On 09 Dec 2009, at 01:42, m.a. wrote:

> Bruno,
>            This is a stupid question but I'm hoping it contains the  
> kernel of an idea. Since logic is based on a few common definitions,  
> do you really need all these complicated steps and permutations to  
> prove a theory? Why can't you show us what you mean in a handful of  
> clear, simple, logical statements?                            marty a.

  Have you an understanding of the six first steps, which does not use  
much of technics. Do you have the UDA slides in front of you?

Then at the seven step, all you need it to accept the idea that there  
is a (finite) program which generates all programs together with all  
their executions. This follows from Church thesis, as I have  
explained, but you can skip those explanations.

Yet for other, notably those who objected to the end of MGA (the Movie  
Graph Argument) that a movie made from a filmed brain could lived a  
conscious experience "qua computatio", I have to prepare them better  
to the (necessarily technical) computational supervenience (how  
consciousness is associated to infinities of computations).

Have you understand that "my" hypothesis is that the brain, or the  
body, or whatever you are willing to suppose responsible for your  
consciousness , is a machine (a digital machine, that is a machine  
such that we can frozen its state and copy it ?). Later we will  
relinquish a lot that assumption, note.

Is the step 0, the definition of "computationalism" clear for you? It  
is equivalent as accepting classical teleportation as a mean for  
locomotion. The reasoning does not depend on the feasibility of this,  
but on its logical possibility.

Or do you prefer I state only the result, in english. I think, that if  
you accept that a universal program like above exists (which it did  
with Church thesis), then I think you can understand in which sense  
physics arise in the mind of the machines, it is enough to get some  
familiarity with the first sixth steps. The result is that physics is  
derivable from computer science, assuming comp. And we get as expected  
gift an explanation for the physical sensations, as emerging from the  
difference between computers science (the truth, in the sense of  
Tarski 1944) and computer's computer science (the beliefs in the sense  
of Gödel 1931).

As for AUDA there is a need to understand some mathematical theorems  
(Gödel, Löb, Solovay). A journalistic version would be that we can  
already make the "UDA test" to a universal machine, instead of you,  
and use the math to see the shadows of the emergence of the physical  

This is what Lucas and Penrose missed, by the rather precise way they  
pretend to tefute mechanism, the machine can already refute their  
argument. This is known and completely uncontroversial in the  
community of logicians, and many physicists agrees. But for some  
reason that reflexion from the part of the machine is ignored.  
Historically this has been seen already by Godel in 1931, precisely  
proved by Hilbert and Bernays, clarified and exploited by Löb up to  
the discovery of G and G¨ by Solovay.

Take it easy. Ask for specific questions and I may be able to be more  
specific too. I think.



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