep., 14:39, "Wei Dai" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> ASSA implies that just before you answer, you should think that you have
> 0.91 probability of being in the universe with "0" up. Does that mean you
> should guess "yes"? Well, I wouldn't. If I was in that situation, I'd think
> "If I answer 'no' my survivors are financially supported in 9 times as many
> universes as if I answer 'yes', so I should answer 'no'." How many copies of
> me exist in each universe doesn't matter, since it doesn't affect the
> outcome that I'm interested in.
> Notice that in this thought experiment my reasoning mentions nothing about
> probabilities. I'm not interested in "my" measure, but in the measures
> of the outcomes that I care about.

I do agree with you, Wei. Sometimes, it's not useful to consider the
expectation for your next observer moment---in particular, if you are
interested in what happens to other people (thus in the observer
moments they must expect for themselves). As I pointed out in my
recent message "A question concerning the ASSA/RSSA debate", an
absolute measure over observer moments isn't necessary. Every specific
problem we are concerned with leads to a specific measure over
observer moments. In this context, I would refer the ideas of the ASSA/
RSSA to the problem "What will I experience next?" This is a problem
we are very often concerned with (for example if we perform an
observation or a measurement, also leading to the Born rule). But it's
not the only problem we might be interested in! So, this new
perspective can be seen as a generalization of the ASSA/RSSA. In our
rational decisions, we can include other aspects (e.g. other people)
than ourselves. Rationality is not restricted to self-sampling. We
could call this 'general rationality'.

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