On 1 October 2011 04:14, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> I have been attempting to ask a similar question, but my words were > failing me. What is the necessity of the 1p? AFAIK, it seems that because it > is possible. This is what I mean by existence = <>. But does this line of > reasoning, arithmetical reductionism, eventually fall into the abyss of > infinite regress or loop back to the 1p for a means to define itself? How > can we be sure that we are assuming a primitive that is only a artifact of > the limits of our imagination? Why are we so sure that there is a > "primitive" in the well founded sense? Well, the question I'm asking has, I think, the same implications regardless of whatsoever you take to be "primitive". The reason for this has to do with the process of reduction itself: having followed the path of "reducing" any and all narratives about the world to those consisting solely of some maximally-reduced entities and their primitive relations, we hoped finally to get to grips with some definitive account of the "real". But the following problem then presents itself: what is supposed to be the ontological status of the "non-reduced" narratives? They appear to have become ontologically redundant (i.e. in a strong sense, they don't exist, just as a house has no ontological status independent of the bricks that constitute it). But, contra this, they manifestly DO still exist, as we would say, "epistemologically". Well, one way of dealing with inconvenient truths of this sort is by ignoring them. And so we can try to sustain the view, where it suits our purposes, that non-primitive phenomena of certain kinds ("qualia" for example) really don't exist, however much they may "seem" to. The problem is that this is insufficiently radical: reductive analysis is an irresistible ontological acid, and more than the merely "illusory" must succumb to its dissolving power. Once it has done its work, what lies revealed to our horrified gaze is - not a world of still somewhat familiar "primary" macroscopic entities and events, merely shorn of their illusory "secondary" properties - but only the starkest landscape of the most primitive entities in their most fundamental relations. Or rather, this is what CANNOT now be revealed, because any possible subject of such revelation must disappear in the same ontological catastrophe as its possible objects of knowledge. Hence, eliminativism of this sort turns out to be more than simply and egregiously question-begging. In effect it is a most perverse species of attempted metaphysical grand larceny: it tries to grab with both hands everything it has just pilfered from reality. The only route out of this impasse seems to be to accept that the aspects of reality that we label "epistemological" must be considered as real (i.e. as relevant to any account of what exists) as those we are pleased to call "primitively ontological". Bruno indeed has sometimes referred to this aspect as the "ontological first-person". For myself, I have remarked on the need to consider equally two "counter-poles" of the real: the analytic and the integrative, neither of which can intelligibly be dispensed with. In any case, failure to take considerations of this sort into account, leads, I think, to much of the confusion that arises in these discussions about what "really exists". David > On 9/30/2011 8:18 PM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 30 September 2011 16:55, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> They are ontologically primitive, in the sense that ontologically they >>> are >>> the only things which exist. even computations don't exist in that >>> primitive >>> sense. Computations already exists only relationally. I will keep saying >>> that computations exists, for pedagogical reasons. For professional >>> logicians, I make a nuance, which would look like total jargon in this >>> list. >> >> I've been following this discussion, though not commenting (I don't >> understand all of it). However, your remark above caught my eye, >> because it reminded me of something that came up a while back, about >> whether reductive explanations logically entail elimination of >> non-primitive entities. I argued that this is their whole point; >> Peter Jones disputed it. Your comment (supporting my view, I think) >> was that reductionism was necessarily ontologically eliminative, >> though of course not epistemologically so. Indeed this seemed to me >> uncontroversial, in that the whole point of a reductionist program is >> to show how all references to compound entities can be replaced by >> more primitive ones. >> >> Your remark above seems now to be making a similar point about >> arithmetical "reductionism" in the sense that, presumably, >> computations can analogously (if loosely) be considered compounds of >> arithmetical primitives, a point that had indeed occurred to me at the >> time. If so, what interests me is the question that inspired the older >> controversy. If the primitives of a given ontology are postulated to >> be all that "really" exist, how are we supposed to account for the >> apparent "existence" of compound entities? If the supposedly >> fundamental underlying mechanism is describable (in principle) >> entirely at the level of primitives, there would appear to be no need >> of any such further entities, and indeed Occam would imply that they >> should not be hypothesised. Yet the bald fact remains that this is >> not how things appear to us. So should such compound appearances be >> considered entirely a matter of epistemology? IOW, is the >> first-person - the "inside" view - in some sense the necessary arena - >> and the sole explanation - for the emergence of anything at all beyond >> the primitive ontological level? >> >> David > > [SPK] > > I have been attempting to ask a similar question, but my words were > failing me. What is the necessity of the 1p? AFAIK, it seems that because it > is possible. This is what I mean by existence = <>. But does this line of > reasoning, arithmetical reductionism, eventually fall into the abyss of > infinite regress or loop back to the 1p for a means to define itself? How > can we be sure that we are assuming a primitive that is only a artifact of > the limits of our imagination? Why are we so sure that there is a > "primitive" in the well founded sense? > > Onward! > > Stephen > >>> On 30 Sep 2011, at 13:44, Stephen P. King wrote: >>> >>> On 9/30/2011 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> If comp +Theaetus is correct, you have to distinguish physical existence, >>> which is of the type <>#, and existence, which is of the type "Ex ... >>> x...". I will use the modal box  and diamond<> fro the intelligible >>> hypostases (X = BX& DX). >>> >>> [SPK] >>> >>> It seems that we have very different ideas of the meaning of the word >>> Existence. "Ex ... x..." seems to be a denotative definition and thus is >>> not >>> neutral with respect to properties. I may not comprehend you thoughts on >>> this. >>> >>> It seems that you introduce meta-difficulties to elude simple question. >>> >>> >>> Do you have a concept for "the totality of all that exists"? >>> >>> A priori and personally: no. >>> Assuming comp: yes. N is the totality of what exists, but, assuming comp, >>> I >>> have to add this is a G* minus G proposition. It is not really >>> communicable/provable. You have to grasp it by your own understanding (of >>> UDA, for example). >>> >>> >>> Would such be unnamable for you? It is for me. >>> >>> Yes. Arithmetical truth, which relies on the ontic N whole, is unnamable >>> for >>> me, that is why I can only refer to it indirectly, by making the comp >>> assumption explicit. >>> >>> As I see it, existence itself is the neutral primitive ground of all >>> things, >>> abstract and concrete. Perhaps my philosophy is more like dual-aspect >>> monism >>> than neutral monism. >>> >>> Can you elaborate shortly on the difference between dual-aspect and >>> neutral >>> monism? Comp is octal-aspect monism, when Theaetetus enters into play. >>> >>> >>> >>> [SPK] >>> Once I have constructed a mental representation of the subject of a >>> reasoning or concept I can use the symbolic representations in a >>> denotative >>> capacity. This is how we dyslexics overcome our disability. :-) >>> >>> Why don't you do that for "Ex ... x ...."? in the numbers domain? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> My result is: mechanism entails immateralism (matter can exist but as no >>> more any relation with consciousness, and so is eliminated with the usual >>> weak occam principle). This should be a problem for you if you want to >>> keep >>> both mechanism and weak materialism, but why do you want to do that. On >>> the >>> contrary, mechanism makes the laws of physics much more solid and stable, >>> by >>> providing an explanation relying only on diophantine addition and >>> multiplication. >>> >>> [SPK] >>> I reject all form of monism except neutral monism. Existence itself >>> is >>> the only primitive. >>> >>> In what sense would mechanism, after UDA, not be a neutral monism. >>> When you use the word "existence" without saying what you assume to >>> exist, >>> it look like the joke "what is the difference between a raven?". >>> >>> [SPK] >>> The totality of all that exists, it merely exists. >>> >>> In non founded set theories, perhaps. But this is assuming far too much, >>> again in the comp frame. The totality of all that exists does not make >>> much >>> sense to me. I can imagine model of Quine New Foundation playing that >>> role, >>> but that is too much literal, and seems to me contradictory, or >>> quasi-contradictory. But with comp this would be a reification of the >>> epistemological. We just cannot do that. >>> >>> >>> Prior to the specification of properties, even distinctions themselves, >>> there is only existence. Existence is not a property such as Red, two or >>> heavy. It has no extension or form in itself but is the possibility to be >>> and have all properties. >>> >>> >>> This seems to me quite speculative, and useless in the comp theory. If >>> you >>> were betting that comp is false, I could understand the motivation for >>> such >>> postulation, but are you really betting that comp is false? >>> >>> >>> >>> [SPK] >>> Numbers and arithmetic presuppose a specific meaning, valuation and >>> relation. >>> >>> This is fuzzy. In the TOE allowed by comp, we can presuppose only 0, s, >>> *, >>> and + and the usual first order axioms. >>> >>> >>> This implies, in my reasoning, that they are not primitive. >>> >>> They are ontologically primitive, in the sense that ontologically they >>> are >>> the only things which exist. even computations don't exist in that >>> primitive >>> sense. Computations already exists only relationally. I will keep saying >>> that computations exists, for pedagogical reasons. For professional >>> logicians, I make a nuance, which would look like total jargon in this >>> list. >>> >>> >>> >>> You seem to assume that they are objects in the mind of God, making God = >>> Existence. I disagree with this thinking. >>> >>> But with comp, God = arithmetical truth, although we have to be careful, >>> because no machines, including perhaps me, can really assert that. It is >>> a >>> just non rationally communicable, but "betable", once we bet on comp. >>> >>> >>> >>> Could you define to me what you mean by topological dual of a number, or >>> a >>> program? >>> >>> [SPK] >>> I do not recognize the idea that a number or a program has a meaning >>> isolate from all else. I do not understand your theory of meaningfulness. >>> How does meaningfulness arise in your thinking? I use a non-well founded >>> set >>> type Dictionary model and have discussed it before. >>> >>> Meaning arise in the mind of number, and the mind of numbers arise by the >>> computational relations they have with other numbers, probably so in the >>> comp theory. >>> >>> I have never stop to give references on this, beyond my own work. See the >>> name Boolos, Smorynski, Smullyan in my papers and books, or in my URL. >>> What is it that you don't understand in the second part of the sane >>> paper. >>> >>> [SPK] >>> I do not understand how you ignore the fact that one must have a >>> means >>> to implement a set of distinguishable symbols, configuration of chalk >>> mark >>> on slate, etc. to denote and connote an abstraction. It is as if you >>> presuppose physicality without giving it credit for what it does. I do >>> not >>> know what else to say now to make this idea more clear. >>> >>> You keep confusing the number 17, with physical representation of it. >>> I do have symbols, but why should they be physical. I use the mark "0", >>> but >>> I can use anything else, physical or not. Arithmetic does not presuppose >>> physicalness? Book on numbers say nothing about any possible relations >>> with >>> physics. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Physicist seems not to have the notion of models, and use that term where >>> logician use the term "theory". Roughly speaking, for a logician "model" >>> is >>> for "a reality". I remind you also that Deutch advocates physicalism, and >>> so, if you get the UDA as you said, you know that Deustch physicalism is >>> incoherent with digital mechanism (which he advocates in FOR). >>> >>> [SPK] >>> I wish that you would write more addressing this critique of >>> Deutsch's >>> argument. >>> >>> Recently on the FOR list Deustch admitted not having a reply to my >>> objection. I think he wants still searching one. >>> >>> >>> >>> Arithmetical truth is the territory. Machines and numbers are what build >>> maps of the territory. When you say "yes" to a doctor, you are just >>> changing >>> a map for another. Nowhere is a confusion between map and territory, >>> except >>> for the fixed points, like the here and now indexical consciousness. But >>> we >>> can be thankful that this is possible (in computer science) because it >>> makes >>> the map/brain useful when relating with a probable part of the territory. >>> >>> [SPK] >>> But are when maps and territories are made of the "same stuff" we >>> have >>> problems. >>> >>> Not necessarily. Or you take the word stuff too literally perhaps. >>> >>> [SPK] >>> I used the word 'stuff" in quotes so that it would not be taken as >>> literal. >>> >>> OK, but then there is no problem with maps and territories having the >>> same >>> "stuff". You can use Kleene second recursion theorem, of your unfounded >>> set >>> theories to provide sense to such fixed points. >>> >>> >>> >>> You can use Scott topology to modelize computations. Stopping programs >>> will >>> correspond to fixed point transformations. >>> But my question was more easy, and can be recasted in physical terms: >>> does a >>> machine stop or not stop (accepting a robust physical universe, and no >>> accidental asteroid destructing the machine)? >>> >>> [SPK] >>> OK, I still do not comprehend how you can say this and still be a >>> ideal >>> monist. I am tired. >>> >>> Take a nap, and then you might answer the simple question: accept you the >>> truth that [phi_i(j) converge V phi_i(j) does not converge]. >>> I remind you also that you can classify me as an ideal monist only if you >>> accept that numbers are ideas (in God's mind, perhaps), but I prefer to >>> classify the comp's consequence as being neutral monism, or octal-monism. >>> But this might only be a vocabulary problem. >>> I am not arguing for or against any philosophical truth. My point is >>> technical. It is that IF we can survive with a material digital >>> body/brain, >>> THEN the physical laws emerge, in a precise way, from already only >>> addition >>> and multiplication of (non negative) integers. >>> Another way to put it: IF we can survive in a digital "matrix", then we >>> are >>> already in a digital matrix. >>> I am not pretending that the proof is without flaw, but up to now, I can >>> find flaws in the way people describe flaws in the reasoning: they almost >>> introduce systematically a supplementary philosophical hypothesis >>> implicitly >>> somewhere. No philosophical hypothesis can refute a deductive argument >>> per >>> se (it might certainly help to find a flaw, but then they have to find >>> it). >>> Bruno >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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