Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 15 Jun 2011, at 21:20, benjayk wrote:
> 
>>
>> Hi Bruno,
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> I think that comp might imply that simple virgin (non programmed)
>>> universal (and immaterial) machine are already conscious. Perhaps  
>>> even
>>> maximally conscious.
>>>
>> What could "maximally conscious" mean? My intuition says quite  
>> strongly that
>> consciousness is a dynamic open-ended process and that there is no  
>> such
>> thing as maximally conscious (exept maybe in the trivial sense of  
>> "simply
>> conscious at all").
> 
> I tend to think that consciousness is the same for all conscious  
> being, except that prejudices coming from competence can make it more  
> sleepy. 
What is it that is the same about consciousness? Consciousness is - or at
least appears - very heterogenous.
The only thing that I can easily see as being the same for all conscious
beings (or, for that matter states of conscious being) is some sense of
subjectivity or self-consistency (whatever is experienced is experienced).
But this is quite trivial and it is a very weak statement.
Especially because it seems like some consciousness is inacessibly "weak".
A methaphor for this is peripheral sight. There is something there, but it
is hardly perceivable and to you have to look at it and at this point it is
not peripheral sight anymore.
In the same way I think consciousness in deep sleep or the "consciousness"
of the universe before the development of complex brains might be like that,
existent, but ungraspable due to its hazyness (without objectifying it,
which doesn't capture its essential character).
I think it fits the fact that the material world developed from apparent
unconsciousness to conscious beings much more nicely then "pure" / "perfect"
/ "maximal" consciousness in the beginning (or rather outside of the
beginning - eternal - and giving rise to the beginning).
So in this way it makes most sense for me to say that consciousness can be
different among different beings or states of beings in every aspect but the
most trivial.

I'm not sure, though, how this fits with COMP, so I'd be interested in your
thoughts on that.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> So, paradoxically, consciousness might be maximal in the case  
> of absence of knowledge and beliefs. 
In some situations this might seem true (like some drug experiences or
states of meditation), but in some the opposite seems to be the case. When I
dream (and have a hazy consciousness) I often have less knowledge about the
world and hold less beliefs then in normal life. For example I often don't
believe in a consistent reality (which really is a big bunch of interrelated
beliefs) and thus don't wonder about crazy things happening. Sometimes I
seem to be incapable of believing, because there really is no person to hold
a belief. These are often very interesting dreams, because they are so
unlike the waking state.
When I am lucid dreaming (and thus feel much more conscious) I am believing
more things, like "I am dreaming", "I am Benjamin, an 21 old human", "What
happens in this dream will most probably not directly influence the waking
world", "This dream will end", "I can just wake up if I want", "Nothing in
this dream can hurt me", etc...
The clarity might be an illusion, but there is really nothing suggesting to
me that it is.

So I feel that whether you feel very conscious or not doesn't necessarily
directly relates to whether you (strongly) hold many beliefs or not. It is
just that you can't know / believe much with a hazy consciousness.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> I can't even conceive what this could be like.
> 
> Well, some drugs can help with that respect. 
I know what you're getting at, because on some drugs it might seem like
you're maximally conscious, because you lose sense of time and space and
feel unified with something greater, which can feel like being an stable,
eternal, "absolute" experience.
I experienced something like this and it was very profound and influenced my
thinking quite strongly (not only positively, though).
So in this way I can conceive what one could mean with maximal
consciousness.
The problem is rather that I don't know how I could know that this is in any
way really a maximum, rather than "maximum" just being an metaphor to convey
what I experienced, like saying "This was the best movie ever". Because of
this I don't see what kind of experience could accurately be called an
experience of maximal consciousness.

The more I reflect upon it, the more it becomes more clear for me that it is
just a experience of relative importance like any other experience (albeit
it is a very profound one). I am amazed that there are such experiences, but
nevertheless I don't assume that such a state is somehow the maximum of
consciousness, just because we are tempted to use this as a description of
such a state. 
In fact it would be quite dissapointing to me if this state was the maximum
of consciousness. After all, it'd make consciousness limited.
The thought that this probably is just one mode of consciousness the brain
is capable of generating (or maybe more accurately manifesting) sounds much
better and much more plausible to me. Technologically enhanced brains or
consciousness run on hardware specifically design to create mystic (or just
generally good) states of consciousness could surpass those states to an
unimaginable degree. This possibility makes me very excited about the
future.




Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Then adding induction gives them Löbianity, and
>>> this makes them self-conscious (which might already be a delusion of
>>> some sort).
>> Why do you think it could be a delusion? This would be a bit  
>> reminscent of
>> buddhism. For me it sounds like quite a terrible thought. After all  
>> it would
>> mean all progress is in a way illusory and maybe not even desirable,  
>> whereas
>> I really wish (and pragmatically believe) that eternal progress is  
>> the thing
>> that can fullfill our ideals of truth, conscious insight and  
>> happiness.
> 
> I am no more sure on this. I can understand the appeal of the idea of  
> progress, but progress might just make pain more painful, frustation  
> more frustrating, etc. 
Well there is certainly something to this. Plants probably don't suffer
much, but "further progressed" organisms like mammal, do.
This might be a good thing, though, because through pain organsims can
quickly learn what they don't want, allowing live to evolve faster in the
direction of what we want. Pain surely is bad, but probably better then
indifference towards the worst things.
But even though progress temporarily makes life more painful, it seems quite
impossible to me that that this will always be the case. Pain is already
(often) quite unuseful for modern human. So there is no reason why we should
keep pain as soon as we can get rid of it. And I have little doubt we will
have the ability to do this. Why shouldn't we? We already can largly rid us
of pain by drugs, it is just that this works crudely and with many side
effects (mostly addiction and adverse effect on congnition and behaviour).

After we leave behind pain and strife and come together in peace to learn
and blossom ever faster, our lives may become very glorious, and they will
become only better.
Of course we can't see into the future and we don't know what obstacles
there might be on our way, but ultimately I have no doubt the good will
prevail in a drastic way. We are already on a promising way, from what I
see.

Also, what is the alternative to progress? I have yet to see any way to
escape progress. Even so called enlightened people are still obviously
subject to change. They are just in a generally stable / peaceful (but often
dispassionate) state of consciousness. And drug experiences may seem
eternal, but they clearly aren't from the sober perspective.

Furthermore I believe the idea of progress not being desirable opens up
large philosophical problems, too. The universe apparently has a drive
towards progress. If we assume the world makes any sense from a point of
conscious beings it wouldn't have this drive if there wasn't something to
gain by this.
If there wasn't, there would be a fundmental error in in this omniverse.
There is too much perfection in the fundamental principles of the omniverse
(as shown by math) for me to believe that.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  Truth is simply not fulfillable,  
Well, it's certainly not completly fullfillable. But this can be seen as a
good thing and encourage us to do fullfill more of it. Everything can
eternally be improved, no matter how good it already is.
The greatest truth is the truth that is beyond itself and the greatest being
the one that is greater even then itself - thus not completely fullfillable
but constantly self-fullfilling in its becoming. Retracting into stasis or
mere apparent perfection would be contrary to this, wouldn't it?
Perfection is the beginning, I'd say, and not the end.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> and happiness  
> is more in equilibrium and balances than in the pursuit of bigger  
> satisfaction.   
I don't buy this dichotomy. I think as we find balance we can easier pursue
bigger satisfaction and as we pursue bigger satisfaction we can find
balance.
We just have to be careful not to understand balance as indifference and
pursuit as stress. Instead we should try find calm, clear-headedness and
peace through balance in our lifes  - and fun, excitement and motivation
through relentless pursuit of our deep wishes and hopes.
I see this clearly in myself. It's when I actually pursue things that are
important to me that I find contenment (sometimes there comes stress and
anxiety with this, but overall it is clearly worth it).
Almost all happy people pursue something they think is important. Monks are
rare and not nearly all of them are happy, I think.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> But then comp might be wrong, and I might miss the  
> point
>   But, yes,  comp leads close to buddhism, and to ethical  
> detachment..  
Does this really have much do to with COMP? I don't see this, at least.
Maybe you could explain. Optimally without too much mathematical
terminology, because even in case I understand it I can't really connect it
to practical matters.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> A machine is intelligent if and only if it is not stupid.
> A machine is stupid when one of the following clause is satisfied:
>   - the machine believes that she is intelligent
>   - the machine believes that she is stupid  
I don't like this definition. Assuming  you are either stupid or intelligent
and you know and believe this definition, you either are intelligent but in
denial of yourself or you are already stupid in the first place.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Now that theory admits a transparent arithmetical interpretation.  
> Replace "intelligent" by consistent (Dt), and stupid by not consistent  
> (~Dt, that is Bf). Then the theory is just Gödel's second  
> incompleteness theorem, and is a sub-theory of G* (BDt -> Bf).  
There seems to be a relation between intelligent and consistency, but for me
it still seems like a stretch to identify them.
Also it is not clear to me why Gödel prevents you from consistently
believing that you are intelligent. From what I see it just implies you
can't prove your intelligence (there is always an unprovable part of your
intelligence that is obviously true - and thus believable - but not provable
from any given axioms).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> An obvious defect of that theory is that it makes pebbles intelligent.  
> But then, why not? Who has ever heard a pebble saying that it is  
> intelligent, or stupid, or said any kind stupidities. Like with the  
> taoists, the wise person keep silent.  
Well, I think you just gave a reductio ad absurdum of your theory. It seems
pragmatically unwise to me to define intelligence in a way that is many ways
opposite to what we usually call intelligence. Clearly we should keep silent
if we have nothing to say, but this is just a small part of intelligence.
If all wise persons kept silent the stupid people would dominate
communication and be the only ones spreading their ideas, which is IMO
clearly not a good goal for intelligent persons.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Roughly speaking a machine becomes stupid when it confuses  
> intelligence and competence and begin to feel superior, or inferior,  
> and begin to lack some amount of respect for his living being fellows.  
>   
I can see this.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> "Science" per se, does not lead to intelligence, as I think it is  
> sadly illustrated by those last centuries. Science can kill  
> intelligence, and science without intelligence can lead to hell,  
> especially if science is confused with a sort of theology, instead of  
> being used to genuinely tackle, interrogate, the (theological)  
> fundamental questions. Humans cannot yet accept their ignorance.  
OK, but then I didn't say that doing science is sufficient for intelligence.
But it helps, as it confronts us with reality, with is where I believe
intelligence lies.
The last century has been a triumph for science and I think we've become
much more intelligent during it. Our morals have improved much and
superstition has a less firm ground now.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> I have already argued that science, well understood, is born with  
> Pythagorus, and is ended with the apparition of the roman empire.
> Fundamental questions are still complete taboo, for most scientists.    
They mostly do not talk about them in the scientific community, but they
often do have a great interest in them personally. The problem with
fundamental questions is that they are hard to settle with evidence and
talking about it yields little objective progress which probably is why it
is not much of a topic in the scientific community. Many think they are
simply too difficult to tackle right now.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> There is no question to rise any doubt on the theology of Aristotle.    
Many ideas of Aristotle are not widely believed anymore, but you probably
mean materialism. I agree that this is a problem, in that it makes people
ignore the fundamental facts beyond physical space and time (eg numbers).
But then materialism is most often meant as naturalism as opposed to belief
in the supernatural, belief in things not accessible through reason that
intervene in the world. And I think this is a useful belief.
It is just that now many scientist throw out the baby with the bathwater and
- for example - try to make the truth of ineffability of subjective
experience into something irrational. I don't believe this reflects that we
have abonded real science, but that we must learn to better distinguish
between claims that seem irrational from some perspective and claims that
really are irrational.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Neither atheists nor Christians can accept that.  
I would consider myself an atheist by most people's conception of atheism
and I acknowledge the shortcomings of materialistic "theology". So there is
at least one counterexample :). And to be honest, my atheistic friends /
family are quiet open to questioning materialistic dogma.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  Free thinking is a myth. 
Well, yes, most people largly simply believe what they are told. But
nowadays you can meet many people that are open to a wide variety of ideas
and you can speak about them mostly without being suppressed. So we are a
lot closer to freethinking than ever before.
But there is still a long way to go. The school and the state and most of
the religions are still severly restricting free thinking, and unfortunately
even more, free action. You can't even freely decide what to ingest or
freely provide the most important services (and the ones most demanding
freedom) like education, security, law and currency.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>   You are not even burned alive  
> for your ideas, today, which is a mark of acknowledging the existence  
> of you and your ideas. Today, obscurantism has developed more  
> efficacious means. This results in an impoverishment of ideas, and in  
> powerful mediatic propaganda.  
Yes, is there still is much propaganda.
But I don't know where you live that you think there is an impoverishment of
ideas. New ideas are blossoming, even though they only slowly displace the
old, widespread, ugly weeds. Our culture(s) is/are more diverse than ever.
There are people of many different religions and world views and political
views living together. Of course many valid ones are still not universally
respected, but at least widely tolerated. You now can be an atheist, muslim,
communist or homosexual in Germany and still live a mostly normal life and
rarely be persecuted without hiding what you believe in or are. Whereas 70
years ago...


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> A good example is the politics of health  
> and prohibition, which destroys lives and minds more efficaciously  
> than atomic bombs.  
I agree. Politics doesn't really care for scientifc truth, but it never did
(and I think it never will, which is why we should get rid of it). 
But this is not a good example that we don't do good science. Science has
just begun - and only a minority practices it - but this is not the fault of
scientists.
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