2010/1/6 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>:

> I can understand that view, but in that case why consider them
> computations?  Why not just suppose all states of your consciousness (and
> even other parts of the world) exist.  If they can be glued together by
> inherent features or simply experienced without even an implicit order,
> then computation seems irrelevant.  Of course that leaves the apparent
> lawfulness of physics even further from possible explanation than the UD
> theory.

We start off with what we observe: apparently there is a physical
world, and some parts of this physical world, called brains, seem to
give rise to consciousness. There is reason to think that computers
running a program can also give rise to consciousness. Taking this
hypothesis of computationalism seriously then leads to interesting
questions, such as whether there is a reason to suppose that
consciousness happens only when the computations are physically
instantiated (and what exactly that means), or whether their status as
platonic objects is enough to generate the associated consciousness.
In other words, there is a series of rational steps starting from what
we observe, and if any step is faulted the whole edifice falls;
whereas imply assuming idealism from the start is ad hoc and
unfalsifiable.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
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