Your position as you have described it sounds a lot like ASSA only
without taking measure into consideration. I am curious if you
believe there is any merit to counting OMs or not. Meaning, if I have
two computers and set them up to run simulations of the same mind, are
there two minds or one?
Let's say I devised an evil simulation in which a mind suffers
horribly and is tortured, and I set the simulation to run each day,
and at the end of the day reset the simulation to the initial state,
such that after the first day, no new information or computations take
place, but they are repeated. If given the choice, would you unplug
the computer to stop the suffering of the mind in the computer, or
having already been simulated once would you consider it
futile/meaningless to stop it.
If the number of implementations of minds does not matter and if all
experiences already exist, then would it not be meaningless to do
anything? All actions, whatever the consequence would be rendered
neutral, having already happened somewhere. If no act of good or evil
matter this philosophy leads to utter fatalism.
I don't consider something happening with 100% probability to be
mutually exclusive with happening more than once. The question is
whether or not that makes any difference to the observer(s?).
On Sun, Apr 26, 2009 at 10:19 PM, Kelly <harmon...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 26, 2009 at 9:00 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>
>> In fact I used that same argument with Russell
>> Standish when he said that ants aren't conscious because if they were
>> then we should expect to be experiencing life as ants and not humans.
> Did you win or lose that argument?
> I've heard that line of reasoning before also. Doesn't it also
> conclude that we're living in the last days? If there are more
> conscious beings in the future than in the present, then we should
> expect to live there and not here, so there must not be more conscious
> beings in the future? And also it predicts that there are no
> significant number of (conscious) aliens? Because if there were, we
> should expect to be one of them and not a human?
> Sounds like over-use of a good idea. In this case it ignores all
> other available information to just focus only on one narrow
> statistic. Why should we ignore everything else we know and only
> credit this single argument from probability? Surely, after studying
> ants and humans, the knowledge that we gain has to alter our initial
> expectations, right? But that isn't taken into account here (at least
> not in your one line description of the discussion...ha!).
> I think the problem with Russell's ant argument stems from trying to
> use "a priori" reasoning in an "a posteriori" situation. There is
> extra information available that he isn't taking into consideration.
> Probably the same applies to the Doomsday argument and aliens. There
> is extra information available that isn't being taking into account by
> SSA. Pure SSA type reasoning only applies when there is no extra
> information available on which to base your conclusion, I think.
>> However, in your theory you explain that there are always "next
>> moments" to be experienced, if you were to wager on your next
>> experience would you guess that it will be random or ordered? If you
>> say ordered, is that not a contradiction when the random experiences
>> so greatly outnumber the ordered?
> I have no choice in the matter. Some of me are going to bet random.
> Some of me are going to bet ordered. When you come to a fork in the
> road, take it.
> Really and truely, I think the best rule of thumb is to bet the way
> that leaves you looking LEAST FOOLISH if you're wrong. Usually
> that'll be "ordered".
>> Perhaps in your theory "next" and "previous" OMs aren't really
>> connected, only the illusion of such a connection?
> Right, that's exactly what I'm saying.
>> Would you say you belong to the ASSA or RSSA camp?
>> Or perhaps something different entirely?
> I guess something different entirely. I'm saying that the only rule
> is: "Everything happens. And sometimes, by sheer coincidence, it
> makes sense."
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