"Velmans introduces perceptual projection but this remains as the Hard Problem in his book, how exactly perceptual projection happens"-Evgenii Rudnyi
I conjecture that the discrete nonphysical particles of compactified space, the so-called Calabi-Yau Manifolds of string theory, have perceptual projection due to the mapping of closed strings, something that Leibniz hypothesized for his monads centuries ago. http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf Richard David On Sun, May 27, 2012 at 1:50 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote: > On 5/26/2012 11:57 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > >> I have just finished reading Understanding Consciousness by Max Velmans >> and below there are a couple of comments to the book. >> >> The book is similar to Jeffrey Gray's Consciousness: Creeping up on the >> Hard Problem in a sense that it takes phenomenal consciousness seriously. >> Let me give an example. Imagine that you watch yourself in the mirror. Your >> image that you observe in the mirror is an example of phenomenal >> consciousness. >> >> The difference with Jeffrey Gray is in the question where the image that >> you see in the mirror is located. If we take a conventional way of >> thinking, that is, >> >> 1) photons are reflected by the mirror >> 2) neurons in retina are excited >> 3) natural neural nets starts information processing >> >> then the answer should be that this image is in your brain. It seems to >> be logical as, after all, we know that there is nothing after the mirror. >> >> However, it immediately follows that not only your image in the mirror is >> in your brain but rather everything that your see is also in your brain. >> This is exactly what one finds in Gray's book "The world is inside the >> head". >> >> Velmans takes a different position that he calls reflexive model of >> perception. According to him, what we consciously experience is located >> exactly where we experience it. In other words, the image that you see in >> the mirror is located after the mirror and not in your brain. A nice >> picture that explains Velmans' idea is at >> >> http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/**brain-and-world.html<http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/brain-and-world.html> >> >> Velmans introduces perceptual projection but this remains as the Hard >> Problem in his book, how exactly perceptual projection happens. >> >> Velmans contrast his model with reductionism (physicalism) and dualism >> and interestingly enough he finds many common features between reductionism >> and dualism. For example, the image in the mirror will be in the brain >> according to both reductionism and dualism. This part could be interesting >> for Stephen. >> > > Hi Evgenii, > > I would be very interested if Velmans discussed how the model would > consider multiple observers of the image in the mirror and how the images > that are in the brains of the many are coordinated such that there is > always a single consistent world of mirrors and brains and so forth. > > >> First I thought that perceptual projection could be interpreted similar >> to Craig's senses but it is not the case. Velmans' reflexive monism is >> based on a statement that first- and third-person views cannot be combined >> (this is what Bruno says). From a third-person view, one observes neural >> correlates of consciousness but not the first-person view. Now I understand >> such a position much better. >> > > Is this third-person view (3p) one that is not ever the actual > first-person (1p) of some actual observer? I can only directly experience > my own content of consciousness, so the content of someone else is always > only known via some description. How is this idea considered, if at all? > > >> Anyway the the last chapter in the book is "Self-consciousness in a >> reflexive universe". >> > > I am interested in "communications between self-conscious entities in a > reflexive universe". ;-) Does Velmans discuss any abstract models of > reflexivity itself? > > >> Evgenii >> >> > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." > ~ Francis Bacon > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<email@example.com> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com <everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.