Le 21-juil.-12, à 20:04, Stephen P. King a écrit :

On 7/21/2012 7:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Stephen,

I appreciate very much Louis Kauffman, including that paper. But I don't see your point. Nothing there seems to cast any problem for comp or its consequences.

Why not read the MGA threads directly, and address the points specifically?

I already did. My contention is that computational universality is NOT the separation of computations from physical systems, it is the independence of a given computation from any one particular physical systems.

Computational universality is an arithmetic notion. You don't need UDA to separate it from physics, you need only a good intro to computer science. This critics is wrong at the very start.

The independence of a given computation from any particular physical system is obviously part of the comp assumption, and should not be confused with the impossibility of any physical system to capture or produce consciousness, which is related to the mathematical and the theological by comp, and that is the consequence of UDA including MGA.

By addressing MGA, I meant you to quote that text, and that text only, and tell me were you disagree, and for what reason.



The former Seperation is categorical in that one has seperate categories with no connection between them whatsoever. The latter is a duality between a pair of categories in that for the class of equivalent computations there is at least one physical system that can implement it and for a class of equivalent physical systems there is at least one computation that can simulate it. (Equivalent between physical systems is defined mathematically in terms of homologies such as diffeomorphisms) This idea was first pointed out by Leibniz and known as Leibniz equivalence. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/ Leibniz_Equivalence.html

This makes sense in Aristotelian physics, which, that is the point, does not make sense if comp is true. Unless you can find a flaw. May be you have a problem with what a proof consists in. Proofs does not depend on the interpretation of the terms and formula occurring in it. A proof in math, and in applied math, is always complete in itself. Keep in mind that comp does not presuppose any theory of physics. It assumes only that the physical reality is Turing complete at least. If not, asking for an artificial digital brain would not make sense.


Bruno



Bruno


Le 20-juil.-12, à 05:34, Stephen P. King a écrit :

Hi Bruno and Friends,

Perhaps this attached paper by Louis H. Kauffman will be a bit enlightening as to what I have been trying to explain. He calls it non-duality, I call it duality. The difference is just a matter of how one thinks of it.

Onward!

Stephen

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

<Laws of Form and the Logic of Non-Duality.pdf>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
Onward!

Stephen

"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to