> > In (3) the universe doesn't have a high aIgorithmic complexity.
> I should have said that in (3) our decisions don't have any consequences, so
> we disregard them even if we do care what happens in them. The end result is
> the same: I'll act as if I only live in (2).
In the (3) I gave, you're indexed so that the thermal fluctuation
doesn't dissolve until November 1, so your actions still have
> I will throw a fair coin. If the coin lands heads up, you will be
> instantaneously vaporized. If it lands tails up, I will exactly double your
> measure (say by creating a copy of your brain and continuously keeping it
This is one of a larger class of problems related to volition, and the
coupling of my qualia to an external reality, that I don't currently
have an answer for. I want to live on in the current Universe, I don't
to die and have a duplicate of myself created in a different Universe.
I want to eat a real ice cream cone, I don't want you to stimulate my
neurons to make me imagine I'm eating an ice cream cone. I would argue
that a world where I can interact with real people is, in some sense,
better than a world where I interact with imaginary people who I
believe are real.
> Well, let's consider an agent who happens to have preferences of a special
> form. It so happens that for him, the multiverse can be divided into several
> "regions", the descriptions of which will be denoted S_1, S_2, S_3, etc.,
> such that S_1 U S_2 U S_3 ... = S and his preferences over the whole
> multiverse can be expressed as a linear combination of his preferences over
> those "regions". That means, there exists functions P(.) and U(.) such that
> he prefers the multiverse S to the multiverse T if and only if
> P(S_1)*U(S_1) + P(S_2)*U(S_2) + P(S_3)*U(S_3) + ...
> > P(T_1)*U(T_1) + P(T_2)*U(T_2) + P(T_3)*U(T_3) ...
> I haven't worked out all of the details of this formalism, but I hope you
> can see where I'm going with this...
You have a general model, which can encompass classical decision
theory, but can also encompass other models as well. It's not
immediately clear to me what benefit, if any, we get from such a
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at