On 26 Sep 2011, at 01:08, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/25/2011 10:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, it would generate every possible information state,
and would therefore create me and all my possible futures, but these
'pictures' would have no coherence, would immediately dissolve back
into the static they emerged from.

The point is that IF we are machine, then we have no choice other than extracting the physical laws from the UD.

Actually I think we do. If what you write above is correct then you could infer a contradiction from assuming a primitive physics - but it seems you discard it as an application of Occam's razor, not as a contradictory concept. Do you think you can prove a contradiction from assuming ur-matter?

I obtain an epistemological contradiction. You can still imagine that there is some matter, but it can't be related at all to your consciousness, so it is exactly like invisible horse (except that such invisible horse can be defined, and primitive matter is never defined). Such a matter has nothing to do with anything we observe. That is the point. We already reach it with just the seven first step, with a strong use of Occam razor. The step 8 just eliminates that strong use, for the weak use equivalent with the "invisible horse".



It seems to me that Peter Jones has given a convincing defense of that as a possible theory of the world.

I have criticized in detail. You can search my reply to Jones, and criticize it.




This is done in the mathematical part, where, contrary to all expectations (at least by some of my colleagues at the time) we get already quantum logics.



The UD, as a generator of static,
cannot explain coherence in my experience.

You need a theory of knowledge. I use the most classical theory of knowledge (the one by Theaetetus), and it is enough to cut any easy conclusion against mechanism.

This is unclear to me. You use Bp & p to denote "knowing p" where p is some proposition. But it seems that "B" is equivocally "Believes" and "Proves" (Beweisbar). I don't see that these two are identical.

B = provable = rationally believable. What I say works for any belief notion for a machine (or a Recursively enumerable set of sentences) close for the modus ponens rules, and arithmetically sound. That is what I call the ideally self-referentially correct machine. They are example of what I call Löbian machines. To extract physics, it would be useless to interview inconsistent or unsound machines.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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