Hi Stephen, On 23 Jan 2011, at 22:29, Stephen Paul King wrote:

[SPK]Interesting! I can only access the 1st page but I can see a lotfrom that. It seems that Di Paoloa and Heller are trying to playhypergames without admitting to it! The evidence for me is thecomment that “.. much of elementary recursion theory can bedeveloped without reference to elements.” Are these elementsassumed to be well founded primitives? It seems so. Maybe I am wrong.If I followed this thesis I would not have the tools that I needto study concurrencies of interactions. I need some form of atomeven if it is not a primitive to act as the generic agent (that hasto have some form of “agency) from which I can reconstruct theMonadology. As a philosopher I am building on the work of otherphilosophers, even to the point of trying to correct the errors thatthey made. Leibniz made two mistakes in his work: he failed tounderstand computational complexity and failed to apply his ownmonadic rule to his own theory. Monads have no windows, so his 3-pideas where just attempts to add verbiage to his writings to conformwith the whims of political structure of his day. Giordano Brunowas burned at the stake for talking about less revolutionary ideas...Still it seems that if we have an identity then we should have away to diagram the left and right hand side relations involved. I ama believer in the universality of Category Theory.

`I try not to add a layer of difficulty. Few people know category`

`theory. In "conscience et mécanisme" I show that category are mainly`

`useful for the math of the first person views, but very complex and`

`easily artificial for the 3-views.`

`Today we are no more burned alive, just defamed and ignore. Not sure`

`it is a progress :(`

[SPK]OK, but my difficulty is in bridging the phenomenology of the 1-p to MEC.

`For UDA, you don't need more that the notion of personal memory`

`access. This is enough to understand that physics is a branch of`

`machine's theology (say), and thus of number theory (including`

`number's number theory).`

`In AUDA, I identify the first person with the knower, and I use`

`Theaetetus definition of the knower. Knowing is when the believer`

`happens to be true. belief is modeled by provability, and truth is`

`defined by Tarski theory of truth. It works well thanks to the gap`

`between provability and truth (incompleteness).`

`It shows that numbers are indeed deluded in believing in time, space,`

`quantum, and we get the qualia by the G-G* splitting.`

It seems that you are avoiding the hard problem by just assumingthat MEC –> 3-p and 1-p is just a finite “shadow” of 3-p. I have notyet gotten permission to play in Platonia <wlEmoticon-sadsmile[1].png> But back to the general problem of the Indexical(thank you for naming it! <wlEmoticon-smile[1].png>) You have statedpreviously that 3-p is an abstraction and I recall that I wasyelling “YES! YES!” as I read that post, but where is the Bruno ofthat day now?I have my 1-p and you have yours and we are having aconversation. How is it that my 1-p contains a image of your 1-p andvice versa such that we can communicate? This is the level that I amtrying to work. I acknowledge the ergodicity of the UD, it mustcover all possible computations if only because of the UDA! LaughOut Loud! It is defined as doing so. But would you consider thetopology of the space of all possible computations for a moment? isit Euclidian? Is it simply connected? Is it Hausdorff? Maybe thiskind of question is just a 1004. OK... But ideas have texture andfeel to me and when two ideas have the same feel to me I willinevitably believe that they are cut from the same cloth. All of theB’s and Bp&Dp’s aside, I still ask that question: How does you modeldeal with the plurality of 1-p and their interactions?

`Intuitively this is simple (difficulties arise from the first person`

`indeterminacy). But intuitively you can understand that the UD`

`generates the detailed simulation of the entire Milky Way evolution`

`(by computing the Heisenberg matrix of the interacting strings`

`constituting it in some approximation. So the UD contains (not the`

`description) but the complete emulation of the discussion we have`

`right now, and all interactions occurring around. This is not enough,`

`because we have to take ino account the infinities of such emulation`

`occurring in the UD*. The "real" physics is a sum on all emulation.`

`Remember that whatever interactions are, they are easily emulated by a`

`dovetailer. Parallelism is also an inside view of the UD*. technically`

`it can be justified by the coherence condition given by the 'material`

`hypostases" Bp & Dp.`

[SPK]OK, then your conception of number bisimulates my conception,numbers are Monads! Numbers do not have windows to exchangesubstances with each other, but their behaviors are mutuallyconstraining nonetheless!

Yes.

My thesis is that we can recover *all* forms of interaction frommutual constraints. I think of monads as the *ansatz primitive*, itis a temporary notion for the sake of giving a starting point forthe narratives that we use to explain an idea, they are more likethe pearls in the net of Indra – which is a wonderful illustrationof a hyperset- but shown here as involute as they do not have“outsides”. They only have 1 side and it is the “inside”.

`OK. Now with DM you can see those pearls as the universal numbers.`

`They do reflect each others, like ourselves right now ...`

[BM]Each hypostases defines a notion of causality, by B(p->q), with Bthe modal operator corresponding to the hypostase.[SPK] OK, what is the relationship between hypostases and 1-p?

`The 1-p are given by the hypostases in which truth is used (trough the`

`conjunct "& p").`

`Mainly the "universal soul": Bp & p, and the sensible matter: Bp & Dp`

`& p.`

`In the hypostases, you can remind that "& p" leads to 1-views, and " &`

`Dt" or "& Dp" leads to "material". "& Dt & p" leads to sensible (1-`

`view of the material).`

[SPK]I am just trying to follow your reasonings within my ownontology and thinking hard about what I am doing in the act offollowing that reasoning. Yes, I realize that you are not using theconcretized version of number, but if I am to follow your reasoningI must treat them as substantial objects. This is the paradox wecannot escape. To talk about an idea we must treat it as a “thing”.

`I can understand that natural numbers can be seen as concrete object.`

`But not as substantial object. The number 13 is just the idea of the`

`quantity of "I" in the sequence "IIIIIIIIIIIII". I see ideas there,`

`not substance. In fact I have never see, nor measure any substances.`

`Even the experimental physicists just measure numbers, and the`

`theoreticians relate numbers. They never use the aritstotelian dogma`

`in their papers (only the week-end).`

Also. Matter is not an epiphenomenon. Matter just don't exist. Thinkof arithmetic as a video game, or Matrix. Except that we aredistributed in it, in a very complex way.I show ~MEC v ~MAT.But the form MEC -> ~MAT is constructive. It explains why matter isphenomenologically observed by persons.Only with MAT consciousness becomes epiphenomenal. This usually endsup with the elimination of the person. Brrr...[SPK] “... does not exist” ????!!!!!!!

`Does not exist "ontologically". Matter is only apprehended or imagined`

`by the numbers, through the relation that they have with each others.`

OK, but something that “it is like to be existing” is occurring formatter whatever one can say of it. We can make statements all daythat the rock does not exist, but my foot still rebounds from itwhen I kick it! We attempt to refute this “Dr. Johnson proof bydemonstration” by pointing out that the foot and its rebounding isjust part of the non-existence of the rock but that does not makethe argument any less convincing. Again, the problem that I amtrying to solve is not visible until one considers the idea ofinteractions between the many, however those many are (!)distributed in the Matrix.If we do not have an ansatz for a particle of matter, an atom ofsorts, how can we hope to make intellectual contact with the grossphysicality that constraints and is our mortal coil? But No, Bruno,you are not explaining “why”; you are attempting to explain “how”matter is phenomenologically observed by persons.

`Dr Johnson's argument is refuted by the oldest metaphysical argument:`

`the dream argument. And ASSUMING DM, we know that numbers dreams, and`

`have to dream.`

`Hmm... if salvia divinorum is legal in your state, you might (with the`

`usual cautions) smoke a little bit. The plant has a gift to make the`

`dream argument in a rather pretty convincing manner.`

`Be careful, some materialist, or people having too strong metaphysical`

`prejudices, can have a bad trip.`

Do you remember your dreams?

Matter is the epiphenomena of *any* form of idealism, even ifyou can claim that “it does not exist”!

`I disagree. Matter is a phenomenon. To be an epiphenomenon, it should`

`exist in some sense. But (primary) matter just don't exist at all. It`

`is only perceived in machine's or number's dream. (Assuming the DM`

`theory, ...)`

You can claim that the rock does not exist, the foot rebounding fromit does not exist, and so forth, BUT THE 1-P EXPERIENCE DOES NOT GOAWAY!

You are right.

I am just trying to say that we can have 1-p dualisms that allow for1-p level reconciliations of MEC and MAT

`You can't, by the Movie Graph Argument (MGA). Actually you can from a`

`pure logical perspective. You can reintroduce a substancial matter in`

`"reality", but it cannot be used to explain any first person`

`observation of any physical things, so by Occam, it is ad hoc and`

`without purpose. The physical observation have to be accounted by the`

`number relations or ... you have to tell me what is wrong in the MGA,`

`or in Maudlin. You can block the argument only by reintroducing a bit`

`of magic which does not fit with the saying "yes" *qua computatio* to`

`the doctor.`

[SPK]Have you a theory of definitions? Consider how a (finite!)dictionary is like a (finite!) Complete Atomic Boolean Algebra....then think of its Stone dual...But we do not live in Platonia, Bruno.

`If DM is correct, we do "live in Platonia". Even on the border of a`

`part of Platonia (and I can see it is a sort of hologram, but this is`

`a metaphore).`

I cannot feed my children Platonic food on Platonic plates withPlatonic cutlery on a Platonic Table...

`Why? Platonic food appears on the border of the UD* (the deployment of`

`the UD).`

I am saying that your reasoning is not incorrect, it is justmisplaced. We must acknowledge a plurality of place (each 1-p hasits own idea of place), even if we allow for a basement in Platoniaand claim that we are the denizens thereof...I DO NOT CLAIM, or ARGUE FOR, A PRIMITIVE SUBSTANCE! (Yes, I amyelling!)

`? (All right, then). Are you open with the idea that physicalism is`

`wrong?`

Can you for one understand that I am using non-well founded setbased logics and that such do not have such primitives except asansatz? I am not arguing for an ultimate turtle upon which all theturtles rest that support the Elephant upon whose back the Earthrests!

`ANY first order specification of a universal system will do. Well-`

`founded or not. The choice of the initial ontology does not have`

`impact on any hypostases of the Löbian machine existing in the model`

`of the initial theory.`

The everything is theory independent!

<5826299-turtle-and-elephants-and-earth[1].jpg>I am saying that existence is more like the net of Indra, whereeach jewel reflects and contains all others.<Schnerf_indrasnet[1].jpg>

`I love that image. That image is already used by John Case in the`

`recursion theory context. In the DM context, the pearls are the`

`universal numbers.`

[SPK]Yes, but it is still the sound of one hand clapping! It issolipsistic and self-stultifying until we can use it to talk aboutthe interactions between many minds. That we “share computations” isthe essence of bisimulations and is the core of how the many caninteract, but we still must have a place where the thought of “manymachines talking to each other” is considered. So far you resistthis thought. Why?Extracting the first person plural from comp, distilling themany from the one, is the philosopher’s stone. It is more easy toderive the commutative diagram of the One from the Many and thenjust invert the Diagram. Pratt already sketch this out for us. Thehard work is already done.** [BM]I have discovered that in some people attributes me a proof of MEC -> PHYSICS, when I have only proved the much more modest MEC ->B(physics) where B = the modal necessity box, here. People confuse p-> q with p -> Bq. It is radical (coming back to Plato's idealism),but modest: we are just at the beginning. I only provide jobs for aninfinity of future mathematicians :)[SPK]You are worthy of the attribution, for the demonstration of themodest model is still a proof of concept of the general principle! Iam very honored to be able to correspond with you. <wlEmoticon-smile[1].png>

`Thanks for that kind remark. I hope you will see the whole point. Then`

`maybe MEC is false and MAT is true, but this does not concern my job.`

`My job has been to show we cannot have both MEC and MAT, and that a`

`phenomenology of MAT is given in MEC by the self-reference logics and`

`their intensional variants (the arithmetical hypostases).`

Have a good day, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.