---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: 2008/7/31
Subject: Re: Theories and Reality (was Re: Lakatos)

2008/7/30 Peter D Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> --- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Quentin Anciaux"
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Hi
>> A little while ago...
>> 2008/7/10 Peter D Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> >
>> > --- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], Babak Seradjeh <babaks@>
>> > wrote:
>> > >
>> > > Let's think, for instance, what is the perceived
>> > > reality of a person connected to David Deutsch's virtual reality
>> > > generator. The generator can be simulating *exactly* the Euclidean
>> > > geometry. So even though Euclidean geometry is not applicable to the
>> > > cosmos as we know it today, it will be exactly applicable to the
>> > > perceived reality of this person. So again, this is not an
>> > > existential problem.
>> >
>> > Of course it is, because it hinges on the actual existence of a VR
>> > generator.
>> I don't see why... it's the same as saying the universe is embedded in
>> something, it depends on the actual existence of the universe bearer.
> Well, it does. I totally fail to see hwo that is a counterexample

It does what ? embedded in something ? or is autosufficient ?
If 2, so does a VR that I could better name as "computational
generated reality", removing the V"irtual" term.

>> > > This is also an argument that the statement "some theories are
> wrong"
>> > > is not an absolute statement. Some theories are wrong *as solutions
>> > > to particular problems*: A theory based on Euclidean geometry is
>> > > wrong as the solution to the problem of cosmological space-time but
>> > > exactly correct as the solution to motion simulated by the above
>> > > virtual reality generator.
>> >
>> > It will still be wrong about the wider reality in which the VR
> generator
>> > is embedded. We demand widespread applicability as a condition of the
>> > correctness of our theories.
>> >
>> I don't understand if we accept the turing emulability of our own
>> "mind" then it is totally meaningless to speak of a level 0 of
>> reality, there isn't a level 0 of emulability it's nonsense.
> I don't remotely see how that follows. Virtual systems
> CAN be emulated by othe rvirtual systems, or they CAN be emulated
> by real systems. What on Earth is there about TE which excludes the
> possibilty of a real system at the bottom of the stack?

Because you did not defined what is real and what makes it inherently
real and differentiable from a computational generated reality ?

>>You have
>> to refer to matter to tell this machine is concrete and is in the
>> level 0, the difference with the abstract machines is it is composed
>> of matter (so it means matter is not emulable, matter is something
>> more than just information),
> Which doesn't contradict anything , and gives a pasimonius solution
> the the WR problem...
>>and you have to assume that the following
>> axiom is false, computational power is infinite (either spacialy or
>> temporaly).
> The computational power of what, for heaven's sake?
> Also, computational power is only /computational/ power. If there
> is something non-informational in existence, then no amount
> of computer power is going to create or destroy it.

That's the point, it follows that mind cannot be turing emulable,
because if it is there is *no need* to postulate a real substrate on
which the computation is done.

>>Meaning all the infinite steps of a non stopping algorithm
>> can be run.
> I'm confused. Am I the one who is assuming computational
> power is infinite, or is it you?
>> I'd like to know how could you tell if you're in level 0 ?
> Occam's razor.

I don't see that follows.

>> it seems to
>> me that a level 0 of reality requires non-turing emulability of the
>> mind,
> I don't see why that should be the case at all.

See upper.

>>ie: you could live in a VR but your "mind" is in level 0,
>> because if it's not the case then Bruno's case show that there is no
>> level 0.
> I can only guess you are thinking in the box that everything is
> information, and that a non-emulable level of reality must therofore
> consist of some uncomputable information.

That's the point.

> I making a much simpler
> and bolder assumption: that there is something which isn't information
> at all.

What is it then ? How can you apprehend the real by other means than
information ? How could you prove this ?

> As such it doesn't have to do anything complicated to be
> non-computer emulable. It may
> do no more than make some abstract structures real while others
> are not (that is how it solves the Tegmarkian WR problem) -- it may
> be no more than a "reality switch".

And how would it works ? and why will it select what is real and not-real ?

Quentin Anciaux

All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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