2009/1/13 Günther Greindl <guenther.grei...@gmail.com>:
>
> Stathis,
>
> thinking about this way (which I did when reading Egan's Permutation
> City) is indeed problematic - because then you would also have to let
> consciousness supervene on Lucky Alice (the one from MGA), right down to
> Super Lucky Alice (Alice which is "made" anew for every state through
> random events).
>
> In a materialist view, you can associate consciousness with states
> directly (which leads to strange consequences, see MGA for instance); or
> some part of the running is responsible - in which case you can't leave
> out the causal dynamics or maybe the material substrate - but that isn't
> computationalism anymore, because you must assume that the substrate is
> not turing-emulable (otherwise you would just have to choose a
> different, correct, substitution level).
>
> That is why I agree with Bruno - IF you assume COMP - and you are
> assuming it, I gather - then forget matter, and forget "running", and
> forget "isolated" states - you will find your OMs in UD* - and as such,
> the states s1 through s20 etc will only contribute to the measure of
> histories for an OM, but will not constitute the OM _by themselves_.
>
> In one sentence: The states s1 through s20 (or any others) will
> contribute to the measure of a certain OM and the ingoing/outgoing
> histories, independent of order, if they can be attributed to a
> computation of an UD.

Yes, I agree, and I see "dust" type arguments as equivalent to
arguments in favour of Marchalian Idealism (to coin a phrase). It's
either that or drop computationalism.



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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