Stathis, I usually appreciate the wisdom in your posts. Now I have a retort:
>"...What I find incoherent is the idea that the psychological properties might be able to be duplicated but nevertheless there is no continuity of identity because the soul cannot be duplicated."< If you accept the topic (to be discussed) of the unidentifiable imaginary "soul", than you have to accept that *"IT"(???) can be duplicated as well.* Once we are in Wunderland we are in Wunderland. And if "you find yourself there" you have no notion of your destoyed identity "here" and you *A R E* the copied fake (I call it 'fake', because it is extracted from your 'here'-relations which constitute the essential content of your identity. The "there" YOU is either another one with relations to the "there" circumstances or a fake replica of what you were 'here' (and have no knowledge (memory) of it. Or is the duplicate homesick? Wunderlandistically yours John M On Sat, Feb 21, 2009 at 1:19 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>wrote: > > 2009/2/21 Stephen Paul King <[email protected]>: > > > > Hi Stathis, > > > > A question : Is is incorrect of me to infer that the psychological > > criterion of personal identity discussed in Shoemaker's book and, by your > > statement below, used by a predominance of members of this list is one > that > > treats conscious self-awareness as an epiphenomena arrising from a > Classical > > system and that it is, at least tacitly, assumed that quantum effects > have > > no supervenience upon any notion of Consciousness? > > While I welcome the rejection of notion of "Souls" which are in > > principle non-verifiable, could we be endulging in meaningless chatter > about > > computerizing consciousness if we do not first determen that > consciousness > > is a purely classical epiphenomena? After all we are repeatedly told that > it > > is the classical view of the Universe and all within it is a theory long > ago > > refuted. > > The psychological criterion of personal identity is, or should be, > agnostic on the question of how consciousness is actually generated. > It says simply that if I am destroyed here and a copy of me with the > same psychological properties is created there, then I will suddenly > find myself there. It is possible to accept this criterion but deny > that the right sort of psychological properties could be duplicated in > a computer, or by any physical means at all if there is a supernatural > element involved in consciousness. What I find incoherent is the idea > that the psychological properties might be able to be duplicated but > nevertheless there is no continuity of identity because the soul > cannot be duplicated. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
