On Feb 22, 12:22 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 22 Feb 2011, at 07:58, Russell Standish wrote:
> > When observing data, it is important that observers are relatively
> > insensitive to error. It does not help to not recognise a lion in the
> > African savannah, just because it is partically obscured by a
> > tree. Computers used to be terrible at just this sort of problem - you
> > needed the exact key to extract a record from a database - now various
> > sorts of fuzzy techniques, particularly ones inspired by the neural
> > structure in the brain - mean computers are much better at dealing
> > wiuth noisy data. With this observation, it becomes clear that the
> > myriad of nearby histories that differ only in a few bits are not
> > recognised as different from the original observation. These are not
> > white rabbits. It requires many bits to make a white rabbit, and this,
> > as you eloquently point out, is doubly exponentially suppressed.
> > Bruno will probably still comment that this does not dispose of all
> > the 1st person white rabbits, but I fail to see what other ones
> > could exist.
> You might be on the right track. Assuming an 'energetical' or
> thermodynamical universe, isotropic, bottom linear, sufficiently
> symmetrical, such form of white rabbit elimination can work for
> collectivity of interacting observers. That would eliminate the first
> person plural WRs. But that assumes a lot on the physical part, which
> should be extracted from all computations, where we still don't know
> if a notion of normal world emerge at all. Meaning that we have not
> yet successfully hunt the third person WRs.
[SPK] This is a crucial part of my thinking. What if the "physical
part" is how we make sense of the "interface" (if I am allowed to
borrow that word from computer science) between interacting
> First person white rabbits crop up due to the fact that, although a
> longstanding gentle white rabbit does consume *many* bits, it happens
> nevertheless easily in the relative way, as dreams confirms, and they
> are easily builded from our relative computational states in UD* (at
> all levels), and we have to exclude them only on a priori grounds (by
> UDA). Due to its peculiar dumbness, the UD generates them all. Their
> "high cost" is relatively high, in deep computational histories, but
> the first person cannot know that, and below her substitution level
> she might jump as well on an infinities of aberrant stories.
[SPK] What if what each person defines as 'time' is just a local
measure of the change that they witness between their own rendition by
the UD* and that of another via the interface of the physical? If many
observers happen to have synchronizations at a common level of
substitution then a global concept of time would obtain for them that
can be use to parametrize their records and narratives.
> Neurophysiology makes the problem even more complex, because it seems
> the brain extracts already information from noise, so we can easily
> see lions where there are not. We have to explain why the UD does not
> make them even more frequent from the point of view of the first
> person. Their high cost in first person plural situation (the
> physical) will not been lifted automatically on the first person
> points of view. But I don't exclude that OCCAM can get rid of them.
> UDA just shows that this would be ultimately equivalent with a
> derivation of the physical laws, including isotropic condition,
> geometrical homogeneity, linearity and symmetries, from the digital
> structure and its digital observers, (keeping in mind this defines
> only a flux of consciousness which differentiates on the limit (the
> first person is distributed on the limit of the "UD work")). The
> derivation of physics from addition and multiplication, should be
> equivalent with the elimination of the first person plural white
> rabbits. If Bp & Dp (& p) gives the right logic of observation, it
> will remains hard to eliminate the 3-WR properly. The measure one has
> to be extended to the whole probability calculus, and even if we
> extract the quantum calculus, we have to get the right corresponding
> part on the qualia to handle the 1-rabbit.
> Interviewing the universal machine is probably not the shorter way to
> figure out the reason of quanta, but I think it might be the only way
> to handle the qualia, and so to handle the (pure, singular) first
> person WRs.
> The quantum shadow of the bodies appears also in pure number theory,
> with the Riemann zeta function, and with the positive integer
> partition function (where even gravity seems to emerge), but if we
> extract the body without the whole theology, we might eliminate the
> person for even more than one millennium.
[SPK] What if this quantum shadow is just the dual that we would
expect from the Stone duality? A quantum physical world would have a
dual quantum logical structure and that logical structure should
appear in pure number theory if your reasoning is correct!
> The advantage of the Löbian interview is that we keep track of the
> difference between the internal views, and so we keep track on the
> qualia/quanta distinction, without eliminating the (first) person at
> all. Practically, the first person white rabbits are also those who
> might play some role "near death", and intermediate real dreams are
> not excluded. Computer science promises many jumps and gap, and
> surprises. With comp and the interview, we are a bit at the beginning
> of the beginning I'm afraid. It is a chance that Platonists are
> patient :)
[SPK] Now it seems that we merely need a way to keep track of the
differences. Hey! That is exact what a physical world does! It acts,
among other things, as a record of all of the differences that where
perceived/measured by observers that happen to be able to interface
with each other. So maybe it is a necessary idea after all.
> I hope I was not too much unclear.
[SPK] Well said, Bruno! Cheers!
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