Hi Brent and Bruno,
From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2011 5:23 PM To: email@example.com Subject: Re: A comment on Mauldin's paper “Computation and Consciousness” On 27 Jan 2011, at 22:12, Brent Meeker wrote: On 1/27/2011 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Jan 2011, at 15:47, Stephen Paul King wrote: <snip> Mathematical structures do not “do” anything, they merely exist, if at all! We can use verbs to describe relations between nouns but that does not change the fact that nouns are nouns and not verbs. The movie graph is a neat trick in that is abstracts out the active process of organizing the information content of the individual frames and the order of their placement in the graph, but that some process had to be involved to perform the computation of the content and ordering cannot be removed, it is only pushed out of the field of view. This is why I argue that we cannot ignore the computational complexity problem that exist in any situation where we are considering a optimal configuration that is somehow selected from some set or ensemble. I don't see how this would change anything in the argument, unless you presuppose consciousness is not locally Turing emulable, to start with. What does "locally" mean in this context? I doubt that consciousness is strictly local in the physical sense; it requires and world to interact with. It means that, when saying yes to the doctor, you will not only survive, but you will feel the same physical laws. You will not change the relative measure on your computations. It might be necessary to duplicate a part of the environment, which, in that case has to be supposed to be Turing emulable in that same sense. That is why I mention the notion of generalized brain. If the environment is not Turing emulable, you have to use another theory of mind than the mechanist one. Consciousness per se, and first person, and matter (first person plural) are not locally emulable. First person point of views are related with the infinite continuum of computations going through their states, and that is not algorithmic (assuming digital mechanism). If my local body is a machine, my soul, I, is not a machine. I should say. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ [SPK] I agree with this but with the caveat that my previously posted definition was strictly physicalist. Bruno’s is the ideal mechanist version. I do not see these as mutually contradictory. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.