Hi Stephen,

On 23 Jan 2011, at 22:29, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Interesting! I can only access the 1st page but I can see a lot from that. It seems that Di Paoloa and Heller are trying to play hypergames without admitting to it! The evidence for me is the comment that “.. much of elementary recursion theory can be developed without reference to elements.” Are these elements assumed to be well founded primitives? It seems so. Maybe I am wrong. If I followed this thesis I would not have the tools that I need to study concurrencies of interactions. I need some form of atom even if it is not a primitive to act as the generic agent (that has to have some form of “agency) from which I can reconstruct the Monadology. As a philosopher I am building on the work of other philosophers, even to the point of trying to correct the errors that they made. Leibniz made two mistakes in his work: he failed to understand computational complexity and failed to apply his own monadic rule to his own theory. Monads have no windows, so his 3-p ideas where just attempts to add verbiage to his writings to conform with the whims of political structure of his day. Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake for talking about less revolutionary ideas...

Still it seems that if we have an identity then we should have a way to diagram the left and right hand side relations involved. I am a believer in the universality of Category Theory.

I try not to add a layer of difficulty. Few people know category theory. In "conscience et mécanisme" I show that category are mainly useful for the math of the first person views, but very complex and easily artificial for the 3-views.

Today we are no more burned alive, just defamed and ignore. Not sure it is a progress :(


OK, but my difficulty is in bridging the phenomenology of the 1- p to MEC.

For UDA, you don't need more that the notion of personal memory access. This is enough to understand that physics is a branch of machine's theology (say), and thus of number theory (including number's number theory).

In AUDA, I identify the first person with the knower, and I use Theaetetus definition of the knower. Knowing is when the believer happens to be true. belief is modeled by provability, and truth is defined by Tarski theory of truth. It works well thanks to the gap between provability and truth (incompleteness).

It shows that numbers are indeed deluded in believing in time, space, quantum, and we get the qualia by the G-G* splitting.

It seems that you are avoiding the hard problem by just assuming that MEC –> 3-p and 1-p is just a finite “shadow” of 3-p. I have not yet gotten permission to play in Platonia <wlEmoticon- sadsmile[1].png> But back to the general problem of the Indexical (thank you for naming it! <wlEmoticon-smile[1].png>) You have stated previously that 3-p is an abstraction and I recall that I was yelling “YES! YES!” as I read that post, but where is the Bruno of that day now? I have my 1-p and you have yours and we are having a conversation. How is it that my 1-p contains a image of your 1-p and vice versa such that we can communicate? This is the level that I am trying to work. I acknowledge the ergodicity of the UD, it must cover all possible computations if only because of the UDA! Laugh Out Loud! It is defined as doing so. But would you consider the topology of the space of all possible computations for a moment? is it Euclidian? Is it simply connected? Is it Hausdorff? Maybe this kind of question is just a 1004. OK... But ideas have texture and feel to me and when two ideas have the same feel to me I will inevitably believe that they are cut from the same cloth. All of the B’s and Bp&Dp’s aside, I still ask that question: How does you model deal with the plurality of 1-p and their interactions?

Intuitively this is simple (difficulties arise from the first person indeterminacy). But intuitively you can understand that the UD generates the detailed simulation of the entire Milky Way evolution (by computing the Heisenberg matrix of the interacting strings constituting it in some approximation. So the UD contains (not the description) but the complete emulation of the discussion we have right now, and all interactions occurring around. This is not enough, because we have to take ino account the infinities of such emulation occurring in the UD*. The "real" physics is a sum on all emulation.

Remember that whatever interactions are, they are easily emulated by a dovetailer. Parallelism is also an inside view of the UD*. technically it can be justified by the coherence condition given by the 'material hypostases" Bp & Dp.


OK, then your conception of number bisimulates my conception, numbers are Monads! Numbers do not have windows to exchange substances with each other, but their behaviors are mutually constraining nonetheless!


My thesis is that we can recover *all* forms of interaction from mutual constraints. I think of monads as the *ansatz primitive*, it is a temporary notion for the sake of giving a starting point for the narratives that we use to explain an idea, they are more like the pearls in the net of Indra – which is a wonderful illustration of a hyperset- but shown here as involute as they do not have “outsides”. They only have 1 side and it is the “inside”.

OK. Now with DM you can see those pearls as the universal numbers. They do reflect each others, like ourselves right now ...

Each hypostases defines a notion of causality, by B(p->q), with B the modal operator corresponding to the hypostase.


    OK, what is the relationship between hypostases and 1-p?

The 1-p are given by the hypostases in which truth is used (trough the conjunct "& p"). Mainly the "universal soul": Bp & p, and the sensible matter: Bp & Dp & p.

In the hypostases, you can remind that "& p" leads to 1-views, and " & Dt" or "& Dp" leads to "material". "& Dt & p" leads to sensible (1- view of the material).


I am just trying to follow your reasonings within my own ontology and thinking hard about what I am doing in the act of following that reasoning. Yes, I realize that you are not using the concretized version of number, but if I am to follow your reasoning I must treat them as substantial objects. This is the paradox we cannot escape. To talk about an idea we must treat it as a “thing”.

I can understand that natural numbers can be seen as concrete object. But not as substantial object. The number 13 is just the idea of the quantity of "I" in the sequence "IIIIIIIIIIIII". I see ideas there, not substance. In fact I have never see, nor measure any substances. Even the experimental physicists just measure numbers, and the theoreticians relate numbers. They never use the aritstotelian dogma in their papers (only the week-end).

Also. Matter is not an epiphenomenon. Matter just don't exist. Think of arithmetic as a video game, or Matrix. Except that we are distributed in it, in a very complex way.

I show ~MEC v ~MAT.
But the form MEC -> ~MAT is constructive. It explains why matter is phenomenologically observed by persons. Only with MAT consciousness becomes epiphenomenal. This usually ends up with the elimination of the person. Brrr...


    “... does not exist” ????!!!!!!!

Does not exist "ontologically". Matter is only apprehended or imagined by the numbers, through the relation that they have with each others.

OK, but something that “it is like to be existing” is occurring for matter whatever one can say of it. We can make statements all day that the rock does not exist, but my foot still rebounds from it when I kick it! We attempt to refute this “Dr. Johnson proof by demonstration” by pointing out that the foot and its rebounding is just part of the non-existence of the rock but that does not make the argument any less convincing. Again, the problem that I am trying to solve is not visible until one considers the idea of interactions between the many, however those many are (!) distributed in the Matrix. If we do not have an ansatz for a particle of matter, an atom of sorts, how can we hope to make intellectual contact with the gross physicality that constraints and is our mortal coil? But No, Bruno, you are not explaining “why”; you are attempting to explain “how” matter is phenomenologically observed by persons.

Dr Johnson's argument is refuted by the oldest metaphysical argument: the dream argument. And ASSUMING DM, we know that numbers dreams, and have to dream. Hmm... if salvia divinorum is legal in your state, you might (with the usual cautions) smoke a little bit. The plant has a gift to make the dream argument in a rather pretty convincing manner. Be careful, some materialist, or people having too strong metaphysical prejudices, can have a bad trip.
Do you remember your dreams?

Matter is the epiphenomena of *any* form of idealism, even if you can claim that “it does not exist”!

I disagree. Matter is a phenomenon. To be an epiphenomenon, it should exist in some sense. But (primary) matter just don't exist at all. It is only perceived in machine's or number's dream. (Assuming the DM theory, ...)

You can claim that the rock does not exist, the foot rebounding from it does not exist, and so forth, BUT THE 1-P EXPERIENCE DOES NOT GO AWAY!

You are right.

I am just trying to say that we can have 1-p dualisms that allow for 1-p level reconciliations of MEC and MAT

You can't, by the Movie Graph Argument (MGA). Actually you can from a pure logical perspective. You can reintroduce a substancial matter in "reality", but it cannot be used to explain any first person observation of any physical things, so by Occam, it is ad hoc and without purpose. The physical observation have to be accounted by the number relations or ... you have to tell me what is wrong in the MGA, or in Maudlin. You can block the argument only by reintroducing a bit of magic which does not fit with the saying "yes" *qua computatio* to the doctor.

Have you a theory of definitions? Consider how a (finite!) dictionary is like a (finite!) Complete Atomic Boolean Algebra.... then think of its Stone dual...

    But we do not live in Platonia, Bruno.

If DM is correct, we do "live in Platonia". Even on the border of a part of Platonia (and I can see it is a sort of hologram, but this is a metaphore).

I cannot feed my children Platonic food on Platonic plates with Platonic cutlery on a Platonic Table...

Why? Platonic food appears on the border of the UD* (the deployment of the UD).

I am saying that your reasoning is not incorrect, it is just misplaced. We must acknowledge a plurality of place (each 1-p has its own idea of place), even if we allow for a basement in Platonia and claim that we are the denizens thereof...


? (All right, then). Are you open with the idea that physicalism is wrong?

Can you for one understand that I am using non-well founded set based logics and that such do not have such primitives except as ansatz? I am not arguing for an ultimate turtle upon which all the turtles rest that support the Elephant upon whose back the Earth rests!

ANY first order specification of a universal system will do. Well- founded or not. The choice of the initial ontology does not have impact on any hypostases of the Löbian machine existing in the model of the initial theory.

The everything is theory independent!


I am saying that existence is more like the net of Indra, where each jewel reflects and contains all others.


I love that image. That image is already used by John Case in the recursion theory context. In the DM context, the pearls are the universal numbers.

Yes, but it is still the sound of one hand clapping! It is solipsistic and self-stultifying until we can use it to talk about the interactions between many minds. That we “share computations” is the essence of bisimulations and is the core of how the many can interact, but we still must have a place where the thought of “many machines talking to each other” is considered. So far you resist this thought. Why? Extracting the first person plural from comp, distilling the many from the one, is the philosopher’s stone. It is more easy to derive the commutative diagram of the One from the Many and then just invert the Diagram. Pratt already sketch this out for us. The hard work is already done.


I have discovered that in some people attributes me a proof of MEC - > PHYSICS, when I have only proved the much more modest MEC -> B(physics) where B = the modal necessity box, here. People confuse p -> q with p -> Bq. It is radical (coming back to Plato's idealism), but modest: we are just at the beginning. I only provide jobs for an infinity of future mathematicians :)

You are worthy of the attribution, for the demonstration of the modest model is still a proof of concept of the general principle! I am very honored to be able to correspond with you. <wlEmoticon- smile[1].png>

Thanks for that kind remark. I hope you will see the whole point. Then maybe MEC is false and MAT is true, but this does not concern my job. My job has been to show we cannot have both MEC and MAT, and that a phenomenology of MAT is given in MEC by the self-reference logics and their intensional variants (the arithmetical hypostases).

Have a good day,



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to