---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: 2008/7/31 Subject: Re: Theories and Reality (was Re: Lakatos) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
2008/7/30 Peter D Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > --- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Quentin Anciaux" > > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >> Hi >> A little while ago... >> >> 2008/7/10 Peter D Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> > >> > --- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], Babak Seradjeh <babaks@> >> > wrote: >> > > >> > > Let's think, for instance, what is the perceived >> > > reality of a person connected to David Deutsch's virtual reality >> > > generator. The generator can be simulating *exactly* the Euclidean >> > > geometry. So even though Euclidean geometry is not applicable to the >> > > cosmos as we know it today, it will be exactly applicable to the >> > > perceived reality of this person. So again, this is not an >> > > existential problem. >> > >> > Of course it is, because it hinges on the actual existence of a VR >> > generator. >> >> I don't see why... it's the same as saying the universe is embedded in >> something, it depends on the actual existence of the universe bearer. > > Well, it does. I totally fail to see hwo that is a counterexample It does what ? embedded in something ? or is autosufficient ? If 2, so does a VR that I could better name as "computational generated reality", removing the V"irtual" term. >> > > This is also an argument that the statement "some theories are > wrong" >> > > is not an absolute statement. Some theories are wrong *as solutions >> > > to particular problems*: A theory based on Euclidean geometry is >> > > wrong as the solution to the problem of cosmological space-time but >> > > exactly correct as the solution to motion simulated by the above >> > > virtual reality generator. >> > >> > It will still be wrong about the wider reality in which the VR > generator >> > is embedded. We demand widespread applicability as a condition of the >> > correctness of our theories. >> > >> >> I don't understand if we accept the turing emulability of our own >> "mind" then it is totally meaningless to speak of a level 0 of >> reality, there isn't a level 0 of emulability it's nonsense. > > I don't remotely see how that follows. Virtual systems > CAN be emulated by othe rvirtual systems, or they CAN be emulated > by real systems. What on Earth is there about TE which excludes the > possibilty of a real system at the bottom of the stack? Because you did not defined what is real and what makes it inherently real and differentiable from a computational generated reality ? >>You have >> to refer to matter to tell this machine is concrete and is in the >> level 0, the difference with the abstract machines is it is composed >> of matter (so it means matter is not emulable, matter is something >> more than just information), > > Which doesn't contradict anything , and gives a pasimonius solution > the the WR problem... > >>and you have to assume that the following >> axiom is false, computational power is infinite (either spacialy or >> temporaly). > > The computational power of what, for heaven's sake? > > Also, computational power is only /computational/ power. If there > is something non-informational in existence, then no amount > of computer power is going to create or destroy it. That's the point, it follows that mind cannot be turing emulable, because if it is there is *no need* to postulate a real substrate on which the computation is done. >>Meaning all the infinite steps of a non stopping algorithm >> can be run. > > I'm confused. Am I the one who is assuming computational > power is infinite, or is it you? > >> I'd like to know how could you tell if you're in level 0 ? > > Occam's razor. I don't see that follows. >> it seems to >> me that a level 0 of reality requires non-turing emulability of the >> mind, > > I don't see why that should be the case at all. See upper. >>ie: you could live in a VR but your "mind" is in level 0, >> because if it's not the case then Bruno's case show that there is no >> level 0. > > I can only guess you are thinking in the box that everything is > information, and that a non-emulable level of reality must therofore > consist of some uncomputable information. That's the point. > I making a much simpler > and bolder assumption: that there is something which isn't information > at all. What is it then ? How can you apprehend the real by other means than information ? How could you prove this ? > As such it doesn't have to do anything complicated to be > non-computer emulable. It may > do no more than make some abstract structures real while others > are not (that is how it solves the Tegmarkian WR problem) -- it may > be no more than a "reality switch". And how would it works ? and why will it select what is real and not-real ? Regards, Quentin Anciaux -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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