On 03 Jan 2010, at 14:55, Nick Prince wrote: > Thank you Stathis > This has helped move me on a bit. “The hardwareless computer” has been > giving me some real problems. Let me replay my understanding of what > you said back just to check it is on the right lines. > As a possible example of one of these “lurking computations” we could > consider the one which begins with no-thing and think of the null set > as made of it phi ={ } and then associating it with the number 0. Then > imagine the set { phi} associating it with 1, then { phi,{phi }} > associating this with 2, then { phi, { phi} , { ,{phi }} }, > associating it with 3 etc. Hence we get an infinite sequence of > abstract (platonic) entities which can conjure up (compute) the > natural numbers and the implied successor function simply from the > abstract (platonic) notion of a set and an association rule (also a > platonic relation). More and more structure can be built up until - as > you say - the entire structure of the computation contained in the > mapping can be envisioned. Now although no external observers might be > able to access these computations, the computations might just create > conscious observers – bootstrapped into existence by the special class > of computations which these (internal) observers (if they believed in > comp) would naturally consider as non trivial. As you say the entire > structure of the mapping which describes the computation is a platonic > object too – hence the world comes from nothing and computation. > Have I got this roughly right? I would be grateful for any critical > comments from you, Bruno (or anyone). > Many thanks > Nick > > > On Jan 3, 11:05 am, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote: >> 2010/1/3 Nick Prince <m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk>: >> >> >> >> >> >>> HI Bruno >>> Thank you so much for your answers to my queries so far. I really >>> need to do some more thinking about all that you have said so far >>> and >>> to understand why I am having difficulty replacing a real physical >>> universal machine existing in the future (like Tipler suggests) or a >>> great programmer existing now (like schmidhuber suggests) with your >>> arithmetical realism. I also need to search some previous posts to >>> make use of past discussion topics that are relevant. Perhaps my >>> background makes me a physicalist who can currently accept a milder >>> form of comp. However, I want to explore your position because I >>> think it makes sense in so far as I think it is less vulnerable to >>> the >>> threat of infinite regressions like in Schmidhuber’s great >>> programmer >>> (or even the greater programmer that programmed him). Your >>> version of >>> computationalism would still be valid if either or both of the two >>> options above were true. Herein lies its appeal to me (both >>> fundamental and universal). >>> I would like to read up on logic and computation as you suggest. I >>> have read about all the books you recommend . However, can you >>> suggest >>> topic areas within these texts which I can focus on to help me >>> get up >>> to speed with the problems I have regarding arithmetical realism >>> with >>> the UDA? There is much that could perhaps be left out on a first >>> reading and to my untrained eyes, it’s difficult to know what to >>> omit >>> (for example what would godels arithmetisation technique come under? >>> (Googling it brings not much up). Sorry but I haven’t ordered any >>> books yet so I can’t look into them. >>> Is there an English translation of your Ph.D. thesis yet? Sorry >>> but I >>> can’t do French. My thanks and best wishes. >> >> My justification for the hardwareless computer is the fact that any >> computation can be mapped onto any physical process, in the same way >> that any English sentence can be mapped onto any string of symbols. >> Such a post hoc mapping would be useless to an observer trying to >> extract meaning from the symbols or the result of a calculation from >> the computer, since he would have to figure out the mapping himself >> and he would have to know the answer he wants before doing this. With >> the right key Bruno's PhD thesis contains an account of next week's >> news, but so what? If you look at it the right way the dust swept up >> by a storm is implementing a Turing machine calculating the digits of >> pi, but what good does that do anyone? The claim that codes and >> computations lurk hidden all around us could be taken as true but >> trivial, or perhaps defined away as untrue on account of its >> triviality. However, there is a special class of computations to >> consider: computations that give rise to conscious observers in >> virtual universes that do not interact with the environment at the >> level of the substrate of implementation. If such computations are >> possible (i.e. if comp is true) then it doesn't matter that no >> external observers have access to the mapping that would allow them >> to >> recognise them, for these computations create their own observers, >> bootstrapping themselves into non-triviality. The physical process >> "sustaining" the computation need not even be as complex in structure >> as the computation: the computation could be mapped for example >> onto a >> repetitive process, the idle passage of time, even a single instant >> of >> time implementing the parts of the computation in parallel. And if we >> get that far, it's obvious that the physical process does nothing, >> and >> we may as well map the computation onto the null set. It is obvious >> that the entire structure of the computation is contained in the >> mapping, and the mapping is a platonic object, not dependent on being >> written down or even understood in the mind of an external observer. >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou- Hide quoted text - >> >> - Show quoted text - > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > >

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