On 7/21/2012 7:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Stephen,

I appreciate very much Louis Kauffman, including that paper. But I don't see your point. Nothing there seems to cast any problem for comp or its consequences.

Why not read the MGA threads directly, and address the points specifically?

I already did. My contention is that computational universality is NOT the separation of computations from physical systems, it is the independence of a given computation from any one particular physical systems. The former Seperation is categorical in that one has seperate categories with no connection between them whatsoever. The latter is a duality between a pair of categories in that for the class of equivalent computations there is at least one physical system that can implement it and for a class of equivalent physical systems there is at least one computation that can simulate it. (Equivalent between physical systems is defined mathematically in terms of homologies such as diffeomorphisms) This idea was first pointed out by Leibniz and known as Leibniz equivalence. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/Leibniz_Equivalence.html


Bruno


Le 20-juil.-12, à 05:34, Stephen P. King a écrit :

Hi Bruno and Friends,

Perhaps this attached paper by Louis H. Kauffman will be a bit enlightening as to what I have been trying to explain. He calls it non-duality, I call it duality. The difference is just a matter of how one thinks of it.

Onward!

Stephen

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<Laws of Form and the Logic of Non-Duality.pdf>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Onward!

Stephen

"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon


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