Hi! On Feb 22, 12:22 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 22 Feb 2011, at 07:58, Russell Standish wrote: > snip > > > When observing data, it is important that observers are relatively > > insensitive to error. It does not help to not recognise a lion in the > > African savannah, just because it is partically obscured by a > > tree. Computers used to be terrible at just this sort of problem - you > > needed the exact key to extract a record from a database - now various > > sorts of fuzzy techniques, particularly ones inspired by the neural > > structure in the brain - mean computers are much better at dealing > > wiuth noisy data. With this observation, it becomes clear that the > > myriad of nearby histories that differ only in a few bits are not > > recognised as different from the original observation. These are not > > white rabbits. It requires many bits to make a white rabbit, and this, > > as you eloquently point out, is doubly exponentially suppressed. > > > Bruno will probably still comment that this does not dispose of all > > the 1st person white rabbits, but I fail to see what other ones > > could exist. > > You might be on the right track. Assuming an 'energetical' or > thermodynamical universe, isotropic, bottom linear, sufficiently > symmetrical, such form of white rabbit elimination can work for > collectivity of interacting observers. That would eliminate the first > person plural WRs. But that assumes a lot on the physical part, which > should be extracted from all computations, where we still don't know > if a notion of normal world emerge at all. Meaning that we have not > yet successfully hunt the third person WRs.

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[SPK] This is a crucial part of my thinking. What if the "physical part" is how we make sense of the "interface" (if I am allowed to borrow that word from computer science) between interacting observers?! > > First person white rabbits crop up due to the fact that, although a > longstanding gentle white rabbit does consume *many* bits, it happens > nevertheless easily in the relative way, as dreams confirms, and they > are easily builded from our relative computational states in UD* (at > all levels), and we have to exclude them only on a priori grounds (by > UDA). Due to its peculiar dumbness, the UD generates them all. Their > "high cost" is relatively high, in deep computational histories, but > the first person cannot know that, and below her substitution level > she might jump as well on an infinities of aberrant stories. > [SPK] What if what each person defines as 'time' is just a local measure of the change that they witness between their own rendition by the UD* and that of another via the interface of the physical? If many observers happen to have synchronizations at a common level of substitution then a global concept of time would obtain for them that can be use to parametrize their records and narratives. > Neurophysiology makes the problem even more complex, because it seems > the brain extracts already information from noise, so we can easily > see lions where there are not. We have to explain why the UD does not > make them even more frequent from the point of view of the first > person. Their high cost in first person plural situation (the > physical) will not been lifted automatically on the first person > points of view. But I don't exclude that OCCAM can get rid of them. > UDA just shows that this would be ultimately equivalent with a > derivation of the physical laws, including isotropic condition, > geometrical homogeneity, linearity and symmetries, from the digital > structure and its digital observers, (keeping in mind this defines > only a flux of consciousness which differentiates on the limit (the > first person is distributed on the limit of the "UD work")). The > derivation of physics from addition and multiplication, should be > equivalent with the elimination of the first person plural white > rabbits. If Bp & Dp (& p) gives the right logic of observation, it > will remains hard to eliminate the 3-WR properly. The measure one has > to be extended to the whole probability calculus, and even if we > extract the quantum calculus, we have to get the right corresponding > part on the qualia to handle the 1-rabbit. > Interviewing the universal machine is probably not the shorter way to > figure out the reason of quanta, but I think it might be the only way > to handle the qualia, and so to handle the (pure, singular) first > person WRs. > > The quantum shadow of the bodies appears also in pure number theory, > with the Riemann zeta function, and with the positive integer > partition function (where even gravity seems to emerge), but if we > extract the body without the whole theology, we might eliminate the > person for even more than one millennium. [SPK] What if this quantum shadow is just the dual that we would expect from the Stone duality? A quantum physical world would have a dual quantum logical structure and that logical structure should appear in pure number theory if your reasoning is correct! > > The advantage of the Löbian interview is that we keep track of the > difference between the internal views, and so we keep track on the > qualia/quanta distinction, without eliminating the (first) person at > all. Practically, the first person white rabbits are also those who > might play some role "near death", and intermediate real dreams are > not excluded. Computer science promises many jumps and gap, and > surprises. With comp and the interview, we are a bit at the beginning > of the beginning I'm afraid. It is a chance that Platonists are > patient :) [SPK] Now it seems that we merely need a way to keep track of the differences. Hey! That is exact what a physical world does! It acts, among other things, as a record of all of the differences that where perceived/measured by observers that happen to be able to interface with each other. So maybe it is a necessary idea after all. > > I hope I was not too much unclear. > > Bruno [SPK] Well said, Bruno! Cheers! Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.