Comments below.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Exercise: criticize the following papers mentioned below in the light 
> of the discovery of the universal machine and its main consequences 
> from incompleteness to first person indeterminacy. Think of the 
> identity thesis. To be sure Tegmark is less "wrong" than Jannes.
> Solution: search in the archive of this list where I have already 
> explained this, or use directly UDA, or wait for what will (perhaps) 
> follow.
> I should send some of my papers on arXiv, but up to now, only 
> logicians understand the whole "trick", so I have to better 
> appreciated what physicians don't understand in logic, before making a 
> version free of references to mathematical logical baggage. Logicians 
> are not interested in mind, nor really matter, and physicians are 
> still naïve on the link consciousness/reality, I would say.
> To be sure Tegmark is closer than most physicists except perhaps Wheeler.
> Also, Tegmarks' argument for mathematicalism is invalid (even with 
> strong non-comp axioms). But I prefer to help you to understand this 
> by yourself through the understanding of what a universal machine is, 
> than trying a direct argument.
*I need to get a better grasp on what a universal machine is, yes.  I am 
interested in finding out how Tegmark's argument for mathematicalism is 
invalid, especially since I'm using it to motivate my research.*

> According of the part of UDA (or perhaps AUDA) you understand, you can 
> already see the weakness of such direct mathematical approach. Note 
> that comp makes physics much more fundamental, and separate it much 
> clearly from possible geograpies. Above all comp does not eliminate 
> the person, which Tegmark is still doing: the frog view is not yet a 
> first person view, in the comp sense.
> Interesting stuff, still. Thanks for the references.
*I'll have to think more on Jannes' paper.  As I basically resting the 
motivation of my research on the correctness of "ERH implies MUH," I'm 
trying to formulate a good refutation to his paper.*

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