On Mon, Apr 2, 2012 at 2:12 AM, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > On 1 April 2012 16:48, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> David, if Dick does not have the impression that Harry has became a sort of >> zombie of some kind, for a time, I would suggest he trusts Harry and his >> doctor. If he is prepared to bet on comp. Once he bet on comp, the nature of >> the ultimate consituants of what do the computation, relatively to its usual >> environments, does not matter. > > Yes, once one has bet on comp, the distinction between "software" and > "hardware" is one of relative level rather than fundamental ontology. > You appear to confirm my thought that the best evidence that the > replacement brain implements the right computation is its behaviour, > and hence that of the recipient. So Dick can only rely on his > assessment of Harry's behaviour to give him confidence for his own bet > on this particular doctor's expertise. However, given the potential > for getting the substitution level wrong in some way, and the finite > nature of any possible test, just how much can Dick trust that his > friend hasn't been affected in some hard-to-detect way, despite all > his assurances to the contrary? As you observe, this may well become > a pragmatic, as opposed to merely philosophical, issue in the > not-too-distant future. Suffice it to say, I'm unlikely to be an > early adopter!
Dick could have the same doubts about any medical treatment short of total brain replacement. Perhaps taking perindopril for hypertension turns people into zombies. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
