2009/1/13 Günther Greindl <[email protected]>: > > Stathis, > > thinking about this way (which I did when reading Egan's Permutation > City) is indeed problematic - because then you would also have to let > consciousness supervene on Lucky Alice (the one from MGA), right down to > Super Lucky Alice (Alice which is "made" anew for every state through > random events). > > In a materialist view, you can associate consciousness with states > directly (which leads to strange consequences, see MGA for instance); or > some part of the running is responsible - in which case you can't leave > out the causal dynamics or maybe the material substrate - but that isn't > computationalism anymore, because you must assume that the substrate is > not turing-emulable (otherwise you would just have to choose a > different, correct, substitution level). > > That is why I agree with Bruno - IF you assume COMP - and you are > assuming it, I gather - then forget matter, and forget "running", and > forget "isolated" states - you will find your OMs in UD* - and as such, > the states s1 through s20 etc will only contribute to the measure of > histories for an OM, but will not constitute the OM _by themselves_. > > In one sentence: The states s1 through s20 (or any others) will > contribute to the measure of a certain OM and the ingoing/outgoing > histories, independent of order, if they can be attributed to a > computation of an UD.
Yes, I agree, and I see "dust" type arguments as equivalent to arguments in favour of Marchalian Idealism (to coin a phrase). It's either that or drop computationalism. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
