On 1 October 2011 18:07, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > To be short, only intelligible > ideas exist [only numbers and definable relations exist]. God and matter > does NOT exist, but they do exist epistemologically. And they are quite > distinct for what really exist. This does not work for a physicalist, > because he want to avoid that GOD, and make the global picture a compound of > the elementary things: he want a universe composed of material stuff, but > that cannot work if we want maintain the existence (even if epistemological) > of first person, and that is why honest and rational materialist are bounded > to eliminate the very existence of the persons.
Yes, this can make sense for me (fortunately we have been round some of these houses before, so I've had some time to bash my brains into shape on these points!). I don't wish to fight over vocabulary here, so when you say "God and matter does NOT exist, but they do exist epistemologically" I will resist any temptation to accuse you of contradicting yourself, but rather accept that this statement is a way of recognising both the reality and the distinctiveness of God, matter, consciousness and the "intelligible ideas". After all, given that it's theology we're talking about, I don't find this more confusing than the doctrine of the Trinity! We agree that "honest and rational materialist are bounded to eliminate the very existence of the persons", although (and this is the nub of my argument) to be consistent they ought at the same time to give up using any vocabulary predicated on (and entirely derived from) such existence. The problem is that if they did, they wouldn't have much left to say for themselves. Perhaps that's why they don't. >> Consequently, in my view, denial of a distinct first person ontology >> ought to be seen as having the consequence of radical reduction of the >> remainder to some such arena of primitives and their relations, >> independent of any metaphysical postulate of their fundamental nature. >> Hence, such denial is unintelligible. > > Not really, even for a physicalist. Because my point above explain why for > machine, their consciousness will appear to be both "ontologically real" yet > quite distinct from anything postulated as primitive in the theory. I'm still not sure why you would say "not for a physicalist". In terms of your theory, there is a principled account of why "their consciousness will appear to be both "ontologically real" yet quite distinct from anything postulated as primitive in the theory", but in the physicalist theory (say, the "identity" version) there can be no such account, given the premise that only the physical primitives are "really real". Of course, if their theory is physicalism + CTM (which we both believe to be incorrect), they are equating consciousness = computation, but the problem with this is that, in the physicalist theory, "computation" just isn't anything of the sort you describe above; it's just certain kinds of relations that happen to exist between entities defined solely in terms of the "real reality". To make this theory coherent, the physicalist would have to accept that "computation" additionally has just the kind of "ontological reality" and distinctness you describe. But then, in the face of physicalism, this would be, as you remark, frankly dualistic (and also, in this case, wrong, unless UDA is false). David David > > On 01 Oct 2011, at 17:42, David Nyman wrote: > >> On 1 October 2011 14:50, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> But UDA shows (I think) that matter and consciousness are first >>> person collective constructs of all the numbers. >> >> Yes, I agree. But my general point was that even in terms of >> physicalism, the way matter ordinarily "appears" to the (unexplained) >> first person is very obviously not in terms of its supposed material >> primitives. > > I agree. That can be related to the weakness of the physicalist approach. > I will try to answer in my other comment why this does not apply to digital > mechanism (DM). > In a sense, you remark does apply to DM, and I refer to it sometimes by the > 0,0001% of consciousness that DM cannot explain. Then point will be that we > (and machines) can explain why IF mechanism is true, there must remain > something which just cannot be explained, and this without postulating any > new first person primitive experience. > You put your finger on the crux of the difficulty of the mind-body problem. > > >> When we seek an explanation for such non-primitive >> experiential constructs, we look for appropriate compound concepts >> that in turn are expected to cash out, ultimately, in terms of these >> selfsame primitives. > > Not necessarily. Consciousness does not need to be a compound things. It is > here that consciousness, as a notion, differ from the nameable constructs; > like prime numbers, universal numbers, etc. With mechanism, we can relate > consciousness with modal qualitative, and non compounded notion, like > arithmetical truth, which can already be said not compounded for any machine > approaching it closely. Machines just lacks the vocabulary here: there are > none. > > >> But, because of this very process of >> explanation, such constructs, considered at the level of the >> primitives that exhaustively comprise them, are exposed as unnecessary >> supplementary hypotheses. > > I see what you mean. But they are implicit in the belief that our axioms > makes sense. This is the implicit (and often unconscious) religious belief > of any scientist. We still have to bet that our theories make sense, despite > we know that no public theories can provide by itself such a sense. We are > using implicitly, at the very moment we suggest (any) theory, an assumption > of self-consistency, or an assumption that there is something real. That > reality is not compounded, and cannot be reduced into its components, *by > us*. Some alien might be able to do this for us, like we can do it for > simpler machine than us, but those aliens will not been able to do this for > themselves. Colin McGuin is right: consciousness need some amount of > mysterianism. > > > >> They are needed to justify appearances, not >> to provide unlooked-for additional influence over what, ex hypothesi, >> are already "primitive", self-sufficient mechanisms. Their demand for >> attention stems exclusively from the manifest fact that such things >> *appear to us*. > > That is the heart of the qualia problem. You single out the 0,0001% of > consciousness that mechanism cannot explain by the conscious entities > themselves, *for themselves*. But machine can understand why it has to be > like that, once they bet that they are machines. And this implies that we > cannot explain completely how mechanism work, and why mechanism does need > some act of faith in the case we use it (in practice, or in theory). That's > the key reason why mechanism *is* a theology. > > > >> >> Consequently, unless one (unintelligibly) attempts to deny such >> appearances, despite relying on them for the very explanations in >> question, such "conceptual realities" must be accepted as having some >> distinct existence (even if only "for us") over and above the >> primitives of which they are "composed". > > They will be distinct in the sense that they need, from the part of the > machine, an (instinctive) bet in a reality. With mechanism, the bet in > arithmetical truth (or more weakly self-consistency) is enough, despite or > thanks to the fact that this cannot be an entirely intelligible act. But the > machine can describe it at some metalevel, and that is what is done with the > internal modal logics. > > > > >> So matter seems this >> (strong) sense to be "a first person collective construct" even under >> the primitive assumptions of physicalism. > > Yes. But this shows physicalism being contradictory or eliminativist. Nice > point. > > > >> One may call this construct >> epistemological reality, or consciousness, or the first-person. But >> whatever one calls it, subtracting it leaves nothing but a barren >> primitive arena; one which, notwithstanding this, continues, at its >> "own level", to do exactly what it always did. This is the zombie >> argument writ large, except that here the "zombie" stands revealed as >> merely an undifferentiated and uninterpreted primitive background. >> Consequently, in my view, denial of a distinct first person ontology >> ought to be seen as having the consequence of radical reduction of the >> remainder to some such arena of primitives and their relations, >> independent of any metaphysical postulate of their fundamental nature. >> Hence, such denial is unintelligible. > > Not really, even for a physicalist. Because my point above explain why for > machine, their consciousness will appear to be both "ontologically real" yet > quite distinct from anything postulated as primitive in the theory. The fact > that it is not will seem, rightly, to be unexplainable by the machine, but > the non-explainability, betting on mechanism (and not on physicalism), can > be explained by the machine. It is necessarily mysterious, and it is > necessary related to the global picture which has to be simple (not > compounded, like Plotinus' one actually) and which has to be transcendental, > and quite distinct from any intelligible object the machine can meet or > imagine. > I think that this is the big discovery made by Plotinus: reality as a whole > has to be distinct that anything which is real or being. That is why > Plotinus explain that we need the ONE, and it has to be above the realm of > the intelligible (even of the divine intelligible). he dares to say that God > is not a being, or even that it does not exist (meaning he does not belong > to th realm of the intelligible). > Put it more simply, that is why we need a notion of god, and why mechanism > make theology the fundamental science. > You can *almost* define it by what makes possible the distinction between > the first and third person, but again, with mechanism this is "only" an > epistemological distinction, indeed it is the distinction between believing > p, and believing p when p is true. Now, the machine cannot even define such > a notion of "truth" in a way encompassing herself completely. But a rich > LUMs can do this for a less rich LUMs, and extrapolating it on herself, but > this is necessarily at her own risk and peril. The fact that it might seems > to work (like surviving with an artificial brain) will remain like an > unintelligible mystery for the machine. > > Mechanism is very like Plotinian theology. To be short, only intelligible > ideas exist [only numbers and definable relations exist]. God and matter > does NOT exist, but they do exist epistemologically. And they are quite > distinct for what really exist. This does not work for a physicalist, > because he want to avoid that GOD, and make the global picture a compound of > the elementary things: he want a universe composed of material stuff, but > that cannot work if we want maintain the existence (even if epistemological) > of first person, and that is why honest and rational materialist are bounded > to eliminate the very existence of the persons. > > Feel free to ask for further precisions, it is a rather subtle (and > fundamental) point. Remember that arithmetic, viewed from inside is FAR > bigger than arithmetic as conceived from pure (extensional) number theory. A > physicalist universe has not that property a priori, and cannot do those > internal epistemological distinctions (except in some ad hoc ways). This > might explain why materialist are often dualist, or believer in some God > (but that is usually an ad hoc completion of the gap). > > > Bruno > > >> >> David >> >>> >>> On 01 Oct 2011, at 02:18, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>> On 30 September 2011 16:55, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>> >>> They are ontologically primitive, in the sense that ontologically they >>> are >>> >>> the only things which exist. even computations don't exist in that >>> primitive >>> >>> sense. Computations already exists only relationally. I will keep saying >>> >>> that computations exists, for pedagogical reasons. For professional >>> >>> logicians, I make a nuance, which would look like total jargon in this >>> list. >>> >>> I've been following this discussion, though not commenting (I don't >>> understand all of it). However, your remark above caught my eye, >>> because it reminded me of something that came up a while back, about >>> whether reductive explanations logically entail elimination of >>> non-primitive entities. I argued that this is their whole point; >>> Peter Jones disputed it. Your comment (supporting my view, I think) >>> was that reductionism was necessarily ontologically eliminative, >>> though of course not epistemologically so. >>> >>> Yes. This makes sense. Certainly a wise attitude, given that UDA shows >>> that >>> if Mechanism is correct then both consciousness and matter are reduced to >>> number relations. If reduction was elimination, we should conclude that >>> consciousness does not exist (that would be nonsensical for any conscious >>> creature) and that the physical reality does not exist, which does not >>> make >>> much sense either. >>> A physicalist would also be obliged to say that molecules, living >>> organism, >>> etc. don't exist. Note that James Watson seemed to have defended such a >>> strong reductive eliminativism. >>> But I don't see any problem with reduction, once we agree that some form >>> of >>> existence can be reduced to other, without implying elimination. >>> Mechanism makes it clear that machine are *correct* when they believe in >>> material form. Indeed all LUMs can see by themselves the rise of matter, >>> or >>> the correct laws of matter by introspection, and they will all see the >>> same >>> laws. >>> >>> >>> >>> Indeed this seemed to me >>> uncontroversial, in that the whole point of a reductionist program is >>> to show how all references to compound entities can be replaced by >>> more primitive ones. >>> >>> Your remark above seems now to be making a similar point about >>> arithmetical "reductionism" in the sense that, presumably, >>> computations can analogously (if loosely) be considered compounds of >>> arithmetical primitives, a point that had indeed occurred to me at the >>> time. If so, what interests me is the question that inspired the older >>> controversy. If the primitives of a given ontology are postulated to >>> be all that "really" exist, how are we supposed to account for the >>> apparent "existence" of compound entities? >>> >>> We need two things. The primitive objects, and the basic laws to which >>> the >>> primitive objects obeys, and which will be responsible of making possible >>> the higher level of organization of those primitive objects, or some >>> higher >>> level appearances of structures. >>> In the case of mechanism, we can take as primitive objects the natural >>> numbers: 0, s(0), s(s(0), etc. >>> And, we need only the basic laws of addition and multiplication, together >>> with succession laws: >>> 0 ≠ s(x) >>> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y >>> x+0 = x >>> x+s(y) = s(x+y) >>> x*0=0 >>> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x >>> There is some amount of latitude here. We could consider that there is >>> only >>> one primitive object, 0. Given that we can define 1, 2, 3, by Ex(x= >>> s(0)), Ex(x= s(s(0))), etc. >>> [Or we could take the combinators (K, S, SK, KS, KKK, K(KK), etc.) as >>> primitive, and the combinators laws: >>> Kxy = x >>> Sxyz = xz(yz) ] >>> It might seems amazing but those axioms are enough to prove the existence >>> of >>> UMs and LUMs, and the whole "Indra Matrix" from which consciousness and >>> physical laws appears at some (different) epistemological levels. >>> It is the same as the brick in the house example. You need the primitive >>> elements (brick) and some laws which makes them holding together (ciment, >>> gravitation, for example). >>> The same occur with physicalism. You need elementary particles, and >>> elementary forces which makes them interact. What I show is that IF >>> mechanism is correct, elementary particles and elementary forces are not >>> primitive but arise as the "border of some universal mind" (to be short), >>> which lives, at some epistemological level, in arithmetic. >>> >>> >>> If the supposedly >>> fundamental underlying mechanism is describable (in principle) >>> entirely at the level of primitives, there would appear to be no need >>> of any such further entities, and indeed Occam would imply that they >>> should not be hypothesised. >>> >>> Yes. And that is indeed why we can say that we explain them. We can >>> explain >>> the DNA structure entirely from the atoms quantum physical laws. So DNA >>> does >>> not need to be taken as a new "elementary" particle. With digital >>> mechanism, >>> atoms and particles are themselves reducible to the non trivial intrinsic >>> unavoidable consequences of addition and multiplication laws. >>> >>> >>> >>> Yet the bald fact remains that this is >>> not how things appear to us. >>> >>> Why? DNA seems clearly to be explainable by the atoms and their laws, >>> like >>> house seems clearly to be explainable in term of bricks and cement. >>> For the reduction of physics to numbers, it might seems less obvious, >>> because we are programmed to take seriously our "epistemological >>> beliefs". A >>> cat would have less chance of surviving in case he doubts the existence >>> of >>> the mouth. So brain have emerged by simplifying the possible world view, >>> but >>> this is due to habitude, and is comparable with many illusion we have had >>> in >>> the past: the sun looks like moving around the earth, but on close >>> inspection, it is the earth rotating on itself, and the move of the sun >>> is a >>> local "illusion". Matter seems to exist in some ontological primitive >>> way, >>> but on closer inspection, it emerges from group symmetries, which >>> themselves >>> emerges from the provable symmetries of the sigma_1 arithmetical >>> sentences >>> when observed by machine. >>> >>> >>> So should such compound appearances be >>> considered entirely a matter of epistemology? >>> >>> Yes, but there are many layers of realities available inside arithmetic, >>> and >>> nuances can be introduced. Take the example of prime number, or even of >>> universal numbers. Those can be said, if we want to, as existing as much >>> as >>> the primitive 0, 1, 2, 3, ... After all they are only special numbers. >>> But consciousness and matter are more properly epistemological (first >>> person >>> singular and first person plural respectively). Those are not numbers, >>> but >>> are number experiences, and those, mainly due to our self-multiplication >>> in >>> arithmetic, are related to infinities of arithmetical relations. >>> A notion like a computation, or a computable functions is intermediate, >>> they >>> can have description, which will be numbers, and extension which will be, >>> usually, sequences of numbers. >>> >>> >>> >>> IOW, is the >>> first-person - the "inside" view - in some sense the necessary arena - >>> and the sole explanation - for the emergence of anything at all beyond >>> the primitive ontological level? >>> >>> You don't need a notion of first person to say that prime numbers exist, >>> or >>> that universal numbers exist. Those are just numbers having special >>> property >>> due to the richness of the laws of addition and multiplication when taken >>> together. But UDA shows (I think) that matter and consciousness are first >>> person collective constructs of all the numbers. >>> Usually, and conventionally I consider that numbers exist primitively >>> even >>> if they have special properties. So I gave the same type of existence to >>> prime numbers, even numbers, or universal numbers. They are captured by >>> sentences with the shape: >>> Ex ( ... x ...), where (... x ...) represent some arithmetical >>> proposition >>> (which contains only the symbols 0, x, y, ..., +, *, s, and the logical >>> symbols). >>> (The proper epistemological existence will be defined by the modal logics >>> like BEx(B(.... x ...), or []<>Ex([]<>(... x ...). The last one are still >>> pure arithmetical formula (thanks to Gödel translation of B in >>> arithmetic), >>> but they have a special "meta-role", and describe what machines can >>> believe, >>> feel, observe, etc. >>> OK? >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> David >>> >>> >>> On 30 Sep 2011, at 13:44, Stephen P. King wrote: >>> >>> On 9/30/2011 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> If comp +Theaetus is correct, you have to distinguish physical existence, >>> >>> which is of the type []<>#, and existence, which is of the type "Ex ... >>> >>> x...". I will use the modal box [] and diamond <> fro the intelligible >>> >>> hypostases ([]X = BX & DX). >>> >>> [SPK] >>> >>> It seems that we have very different ideas of the meaning of the word >>> >>> Existence. "Ex ... x..." seems to be a denotative definition and thus is >>> not >>> >>> neutral with respect to properties. I may not comprehend you thoughts on >>> >>> this. >>> >>> It seems that you introduce meta-difficulties to elude simple question. >>> >>> >>> Do you have a concept for "the totality of all that exists"? >>> >>> A priori and personally: no. >>> >>> Assuming comp: yes. N is the totality of what exists, but, assuming comp, >>> I >>> >>> have to add this is a G* minus G proposition. It is not really >>> >>> communicable/provable. You have to grasp it by your own understanding (of >>> >>> UDA, for example). >>> >>> >>> Would such be unnamable for you? It is for me. >>> >>> Yes. Arithmetical truth, which relies on the ontic N whole, is unnamable >>> for >>> >>> me, that is why I can only refer to it indirectly, by making the comp >>> >>> assumption explicit. >>> >>> As I see it, existence itself is the neutral primitive ground of all >>> things, >>> >>> abstract and concrete. Perhaps my philosophy is more like dual-aspect >>> monism >>> >>> than neutral monism. >>> >>> Can you elaborate shortly on the difference between dual-aspect and >>> neutral >>> >>> monism? Comp is octal-aspect monism, when Theaetetus enters into play. >>> >>> >>> >>> [SPK] >>> >>> Once I have constructed a mental representation of the subject of a >>> >>> reasoning or concept I can use the symbolic representations in a >>> denotative >>> >>> capacity. This is how we dyslexics overcome our disability. :-) >>> >>> Why don't you do that for "Ex ... x ...."? in the numbers domain? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> My result is: mechanism entails immateralism (matter can exist but as no >>> >>> more any relation with consciousness, and so is eliminated with the usual >>> >>> weak occam principle). This should be a problem for you if you want to >>> keep >>> >>> both mechanism and weak materialism, but why do you want to do that. On >>> the >>> >>> contrary, mechanism makes the laws of physics much more solid and stable, >>> by >>> >>> providing an explanation relying only on diophantine addition and >>> >>> multiplication. >>> >>> [SPK] >>> >>> I reject all form of monism except neutral monism. Existence itself is >>> >>> the only primitive. >>> >>> In what sense would mechanism, after UDA, not be a neutral monism. >>> >>> When you use the word "existence" without saying what you assume to >>> exist, >>> >>> it look like the joke "what is the difference between a raven?". >>> >>> [SPK] >>> >>> The totality of all that exists, it merely exists. >>> >>> In non founded set theories, perhaps. But this is assuming far too much, >>> >>> again in the comp frame. The totality of all that exists does not make >>> much >>> >>> sense to me. I can imagine model of Quine New Foundation playing that >>> role, >>> >>> but that is too much literal, and seems to me contradictory, or >>> >>> quasi-contradictory. But with comp this would be a reification of the >>> >>> epistemological. We just cannot do that. >>> >>> >>> Prior to the specification of properties, even distinctions themselves, >>> >>> there is only existence. Existence is not a property such as Red, two or >>> >>> heavy. It has no extension or form in itself but is the possibility to be >>> >>> and have all properties. >>> >>> >>> This seems to me quite speculative, and useless in the comp theory. If >>> you >>> >>> were betting that comp is false, I could understand the motivation for >>> such >>> >>> postulation, but are you really betting that comp is false? >>> >>> >>> >>> [SPK] >>> >>> Numbers and arithmetic presuppose a specific meaning, valuation and >>> >>> relation. >>> >>> This is fuzzy. In the TOE allowed by comp, we can presuppose only 0, s, >>> *, >>> >>> and + and the usual first order axioms. >>> >>> >>> This implies, in my reasoning, that they are not primitive. >>> >>> They are ontologically primitive, in the sense that ontologically they >>> are >>> >>> the only things which exist. even computations don't exist in that >>> primitive >>> >>> sense. Computations already exists only relationally. I will keep saying >>> >>> that computations exists, for pedagogical reasons. For professional >>> >>> logicians, I make a nuance, which would look like total jargon in this >>> list. >>> >>> >>> >>> You seem to assume that they are objects in the mind of God, making God = >>> >>> Existence. I disagree with this thinking. >>> >>> But with comp, God = arithmetical truth, although we have to be careful, >>> >>> because no machines, including perhaps me, can really assert that. It is >>> a >>> >>> just non rationally communicable, but "betable", once we bet on comp. >>> >>> >>> >>> Could you define to me what you mean by topological dual of a number, or >>> a >>> >>> program? >>> >>> [SPK] >>> >>> I do not recognize the idea that a number or a program has a meaning >>> >>> isolate from all else. I do not understand your theory of meaningfulness. >>> >>> How does meaningfulness arise in your thinking? I use a non-well founded >>> set >>> >>> type Dictionary model and have discussed it before. >>> >>> Meaning arise in the mind of number, and the mind of numbers arise by the >>> >>> computational relations they have with other numbers, probably so in the >>> >>> comp theory. >>> >>> I have never stop to give references on this, beyond my own work. See the >>> >>> name Boolos, Smorynski, Smullyan in my papers and books, or in my URL. >>> >>> What is it that you don't understand in the second part of the sane >>> paper. >>> >>> [SPK] >>> >>> I do not understand how you ignore the fact that one must have a means >>> >>> to implement a set of distinguishable symbols, configuration of chalk >>> mark >>> >>> on slate, etc. to denote and connote an abstraction. It is as if you >>> >>> presuppose physicality without giving it credit for what it does. I do >>> not >>> >>> know what else to say now to make this idea more clear. >>> >>> You keep confusing the number 17, with physical representation of it. >>> >>> I do have symbols, but why should they be physical. I use the mark "0", >>> but >>> >>> I can use anything else, physical or not. Arithmetic does not presuppose >>> >>> physicalness? Book on numbers say nothing about any possible relations >>> with >>> >>> physics. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Physicist seems not to have the notion of models, and use that term where >>> >>> logician use the term "theory". Roughly speaking, for a logician "model" >>> is >>> >>> for "a reality". I remind you also that Deutch advocates physicalism, and >>> >>> so, if you get the UDA as you said, you know that Deustch physicalism is >>> >>> incoherent with digital mechanism (which he advocates in FOR). >>> >>> [SPK] >>> >>> I wish that you would write more addressing this critique of Deutsch's >>> >>> argument. >>> >>> Recently on the FOR list Deustch admitted not having a reply to my >>> >>> objection. I think he wants still searching one. >>> >>> >>> >>> Arithmetical truth is the territory. Machines and numbers are what build >>> >>> maps of the territory. When you say "yes" to a doctor, you are just >>> changing >>> >>> a map for another. Nowhere is a confusion between map and territory, >>> except >>> >>> for the fixed points, like the here and now indexical consciousness. But >>> we >>> >>> can be thankful that this is possible (in computer science) because it >>> makes >>> >>> the map/brain useful when relating with a probable part of the territory. >>> >>> [SPK] >>> >>> But are when maps and territories are made of the "same stuff" we have >>> >>> problems. >>> >>> Not necessarily. Or you take the word stuff too literally perhaps. >>> >>> [SPK] >>> >>> I used the word 'stuff" in quotes so that it would not be taken as >>> >>> literal. >>> >>> OK, but then there is no problem with maps and territories having the >>> same >>> >>> "stuff". You can use Kleene second recursion theorem, of your unfounded >>> set >>> >>> theories to provide sense to such fixed points. >>> >>> >>> >>> You can use Scott topology to modelize computations. Stopping programs >>> will >>> >>> correspond to fixed point transformations. >>> >>> But my question was more easy, and can be recasted in physical terms: >>> does a >>> >>> machine stop or not stop (accepting a robust physical universe, and no >>> >>> accidental asteroid destructing the machine)? >>> >>> [SPK] >>> >>> OK, I still do not comprehend how you can say this and still be a >>> ideal >>> >>> monist. I am tired. >>> >>> Take a nap, and then you might answer the simple question: accept you the >>> >>> truth that [phi_i(j) converge V phi_i(j) does not converge]. >>> >>> I remind you also that you can classify me as an ideal monist only if you >>> >>> accept that numbers are ideas (in God's mind, perhaps), but I prefer to >>> >>> classify the comp's consequence as being neutral monism, or octal-monism. >>> >>> But this might only be a vocabulary problem. >>> >>> I am not arguing for or against any philosophical truth. My point is >>> >>> technical. It is that IF we can survive with a material digital >>> body/brain, >>> >>> THEN the physical laws emerge, in a precise way, from already only >>> addition >>> >>> and multiplication of (non negative) integers. >>> >>> Another way to put it: IF we can survive in a digital "matrix", then we >>> are >>> >>> already in a digital matrix. >>> >>> I am not pretending that the proof is without flaw, but up to now, I can >>> >>> find flaws in the way people describe flaws in the reasoning: they almost >>> >>> introduce systematically a supplementary philosophical hypothesis >>> implicitly >>> >>> somewhere. No philosophical hypothesis can refute a deductive argument >>> per >>> >>> se (it might certainly help to find a flaw, but then they have to find >>> it). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> >>> "Everything List" group. >>> >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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