# Re: The seven step series (december 2009)

```Bruno,
This English version of the 7-Step Series is greatly appreciated and
I am more than willing to accept its conclusions on faith. Unfortunately, it
seems that the only proof of these concepts, at present, requires the
traversing of long chains of logical formulae which I am unable to do. I assume
that more easily demonstrable proofs will appear when predictions based on your
ideas attain experimental reality e.g. teleportation, digital brain recording
and so on. Till then I remain, without religious implications, a believer.
m.a.```
```

----- Original Message -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2009 2:25 PM
Subject: Re: The seven step series (december 2009)

On 09 Dec 2009, at 01:42, m.a. wrote:

Bruno,
This is a stupid question but I'm hoping it contains the kernel
of an idea. Since logic is based on a few common definitions, do you really
need all these complicated steps and permutations to prove a theory? Why can't
you show us what you mean in a handful of clear, simple, logical statements?
marty a.

Have you an understanding of the six first steps, which does not use much of
technics. Do you have the UDA slides in front of you?

Then at the seven step, all you need it to accept the idea that there is a
(finite) program which generates all programs together with all their
executions. This follows from Church thesis, as I have explained, but you can
skip those explanations.

Yet for other, notably those who objected to the end of MGA (the Movie Graph
Argument) that a movie made from a filmed brain could lived a conscious
experience "qua computatio", I have to prepare them better to the (necessarily
technical) computational supervenience (how consciousness is associated to
infinities of computations).

Have you understand that "my" hypothesis is that the brain, or the body, or
whatever you are willing to suppose responsible for your consciousness , is a
machine (a digital machine, that is a machine such that we can frozen its state
and copy it ?). Later we will relinquish a lot that assumption, note.

Is the step 0, the definition of "computationalism" clear for you? It is
equivalent as accepting classical teleportation as a mean for locomotion. The
reasoning does not depend on the feasibility of this, but on its logical
possibility.

Or do you prefer I state only the result, in english. I think, that if you
accept that a universal program like above exists (which it did with Church
thesis), then I think you can understand in which sense physics arise in the
mind of the machines, it is enough to get some familiarity with the first sixth
steps. The result is that physics is derivable from computer science, assuming
comp. And we get as expected gift an explanation for the physical sensations,
as emerging from the difference between computers science (the truth, in the
sense of Tarski 1944) and computer's computer science (the beliefs in the sense
of Gödel 1931).

As for AUDA there is a need to understand some mathematical theorems (Gödel,
Löb, Solovay). A journalistic version would be that we can already make the
"UDA test" to a universal machine, instead of you, and use the math to see the
shadows of the emergence of the physical laws.

This is what Lucas and Penrose missed, by the rather precise way they pretend
to tefute mechanism, the machine can already refute their argument. This is
known and completely uncontroversial in the community of logicians, and many
physicists agrees. But for some reason that reflexion from the part of the
machine is ignored. Historically this has been seen already by Godel in 1931,
precisely proved by Hilbert and Bernays, clarified and exploited by Löb up to
the discovery of G and G¨ by Solovay.

Take it easy. Ask for specific questions and I may be able to be more
specific too. I think.

Bruno

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