2009/2/7 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> Le 06-févr.-09, à 12:06, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
> > Hi,
> > 2009/2/6 russell standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>
> >> He also mentions Tegmark's amoeba croaks argument, which is not
> >> actually an argument against QI, but rather a discussion of what QI
> >> might actually mean. Contrary to what some people might think, QI
> >> doesn't predict one would necessarily experience being vastly older
> >> than the rest of the population. It just predicts that we should all
> >> experience a "good innings", and that what happens after that is
> >> rather unpredictable - it may be lapsing into senesence, it may be
> >> followed
> >> by rebirth into a different consciousness, it may be a form of
> >> afterlife, or of uploading Singulatarian style.
> > Well if you are "rebirth" in another consciousness for me it means
> > you're dead, so rebirth without memory is equal to real death.
> But what if you rebirth with the same consciousness? What if there is
> only one consciousness, or one person?
What does it mean to be rebirth in the "same" consciousness (without
I understand this as meaning there is a property "me" which is somehow
transferred and totally independant of memories... I don't think it makes
sense. "me" is a feeling and is attached to the memories of being me...
without that there is no "me".
> > But if comp is true (hence RSSA) and no cul-de-sac hold,
> By definition: in the observable or probability "hypostases". They are
> defined by Bp & Dp, given that Gödel's incompleteness makes Bp not
> implying Dp "on earth". But BP itself entails there are cul-de-sac
> everywhere (cf the realist multiverse, which I have called also the
> Papaoiannou multiverse in preceding discussions). That is why we put Dp
> (and DDp, and DDDp, etc.). OK it is a bit technical, and we will
> probably come back on this.
> > then there always exists a continuation of you with your memory... if
> > you loose your memory I don't see how it can count as a continuation ?
> > neither causaly nor does it shows similarity.
> Are you sure about this?
> I don't like to much thought experiment involving amnesia, and I have
> eliminated them in my publications and/or theses. Yet it is hard to
> avoid them in the immortality discussion. Actually I have change my
> mind often on this issue: the "truth" is hard to believe here. So let
> me propose a thought experiment involving amnesia, and I will just ask
> you a question. Suppose you are read and annihilate in Brussels, and
> then reconstituted in 1000 versions. 999 of them are partially amnesic
> (some memories have been blocked or suppressed), and one version keeps
> its memory. What is your expectation to live the experience of an
> Is there a notion of statistically normal immortality?
Well if the 999 have partial memory of me... then they are partial
continuation of me and I could agree to a certain degree that they could
depend on the "me" right now (provided they remember this me right now).
Secondly If I have to take your though experiment and that I would be warned
in advance of what you'll be doing, the copy who is plainly me (with all of
my memories) just have to do perfect copy of itself 1000 times after being
awaken to outnumber the umperfect copies... But anyhow, I don't think it
makes sense. But my answer would be anyway (even without making the 1000
copies) to be the one with full memory... Or I should say the one with all
the memories knows everything I know then it is me. I can accept that degree
exists in the definition of me... but if there always exists a continuation
of me with full memories it's all I need to ensure I will be.
The only thing I'm sure in this setting is that I'm in hell forever and I'm
unable to escape that.
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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