I'm examining this question: if I'm a physical object, what object am I? We'll try two competing hypotheses:
1. I am a body. This hypothesis has massive descriptive complexity (Kolmogorov complexity), as we must trace its form in spacetime when we describe it. It has no clear boundaries in spacetime. It is not causally separate from its environment. However, if the mind, the cognitive process that rationalizes existence, doesn't look after the body, the body will die. 2. I am the universe. This hypothesis is simple and concise. It is a self-contained physical object. It is causally complete. I'd say the fact that the mind must take care of the body is contingent and should carry less weight to a materialist than more fundamental physical arguments like causality. But of course this is metaphysics :). Note that the physical processes that are responsible for cognition exist inside the body, but they exist just as equally inside the universe. The descriptive complexity of the universe can be questioned. What if the universe is part of some multiverse and doesn't exist as an independent physical object? Then we would need to decribe how it's a part of this multiverse, as we can't take a non-physical thing as a descriptional primitive, increasing the complexity. In that case we would simply carry the abstraction one step further and assume the hypothesis "I am the multiverse", which is again simple. This process can be continued until only one object remains, I. To continue on a tangent, I believe the person to be a necessary mental model for survival, but serious thought should be given before it's turned from an unstable psychological identity to something more fundamental. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
