On 26 Sep 2011, at 01:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/25/2011 10:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, it would generate every possible information state,
and would therefore create me and all my possible futures, but these
'pictures' would have no coherence, would immediately dissolve back
into the static they emerged from.
The point is that IF we are machine, then we have no choice other
than extracting the physical laws from the UD.
Actually I think we do. If what you write above is correct then you
could infer a contradiction from assuming a primitive physics - but
it seems you discard it as an application of Occam's razor, not as a
contradictory concept. Do you think you can prove a contradiction
from assuming ur-matter?
I obtain an epistemological contradiction. You can still imagine that
there is some matter, but it can't be related at all to your
consciousness, so it is exactly like invisible horse (except that such
invisible horse can be defined, and primitive matter is never
defined). Such a matter has nothing to do with anything we observe.
That is the point. We already reach it with just the seven first step,
with a strong use of Occam razor. The step 8 just eliminates that
strong use, for the weak use equivalent with the "invisible horse".
It seems to me that Peter Jones has given a convincing defense of
that as a possible theory of the world.
I have criticized in detail. You can search my reply to Jones, and
This is done in the mathematical part, where, contrary to all
expectations (at least by some of my colleagues at the time) we get
already quantum logics.
The UD, as a generator of static,
cannot explain coherence in my experience.
You need a theory of knowledge. I use the most classical theory of
knowledge (the one by Theaetetus), and it is enough to cut any easy
conclusion against mechanism.
This is unclear to me. You use Bp & p to denote "knowing p" where p
is some proposition. But it seems that "B" is equivocally
"Believes" and "Proves" (Beweisbar). I don't see that these two are
B = provable = rationally believable. What I say works for any belief
notion for a machine (or a Recursively enumerable set of sentences)
close for the modus ponens rules, and arithmetically sound. That is
what I call the ideally self-referentially correct machine. They are
example of what I call Löbian machines. To extract physics, it would
be useless to interview inconsistent or unsound machines.
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