Jesse Mazer wrote:
>   
>> Jesse Maser wrote:
>>
>> The copenhagen interpretation is just one of several ways of thinking about 
>> QM, though. Other interpretations, like the many-worlds interpretation or 
>> the Bohm interpretation, do try to come up with a model of an underlying 
>> reality that gives rise to the events we observe empirically. Of course, as 
>> long as these different models of different underlying realities don't lead 
>> to any new predictions they can't be considered scientific theories, but 
>> physicists often discuss them nevertheless.
>>
>> -----------------------------------------
>> There are so many ways in which the point has been missed it's hard to know 
>> where to start. You are both inside 'the matrix' :-) Allow me to give you 
>> the red pill.
>>
>> Name any collection of QM physicist you like....name any XYZ interpretation, 
>> ABC interpretations....Blah interpretations... So what? You say these things 
>> as if they actually resolve something? Did you not see that I have literally 
>> had a work in review for 2 years labelled 'taboo' ? Did you not see that my 
>> supervisor uttered "forbidden?"  Read Stapp's book: BOHR makes the same kind 
>> of utterance. Look at how Lisi is programmed to think by the training a 
>> physicist gets...It's like there's some sort of retreat into a safety-zone 
>> whereby "if I make noises like this then I'll get listened to"....
>>
>> and I'm not talking about some minor nuance of scientific fashion. This is a 
>> serious cultural problem in physics. I am talking about that fact that 
>> science itself is fundamentally configured as a religion or a club and the 
>> players don't even know it. I'll try and spell it out even plainer with set 
>> theory:
>>
>>  = {descriptive laws of an underlying reality}
>>  =  { every empirical law of nature ever concocted bar NONE, including QM, 
>> multiverses, relativity, neuroscience, psychology, social science, cognitive 
>> science, anthropology EVERYTHING}
>>     
>
>
> You're not being very clear about why you think things like the Bohm 
> interpretation of QM cannot fall into the category "descriptive laws of an 
> underlying reality". By "descriptive" do you mean something intrinsically 
> non-mathematical, so that any mathematical model of an underlying reality 
> wouldn't qualify? If so, how could this non-mathematical description give 
> rise to quantitative explanations of what we actually measure empirically? On 
> the other hand, if you do allow the descriptive laws to be mathematical, what 
> is it specifically about something like the Bohm interpretation or the 
> many-worlds interpretation that makes them fail to qualify?
>   
The 'mathematicality'  (that a word?) or otherwise of descriptions is 
moot. That the natural world happens to cooperate to satisfy the needs 
of certain calculii, making certain mathematical abstractions useful, is 
only that - happenstance...In the final analysis the 'laws' are merely 
descriptions in the sense that they  facilitate prediction, which is how 
the natural world will appear to us when we look (with our 
P-consciousness). Or, in the applied sciences, how we should make the 
world appear in order that a desired behaviour occurs. That's all. Being 
merely descriptions, they cannot automatically be ascribed any sort of 
structural role. Such an assumption is logically flawed. Conversely our 
situation does not a-priori prohibit the assembly of a set of 
descriptions of actual underlying reality... provided it is consistent 
with everything we know AND predictive of an observer.

As I said in the first post: <aspect 1> is descriptions of an underlying 
reality. <aspect 2> is also a set of descriptions, but merely of 
generalisations/abstractions of the appearances in an observer made of 
<aspect 1>. Both aspects are equally empirically supported. You can't 
give either aspect priority-ownership of the evidence.

>   
>> FACT
>>   = {Null}
>> FACT
>>   = {has NO law that predicts or explains P-consciousness, nor do they have 
>> causality in them. They never will. Anyone and everyone who has a clue about 
>> it agrees that this is the case}
>>     
>
>
> What do you mean by the term "P-consciousness"? Are you talking about the 
> first-person aspects of consciousness, what philosophers call 'qualia'? 
> Personally I'd agree that no purely third-person description of physical 
> phenomena can explain this, but I like the approach of the philosopher David 
> Chalmers, who postulates that on the one hand there are laws which fully 
> determine the mathematical relationships between events in the physical world 
> (so the physical world is 'causally closed', the notion of interactive 
> dualism where some free-willed mind-stuff can influence physical events is 
> false), and on the other hand there are 'psychophysical laws' which determine 
> which patterns of events in the physical world give rise to which types of 
> first-person qualia. Of course, since I prefer monism to dualism I have some 
> vague ideas that the laws of mind might actually be fundamental, with the 
> apparent physical laws being derived from them--see 
> http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg13848.html for my 
> speculations on this.
>   
I have provided (see below) a quote from my stockpile.... it explains 
the P-consciousness term. Yes, it's the 1st person perspective.

I'm seeing Dave next week. He's in town...maybe I'll get in his ear 
about this... I do not see how 'mind-stuff' has been made false.... but 
that is moot, for I do not posit or need any such thing. This is a dual 
aspect MONISM. There is only 1 reality: that which is described as 
<aspect 1>. Within that reality, we concoct stories about those things 
we find 'physical'.... like matter. But that does not entail that the 
underlying reality is completely defined by our descriptions: ie that 
our notion of 'physical' is all that there is to be described.

This is a dual-aspect EPISTEMOLOGY. One collection of stuff, 2 
collections of descriptions of it.

The problem is that */we/* have defined 'physical', when actual reality 
can be quite different to what we call 'physical' and very consistent 
with all observation...indeed it must be different  ...because all our 
so-called 'physical' laws fail to deliver an observer (see below).

In the post to Brent Meeker I outlined a cellular automaton version of 
the <aspect 1>/<aspect 2> situation. Imagine yourself an entity inside a 
CA and that collections of 'cells' in the CA are 'painted' by your 
perceptions to appear fundamental. Let's say you call one of these 
fundamental entities an electron, which actually involves 2347502457923 
cooperating cells in the CA. You, inside the CA, made of the CA, see 1 
electron. You describe the electron in <aspect 2> science terms. But 
this is in stark contrast to describing 2347502457923 cells 
collaborating in some way (according to the rules of operation of the 
CA), which are then revealed to you, through mechanisms inherent to the 
CA, as an electron. <aspect 1> describes collaborating parts to <aspect 
2>'s description of appearing 'wholes'.

When you talk of any physicist making any interpretation of QM anything, 
in the current mode of the operation of science (which I call SINGLE 
ASPECT SCIENCE), all you are talking about is rearranging the 
'appearance deckchairs' on the <aspect 2> titanic. You can do it until 
the end of time - you will never explain P-consciousness, because you 
have failed to talk about actual reality because you have failed to 
predict an observer (P-consciousness). In context, scientific 
observation and P-consciousness are literally identities.

>   
>> In other words, scientists have added special laws to  that masquerade as 
>> constitutive and explanatory. They are metabeliefs. Beliefs about Belief. 
>> They ascribe actual physical reification of quantum mechanical descriptions. 
>> EG: Stapp's "cloud-like" depiction. I put it to you that reality  could have 
>> every single particle in an exquisitely defined position simultaneously with 
>> just as exquisitely well defined momentum. 
>>     
>
> That's exactly what's true in the Bohm interpretation, particles have 
> well-defined positions and velocities at all times. If you're not familiar 
> with this interpretation see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/
>
>
>   
This does not help for the reasons outlined above! No amount of 
interpretation of <aspect 2> 'laws of appearances' can be construed 
structural. If they could, when we open up a cranium we'd literally see 
appearances, NOT BRAIN MATERIAL. That is, if an observer X was 
encountering a green thing moving about in the external world then 
something green moving about would be evidenced inside X's cranium. This 
disparity between predicted (by physics) and actual evidence (by 
neuroscience) proves that describing appearances and describing 
structure are NOT the same set of descriptions. Dual aspect science is 
thus empirically justified. Single aspect science (of the Bohmian or 
anyotherian kind)  is thus empirically refuted.

I hope I am making progress here... as a physics participant, you have 
been handed 'Single Aspect Science', SAS, imbued with failure, as a 
given. You are expected to continue with it despite it being empirically 
refuted ... and.. you have been programmed to consider science itself as 
developmentally complete, when I claim the reverse... science has not 
finished developing. It has one more hurdle to cross, when its 
inconsistencies are eliminated: Dual Aspect Science

REF: see Velmans, M. 'Reflexive monism', Journal of Consciousness 
Studies vol. 15, no. 2, 2008. 5-50.
...an excellent conceptual grounding - he calls it a 'reflexive monism', 
but he does not apply the concept to science itself.

cheers
colin hales
*/----------------- Terminology
/*

*/Neuroscience and cognitive science have a highly developed and well 
documented system used to discuss the subjectively delivered, privately 
presented experiential life of humans. It has been adopted from the 
terminology in the relevant discourse in philosophy./ *< !--[if 
supportFields]>The primary senses of vision, audition and so on are a 
subset of the totality of the perceptual fields, which also includes 
visual imagination, primordial and situational emotion and others. The 
perceptual fields have acquired various collective nouns: 
'P-consciousness' [1], 'phenomenal consciousness' [2], 'qualia' [3] and 
'phenomenality' [4]. These are synonyms. P-consciousness will be used 
here. These terms are widely used, but within a discourse that 
acknowledges a chronic state of complete explanatory failure. Thus 
P-consciousness, the ultimate mediator of all scientific observation 
(see below), is accepted as '/a robust phenomenon in need of 
explanation/'[2, 5]. The physics basis of the 'perceptual fields' that 
are the subjective experiences of vision, hearing and so forth is thus 
acknowledged as one of the great mysteries in science[6, 7]. The 
explanatory problem itself even has its own name: the '/hard problem/' 
of the physics of P-consciousness[2]. The best known method for 
discussing 1^st person experience is that it is 'like something' to be 
in receipt of the experiences[8].

[1]        Block, N. 'On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness', 
/Behavioral and Brain Sciences/ vol. 18, no. 2, 1995. 227-247.

[2]        Chalmers, D. J., The conscious mind: in search of a 
fundamental theory, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, pp. xvii, 414.

[3]        Tye, M. (2004) /Qualia/. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, E. N. Zalta (ed.), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/qualia/

[4]        Block, N. (2003) Consciousness, Philosophical Issues about. 
In L. Nadel (ed.). /Encyclopedia of cognitive science/, Nature Pub. 
Group, London.

[5]        Gamez, D. 'Progress in machine consciousness', /Consciousness 
and Cognition/ vol. 17, no. 3, 2008. 887-910.

[6]        Velmans, M. and Schneider, S., Eds. (2007). The Blackwell 
companion to consciousness. Malden, MA ; Oxford, Blackwell Publishing.

[7]        Zeman, A. 'Consciousness', /Brain/ vol. 124, 2001. 1263-1289.

[8]        Nagel, T. 'What is it like to be a bat?' /The Philosophical 
Review/, no. Oct, 1974. 435-450.

 


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