Hi Stephen, Well the asumption is that the mind is turing emulable... a turing machine is a mathematical object. When I wrote a program what it does is only dependant on the computation which is performed, that computation does not depend on the actual physical computer that will instantiate it hence it does not depend on any piece of matter and surely not on a causaly inactive piece of matter inside that particular physical computer.
If it did depend on it, I could'nt write programs in the first place without knowing on what it will run. 1+1=2 even if you use rocks to do it and even for big value of 1... Regards, Quentin 2011/1/25 Stephen Paul King <[email protected]> > Dear Bruno, > > As far as I can tell, there would not be a “non active piece of > matter”. This is what causes a problem. On the other hand, I can see a fix > for Mauldin’s argument if we frame the supervenience principle in a way that > is consistent with the violation of Bell’s Theorem. We just have to use a > Turing machine that obeys quantum rules. What I find fascinating is that the > unitary evolution of the wave function acts as a computation all by itself. > So a quantum system is a computational system from its preparation, but the > substitution rules would be tricky: one cannot clone or copy its state. > I just want to understand if its possible to model a plurality of > computations. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > *From:* Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Tuesday, January 25, 2011 6:24 AM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and > Consciousness” > Hi Stephen, > > If the "non active piece of matter" plays a role in the computation, it > means that we have not choose the correct substitution level. For example > the brain would be a quantum computer. But quantum computer are Turing > emulable, and so its work is emulated by the Universal Dovetailer, and the > UDA (+MGA) goes trough. That applies to Maudlin's argument as well. > > Bruno > > > On 25 Jan 2011, at 10:04, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > Dear Bruno and Friends, > > I was re-reading the Mauldin paper again and something struck me that I > had not noticed before. I hope that I am not way over my head on this one, > but I think that there is something of a straw man in Mauldin’s definition > of the supervenience thesis! He assumes the principle of > Locality<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_locality>. > > > We read on page 409 of “Computation and Consciousness”: > > “If an active physical system supports a phenomenal state, how could > the presence or absence of a causally disconnected object effect that state? > How could the object enhance or impede or alter or destroy the phenomenal > state except via some causal interaction with the system? Since the > phenomenal state is entirely realized at the time of the experience, only > the activity of the system at that time should be relevant to its > production. The presence or absence of causally isolated objects could not > be relevant. This is all the supervenience thesis needs to say.” > > Now, let us take a look at Bell’s theorem. From the wiki article > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell's_theorem<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_theorem> > > “Bell's theorem has important implications for physics and the philosophy > of science <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_science> as it > indicates that every quantum theory must violate either > locality<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_locality>or counterfactual > definiteness <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfactual_definiteness>. > In conjunction with the experiments verifying the quantum mechanical > predictions <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_test_experiments> of > Bell-type systems, Bell's theorem demonstrates that certain quantum effects > travel faster than light <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superluminal> and > therefore restricts the class of tenable hidden variable theories to the > nonlocal <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonlocality> variety.” > end quote > > While we are considering the idea of “causal efficacy” here and not > hidden variable theories, the fact that it has been experimentally verified > that Nature violates the principle Locality. Therefore the assumption of > local efficacy that Mauldin is using for the supervenience thesis is not > realistic and thus presents a flaw in his argument. We cannot claim that > only those objects in some near distance or time of flight to the system > that we propose is a generator of phenomenal states are the only ones that > are involved in the emergence of the phenomenal states. > We have overwhelming experimental evidence that the classical > assumptions must be carefully examined to be sure that they are correct. The > locality assumption is flawed. So what if instead we question the > contrafactual definiteness aspect? If we disallow for the definiteness of > contrafactuals then Mauldin cannot construct Olympia and thus his argument > does not work either. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > PS, It is interesting that you mention reincarnation, Bruno. I too am > friendly toward that idea and I am a little bit motivated in my questions > about interactions with you by something that my wife mentioned to me in a > conversation that we had about the idea of reincarnation of souls. She asked > me” “Could bodies be necessary so that souls can interact with each other > and thus evolve?” By the way, the Syfy television channel’s series “Caprica” > explored a very cool computational version of reincarnation that you might > find amusing. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]<everything-list%[email protected]> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]<everything-list%[email protected]> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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