On 9 June 2012 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:

> No, I have meant
> a) simulated computer
> b) simulated myself (but not in a)
> Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions executed by
> some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would you
> define the difference then in this case?

I agree with you that there is no difference if you are thinking in
terms of a physical machine, and assume primitive physicality.  In
that case the very notion of computation itself is an unnecessary
auxiliary assumption in explaining the machine's physical behaviour.
But then how can you justify the computational theory of mind on which
the whole notion of simulation of consciousness depends?


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