I'm examining this question: if I'm a physical object, what object am
We'll try two competing hypotheses:
1. I am a body.
This hypothesis has massive descriptive complexity (Kolmogorov
complexity), as we must trace its form in spacetime when we describe
it. It has no clear boundaries in spacetime. It is not causally
separate from its environment.
However, if the mind, the cognitive process that rationalizes
existence, doesn't look after the body, the body will die.
2. I am the universe.
This hypothesis is simple and concise. It is a self-contained physical
object. It is causally complete.
I'd say the fact that the mind must take care of the body is
contingent and should carry less weight to a materialist than more
fundamental physical arguments like causality. But of course this is
Note that the physical processes that are responsible for cognition
exist inside the body, but they exist just as equally inside the
The descriptive complexity of the universe can be questioned. What if
the universe is part of some multiverse and doesn't exist as an
independent physical object? Then we would need to decribe how it's a
part of this multiverse, as we can't take a non-physical thing as a
descriptional primitive, increasing the complexity.
In that case we would simply carry the abstraction one step further
and assume the hypothesis "I am the multiverse", which is again
simple. This process can be continued until only one object remains,
To continue on a tangent, I believe the person to be a necessary
mental model for survival, but serious thought should be given before
it's turned from an unstable psychological identity to something more
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at