On 15 Jun 2009, at 19:31, David Nyman wrote:
> Forgive me in advance if this has been covered adequately before in
> the list, but the following occurs to me with respect to 'Bostrom'
> style assessments of where I should expect my 'current' OM to be
> situated with respect to the total population of OMs in which I exist.
> Presumably, I should expect that my current awareness of my 'life-
> stage' will be characteristic of those OMs with the highest
> 'measure' (a concept upon which I think I have at least a vague grasp
> in this context). Ostensibly, taking into account the various points
> at which I die off, one would expect that the highest such measure
> would be characteristic of a later life-stage rather than an earlier,
> taken across all branches in which I exist. Indeed, I don't recall
> ever having been any older!
> However, assuming the co-existence of all OMs (i.e. where 'time
> doesn't actually 'unfold'), should I expect ever to find myself
> conscious of an OM of lower measure? What does this say about my
> ostensibly conscious past experiences (i.e. those putatively
> representing OMs of lower measure)? Should I conclude that 'from here
> on' in terms of life-stage my survivors are on average becoming rarer
> and that consequently on the basis of measure I shouldn't expect to
> experience getting any older? In this case, does it further imply
> that the experience of quantum immortality would make sense only in
> terms of some sort of 'real' time-line along which I could expect to
> actually experience an extended 'tail' of surviving conscious moments
> regardless of their measure?
> I'm definitely confused.
I would distinguish the 1-OMs with the 3-OMs (by 1-x, resp. 3-x, I
mean x from the first person view, resp. from the third person view).
Assuming the computationalist hypothesis, and some reasoning, the 3-
OMs "appears" infinitely often, or are defined infinitely often in the
arithmetical truth (the tiny part of it corresponding to the universal
deployment). It is not difficult to realize that if you put the first
person indeterminacy of the 1-OMs, on the 3-OMs, then we should expect
white noise. So the measure on the 1-OMs have to be related on the
computational histories, that is the computations in the Universal
Dovetailing which go through the corresponding 3-OMs. There are
uncountably many such histories.
I will come back on this in my explanation to Kim and Marty, of the
seven step of the Universal Dovetailer Argument. You may read or
reread the first sixth step (cf the paper :
. You could try to catch up, because Marty is in holiday, and I have
the june exams. We go very slowly starting from zero, but in such a
way that the math is introduced little by little.
To be sure, this type of explanation is based on the relative self-
sampling assumption. I don't know if a notion of absolute self-
sampling assumption, à-la-Bostrom, makes sense in the frame of the
computationalist hypothesis, although some use of it cannot be
excluded, notably to prevent trivial and inconsistent histories. An
ASSA "Turing-thropic" is not excluded per se by the use of RSSA
measure. (This would entail multi-multi-verses, ...)
To be clear, I agree with Stathis's answer (to you and to Brent),
except that Stathis does not take into account that with the comp hyp.
a computational state, and thus a 3-OM, makes sense only relatively to
a universal machine/system/language. And then, the corresponding 1-OM
will be related by the infinitely many universal system which
generates them. All this leads to math, at some point. Physical and
psychological times could be very different, and both emerge from the
natural number relations, once we assume we are digital machines (or
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