Hi John,

Le 17-avr.-08, à 16:48, John Mikes a écrit :

> Bruno, ashamed, because I decided many times not to barge into topics 
> I do not understand and now I misuse your (and the list's) patience 
> again:
> you use "statistical". - "verified in MOST branches".
>  I think my view is not too far away: statistical in my dictionary 
> means a choice-set of cases selected for observation and in such 
> selection we COUNT the matching and non-matching occurrences. The 
> conclusions are strictly group-restricted.
>  Choose different boundaries (maybe include domains we don't even know 
> of) and the 'statistical' result may be different.

Yes. Actually this is what the comp suicide (and the quantum suicide) 
is all about. By preventing your continuation in some branch, you 
change your boundaries.

> Accordingly I would not say
>     " Those branches do violate the second law..."
>  I would rather say the II law is not valid (identified?) in "those" 
> branches.


> "For that period of time"? I consider the MWI a one-plane extract of MW

As I said often, but without success (:-)), I believe (like deWitt, 
Everett's editor) that Everett has never proposed a new interpretation 
of QM, but has "just" given a new *formulation* of QM. Well, this is 
obvious (for a logician or metamathematician). Everett "theory" is 
really given by the Copenhagen axioms minus the collapse axiom. Then 
the "interpretations" are derived from the talk of the "normal and 
correct physicists" as being described (correctly by definition) by the 
SWE. The interpretation of the SWE are given by the average discourse 
of the physicists described by the SWE.

>  and in my 'narrative' (i don't use 'theory' for unsubstantiatable 
> ideas, even if certain math can justify it) the multitude of universes 
> is not in any qualitative bound.

(I am using "theories" only for unsubstantiable ideas (and 
unjustifiable). Ah ok ... I think you mean unpalatable or something 
like that.

> Diversity exceeds our human (scientific?) fantasy.

I am not sure how you could know that, unless you are just saying that 
"our theology" exceeds "our science". The lobian "scientific theology" 
just says that. It is the beauty of the "incompleteness phenomenon": 
Machines can know that they know almost nothing. The wise and knowing 
machine know she has to be modest. For ever.

>  Time, however, is a coordinate of THIS universe and I have no idea 
> what kind of and what at all "time" may reign in other, totally 
> different universes. Our physics
> is just our physics.

Yes. And with comp physics can only be defined and recover correctly 
from that idea. And then, again with comp (or weakenings), the correct 
physics has to be derived by "our physics" with "our physics" = the 
physics of us, and us = the lobian machine/entity.
Put in another way: physics has to be the science of the border of our 
ignorance, and "our ignorance" get a precise mathematical structure, 
once we assume our lobian mechanicalness.
About time, I am not sure there is any physical third person time. I do 
believe in the subjective duration, and I am willing to bet that local 
physical time is a first person plural construct.

> I honor Everett as a pioneer and allow pioneers to be overstepped.
> (Another of my heresy: * probability * I consider as starting 
> similarly to the above statistical formulation of mine, with an added 
> superstition that the "next" (not necessarily the following one) will 
> be adjusted to the 'statistically found'  and chosen variant.).

No problem.

> I like your phrasing: "...**IF** comp is true.

This is of the upmost importance. That is why I insist so much on that 
"if", and of the fact that a comp practice (like saying "yes" to the 
doctor) is a religious (if not funeral-like) act. It is a belief in a 
form of reincarnation, and it transforms computer science, as applied 
to us, into an authentic theology.
I know it seems paradoxical, but no machine can ever know she is a 
machine: she can only hope (or fear) that she is a machine. I could 
even say (but don't always dare to say) that the first person "I" of 
the machine is 100% correct when she says "I am not a machine". It is 
here that the gap between first person and third person is maximal.
It is also here that we are on the verge of a contradiction, but "our 
topic" lives there.
If your doctor pretends (scientifically) that you are a machine, you 
have to run away ...
You can say "yes" to the doctor ("yes" for an artificial digital brain 
substitution) only when your doctor says something like  "let us bet 
you are a machine at this or that third person level of description". 
And then you can... pray.

Have a good day,


> On Thu, Apr 17, 2008 at 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 
> wrote:
>>  Are you saying that the second law is verified in each of all
>>  "branches" of the (quantum) multiverse? I would say the second law is
>>  statistical, and is verified in most branches. In the MWI applied to
>>  quantum field it seems to me that there can be branches with an
>>  arbitrarily high number of photon creation without annihilation, and
>>  this for each period of time. Those branches do violate the second 
>> law
>>  for that period of time, although in most of branches, such violation
>>  are quite ephemera. The probability to find ourself in such branch, a
>>  priori, is very little, but the probability to *remain* in such a
>>  branch is exponentially more negligible, if I can say. And that is 
>> what
>>  counts, if you accept the RSSA.
>>  (Then if comp is true, my point is that even schroedinger equation
>>  itself has to come from a statistical phenomenon, albeit pertaining 
>> on
>>  number (or abstract machines) relations: Everett is correct but don't
>>  push his methodology sufficiently far). Isn't it?
>>  Bruno
>>  Le 17-avr.-08, à 15:02, Telmo Menezes a écrit :
>>  >
>>  > Yes, you're right. Still I think my argument holds. The production 
>> of
>>  > the rifle, bullet and geiger counter system plus the geiger counter
>>  > operation should produce more than enough entropy to compensate for
>>  > the atom not decaying.
>>  >
>>  > On Thu, Apr 17, 2008 at 1:45 PM, Michael Rosefield
>>  > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>  >> It's not so much the input of energy, it's the production of more
>>  >> entropy
>>  >> where the energy is taken from.
>>  >>
>>  >>
>>  >>
>>  >> On 17/04/2008, Telmo Menezes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>  >>>
>>  >>> I would like to argue that in setting this experiment, energy is
>>  >>> being
>>  >>> expended to prevent the increase in entropy, albeit not in an 
>> obvious
>>  >>> way.
>>  >>>
>>  >>> It is a trivial observation that systems may be devised that 
>> prevent
>>  >>> increases in entropy by paying energy costs. One example is an 
>> ice
>>  >>> cube in the freezer.
>>  >>>
>>  >>> In the case of this experiment, and assuming MWI, we are 
>> creating a
>>  >>> scenario where the atomic decay is not possible from the
>>  >>> experimenter's perspective. However, the experimenter is setting 
>> a
>>  >>> system that includes the rifle and the geiger counter. Both these
>>  >>> devices need energy to operate. Maybe it's just a convoluted 
>> version
>>  >>> of the ice cube in the freezer?
>>  >>>
>>  >>> Best regards,
>>  >>> Telmo Menezes.
>>  >>>
>>  >>> On Tue, Apr 15, 2008 at 12:18 AM, nichomachus
>>  >>>
>>  >>> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>  >>>>
>>  >>>
>>  >>>>  In the description of the quantum immortality gedanken 
>> experiment,
>>  >>>> a
>>  >>>>  physicist rigs an automatic rifle to a geiger counter to fire 
>> into
>>  >>>> him
>>  >>>>  upon the detection of an atomic decay event from a bit of
>>  >>>> radioactive
>>  >>>>  material. If the many worlds hypothesis is true, the
>>  >>>> self-awareness of
>>  >>>>  the physicist will continue to find himself alive after any 
>> length
>>  >>>> of
>>  >>>>  time in front of his gun, since there exist parallel worlds 
>> where
>>  >>>> the
>>  >>>>  decay does not occur.
>>  >>>>
>>  >>>>  On a microscopic scale this is analogous to the observing a
>>  >>>> reality in
>>  >>>>  which the second law of thermodynamics does not hold. for 
>> example,
>>  >>>>  since there is a non-zero probability that molecular 
>> interactions
>>  >>>> will
>>  >>>>  result in a decrease in entropy in a particular sealed volume 
>> under
>>  >>>>  observation, there exist histories in which this must be 
>> observed.
>>  >>>>
>>  >>>>  This is never observed. Therefore the MWI is shown to be false.
>>  >>>>>
>>  >>>>
>>  >>>
>>  >>>
>>  >>>>>
>>  >>>
>>  >>
>>  >
>>  > >
>>  >
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>  >

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