"Velmans introduces perceptual projection but this remains as the Hard
Problem in his book, how exactly perceptual projection happens"-Evgenii
I conjecture that the discrete nonphysical particles of compactified space,
the so-called Calabi-Yau Manifolds of string theory, have perceptual
projection due to the mapping of closed strings, something that Leibniz
hypothesized for his monads centuries ago.
On Sun, May 27, 2012 at 1:50 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
> On 5/26/2012 11:57 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>> I have just finished reading Understanding Consciousness by Max Velmans
>> and below there are a couple of comments to the book.
>> The book is similar to Jeffrey Gray's Consciousness: Creeping up on the
>> Hard Problem in a sense that it takes phenomenal consciousness seriously.
>> Let me give an example. Imagine that you watch yourself in the mirror. Your
>> image that you observe in the mirror is an example of phenomenal
>> The difference with Jeffrey Gray is in the question where the image that
>> you see in the mirror is located. If we take a conventional way of
>> thinking, that is,
>> 1) photons are reflected by the mirror
>> 2) neurons in retina are excited
>> 3) natural neural nets starts information processing
>> then the answer should be that this image is in your brain. It seems to
>> be logical as, after all, we know that there is nothing after the mirror.
>> However, it immediately follows that not only your image in the mirror is
>> in your brain but rather everything that your see is also in your brain.
>> This is exactly what one finds in Gray's book "The world is inside the
>> Velmans takes a different position that he calls reflexive model of
>> perception. According to him, what we consciously experience is located
>> exactly where we experience it. In other words, the image that you see in
>> the mirror is located after the mirror and not in your brain. A nice
>> picture that explains Velmans' idea is at
>> Velmans introduces perceptual projection but this remains as the Hard
>> Problem in his book, how exactly perceptual projection happens.
>> Velmans contrast his model with reductionism (physicalism) and dualism
>> and interestingly enough he finds many common features between reductionism
>> and dualism. For example, the image in the mirror will be in the brain
>> according to both reductionism and dualism. This part could be interesting
>> for Stephen.
> Hi Evgenii,
> I would be very interested if Velmans discussed how the model would
> consider multiple observers of the image in the mirror and how the images
> that are in the brains of the many are coordinated such that there is
> always a single consistent world of mirrors and brains and so forth.
>> First I thought that perceptual projection could be interpreted similar
>> to Craig's senses but it is not the case. Velmans' reflexive monism is
>> based on a statement that first- and third-person views cannot be combined
>> (this is what Bruno says). From a third-person view, one observes neural
>> correlates of consciousness but not the first-person view. Now I understand
>> such a position much better.
> Is this third-person view (3p) one that is not ever the actual
> first-person (1p) of some actual observer? I can only directly experience
> my own content of consciousness, so the content of someone else is always
> only known via some description. How is this idea considered, if at all?
>> Anyway the the last chapter in the book is "Self-consciousness in a
>> reflexive universe".
> I am interested in "communications between self-conscious entities in a
> reflexive universe". ;-) Does Velmans discuss any abstract models of
> reflexivity itself?
> "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
> ~ Francis Bacon
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