On 22 Feb 2011, at 07:58, Russell Standish wrote:

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On Fri, Feb 18, 2011 at 03:46:45PM -0800, Travis Garrett wrote:Hi Stephen, Sorry for the slow reply, I have been working on various things andalso catching up on the many conversations (and naming conventions)onthis board. And thanks for your interest! -- I think I have discovered a giant "low hanging fruit", which had previously gone unnoticed since it is rather nonintuitive in nature (in addition to being a subject that many smart people shy away from thinking about...). Ok, let me address the Faddeev-Popov, "gauge-invariant information"issue first. I'll start with the final conclusion reduced to itsmostbasic essence, and give more concrete examples later. First, notethat any one "structure" can have many different "descriptions".Whencounting among different structures thus it is crucial to choose only one description per structure, as including redundant descriptions will spoil the calculation. In other words, one only counts over the gauge-invariant information structures.This is essentially what one does in the derivation of the Solomonoff-Levin distribution, aka "Universal Prior". That is, fix a universal prefix Turing machine, which halts on all input. Then all input programs generating the same output are considered equivalent. The universal prior for a given output is given by summing over the equivalence class of inputs giving that output, weighted exponentially by the length of the unique prefix. This result (which dates from the early 70s) gives rise to the various Occams razor theorems that have been published since. My own modest contribution was to note that any classifier function taking bit strings as input and mapping them to a discrete set (whether integers, or meanings, matters not) in a prefix way (the meaning of the string, once decided, does not change on reading more bits) will work. Turing machines are not strictly needed, and one expects observers to behave this way, so an Occams razor theorem will apply to each and every observer, even if the observers do not agree on the relative complexities of their worlds. However, this only suffices to eliminate what Bruno would call "3rd person white rabbits". There are still 1st person white rabbits that arise through the failure of induction problem. I will explain my solution to that issue further down.A very important lemma to this is that all of the random noise is also removed when the redundant descriptions are cut, as the random noise doesn't encode any invariant structure. Thus, for instance, I agree with COMP, but I disagree that white rabbits are therefore a problem... The vast majority of the output of a universal dovetailer (which I call A in my paper) is random noise which doesn't actuallydescribe anything (despite "optical illusions" to the contrary...)andcan therefore be zapped, leaving the union of nontrivial, invariantstructures in U (which I then argue is dominated by the observerclassO due to combinatorics).It is important to remember that random noise events are not whiterabbits. Anice physicsy example of the distinction is to consider a room full of air. The random motion of the molecules are not white rabbits, that is just normal thermal noise. All of the molecules being situated in onesmall corner of the room, however, so that an observer sitting inthe roomends up suffocating is a white rabbit. One could say that white rabbits are extremely low entropy states that happen by chance, which is the key to udnerstanding why they're never observed. To be low entropy, the state must have significance to the observer, as well as being of low probability. Otherwise, any arbitrary configuration will have low entropy. When observing data, it is important that observers are relatively insensitive to error. It does not help to not recognise a lion in the African savannah, just because it is partically obscured by a tree. Computers used to be terrible at just this sort of problem - you needed the exact key to extract a record from a database - now various sorts of fuzzy techniques, particularly ones inspired by the neural structure in the brain - mean computers are much better at dealing wiuth noisy data. With this observation, it becomes clear that the myriad of nearby histories that differ only in a few bits are not recognised as different from the original observation. These are not white rabbits. It requires many bits to make a white rabbit, and this, as you eloquently point out, is doubly exponentially suppressed. Bruno will probably still comment that this does not dispose of allthe 1st person white rabbits, but I fail to see what other onescould exist.

`You might be on the right track. Assuming an 'energetical' or`

`thermodynamical universe, isotropic, bottom linear, sufficiently`

`symmetrical, such form of white rabbit elimination can work for`

`collectivity of interacting observers. That would eliminate the first`

`person plural WRs. But that assumes a lot on the physical part, which`

`should be extracted from all computations, where we sytill don't know`

`if a notion of normal world emerge at all. Meaning that we have not`

`yet succesfully hunt the thris person WRs.`

`First person white rabbits crop up due to the fact that, although a`

`longstanding gentle white rabbit does consume *many* bits, it happens`

`nevertheless easily in the relative way, as dreams confirms, and they`

`are easily builded from our relative computational states in UD* (at`

`all levels), and we have to exclude them only on a priori grounds (by`

`UDA). Due to its peculiar dumbness, the UD generates them all. Their`

`"high cost" is relatively high, in deep computational histories, but`

`the first person cannot know that, and below her substitution level`

`she might jump as well on an infinities of aberrant stories.`

`Neurophysiology makes the problem even more complex, because it seems`

`the brain extracts already information from noise, so we can easily`

`see lions where there are not. We have to explain why the UD does not`

`make them even more frequent from the point of view of the first`

`person. Their high cost in first person plural situation (the`

`physical) will not been lifted automatically on the first person`

`points of view. But I don't exclude that OCCAM can get rid of them.`

`UDA just shows that this would be ultimately equivalent with a`

`derivation of the physical laws, including isotropic condition,`

`geometrical homogeneity, linearity and symmetries, from the digital`

`structure and its digital observers, (keeping in mind this defines`

`only a flux of consciousness which differentiates on the limit (the`

`first person is distributed on the limit of the "UD work")). The`

`derivation of physics from addition and multiplication, should be`

`equivalent with the elimination of the first person plural white`

`rabbits. If Bp & Dp (& p) gives the right logic of observation, it`

`will remains hard to eliminate the 3-WR properly. The measure one has`

`to be extended to the whole probability calculus, and even if we`

`extract the quantum calculus, we have to get the right corresponding`

`part on the qualia to handle the 1-rabbit.`

`Interviewing the universal machine is probably not the shorter way to`

`figure out the reason of quanta, but I think it might be the only way`

`to handle the qualia, and so to handle the (pure, singular) first`

`person WRs.`

`The quantum shadow of the bodies appears also in pure number theory,`

`with the Riemann zeta function, and with the psoitive integer`

`partition function (where even gravity seems to emerge), but if we`

`extract the body without the whole theology, we might eliminate the`

`person for even more than one millennium.`

`The advantage of the LĂ¶bian interview is that we keep track of the`

`difference between the internal views, and so we keep track on the`

`qualia/quanta distinction, without eliminating the (first) person at`

`all. Practically, the first person white rabbits are also those who`

`might play some role "near death", and intermediate real dreams are`

`not excluded. Computer science promises many jumps and gap, and`

`surprises. With comp and the interview, we are a bit at the beginning`

`of the beginning I'm afraid. It is a chance that Platonists are`

`patient :)`

I hope I was not too much unclear. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.