John M, that was a pretty excellent performance, you should write more on here.
On Jun 15, 12:54 pm, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote: > Dear Brent, > let me cut in with your last par: > > *"...There is a tendency to talk about "human-equivalent intelligence" or > "human level intelligence" as an ultimate goal. Human intelligence evolved > to enhance certain functions: cooperation, seduction, bargaining, > deduction,... There's no reason to suppose it is the epitome of > intelligence. Intelligence may take many forms, some of which we would have > difficulty realizing or crediting. Like a universal machine that is not > programmed, which by one measure is maximally intelligent but also maximally > incompetent. Even in humans intelligence is far from one-dimensional. A > small child is extremely intelligent as measured by the ability to learn, > but not very smart as measured by knowledge. > **Brent"* > * > * > and say: thank you. In my vocabulary (agnostic) we cannot simulate "human" > (not limited to our present 'knowledge'), nor do (I?) have an acceptable > definition for intelligence (not restricted of course to the methodology of > the US IQ tests). "Inter-lego" means IMO to read between lines - a mentally > active attitude. Mentally means more than we could identify 3000 years ago, > but still on the move for more to be learned today. We are still YOUR > "small child". I look for 'intelligence' in more than human traits, but > accept your distinction of "human-equivalent" (especially the "human > level"). To be smart is useful, but IMO not a sole requirement of > intelligence. > > IMO the universal machine (I wish I knew more about it...) is "not > programmed" within our human technological thinking, - maybe it is way > 'above' it - and "incompetent" only in our human distinction. I have a hard > time to follow your "one-dimensional " view of intelligence. > It may reach into the 'nonlinear' as well, without us being aware of it. > > Thanks to Bruno for the hint to my old (15-20y ago) friendly contact Ben > Goertzel whom I try to ask about his recent positions. He had 'fertilizing' > ideas. To (Bruno's) other par: > do you have a 'measurable' definition for "conscious" - to speak about > (virgin = not programmed) yet 'maximally conscious' universal machine(s)? - > WITH included some > 'Self-Consciousness'? > (In my recent (ongoing) speculations I erred into the 'world's' "Unlimited > Complexity", - as said: 'out there', of which we derived only a so far > acquired portion FOR our world(view?) (including the conventional sciences) > as* perceived reality* or say a better name - with "imagining" a* > perfectsymmetry > * (more than existing in our present knowledge) of hard-to-identify > (hard-to-distinguish) 'aspects' in exchanging relations rather than > identifiable topics relating to our (worldly) topics, we can use. This would > serve a higher level of agnosticism. Our 'models' we think *within* (R. > Rosen) are formed by our capability to position the received (perceived?) > phenomenal information adjusted into our 'mental'(?) personalized, unique > worldview upon Colin Hale's earlier 'mini-solipsism'). > n such lines the universal machine etc. are 'human inventions' to facilitate > some (our?) understanding of the 'world' still beyond our knowledge base. > And - sorry! - so are 'numbers' as well. We cannot overstep our human logic > - at least not in fundamental questions. > > Best regards > John M > > > > > > > > On Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 12:47 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > On 6/15/2011 6:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> Doesn't this objection only apply to attempts to construct an AI with > >>> human-equivalent intelligence? As a counter example I'm thinking here > >>> of Ben Goertzel's OpenCog, an attempt at artificial general > >>> intelligence (AGI), whose design is informed by a theory of > >>> intelligence that does not attempt to mirror or model human > >>> intelligence. In light of the "Benacerraf principle", isn't it > >>> possible in principle to provably construct AIs so long as we're not > >>> trying to emulate or model human intelligence? > > >> I think that comp might imply that simple virgin (non programmed) > >> universal (and immaterial) machine are already conscious. Perhaps even > >> maximally conscious. Then adding induction gives them Löbianity, and this > >> makes them self-conscious (which might already be a delusion of some sort). > >> Unfortunately the hard task is to interface such (self)-consciousness with > >> our probable realities (computational histories). This is what we can > >> hardly > >> be sure about. > >> I still don't know if the brain is just a filter of consciousness, in > >> which case losing neurons might enhance consciousness (and some data in > >> neurophysiology might confirm this). I think Goertzel is more creating a > >> competent machine than an intelligent one, from what I have read about it. > >> I > >> oppose intelligence/consciousness and competence/ingenuity. The first is > >> needed to develop the later, but the later has a negative feedback on the > >> first. > > >> Bruno > > > There is a tendency to talk about "human-equivalent intelligence" or "human > > level intelligence" as an ultimate goal. Human intelligence evolved to > > enhance certain functions: cooperation, seduction, bargaining, deduction,... > > There's no reason to suppose it is the epitome of intelligence. > > Intelligence may take many forms, some of which we would have difficulty > > realizing or crediting. Like a universal machine that is not programmed, > > which by one measure is maximally intelligent but also maximally > > incompetent. Even in humans intelligence is far from one-dimensional. A > > small child is extremely intelligent as measured by the ability to learn, > > but not very smart as measured by knowledge. > > > Brent > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > For more options, visit this group at > >http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.