----- Have received the following content ----- 
Sender: Roger 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-17, 10:03:03
Subject: Re: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model


Hi Craig Weinberg 

Bruno Marchal's Comment below on the possibility of digitally dealing with 
subjective experience has put a hold on my previous objections (such as you 
discuss at the bottom). 

BRUNO'S COMMENT 
__________________________________________________________________________
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-15, 04:17:20
Subject: Re: Imprisoned by language (code)


<SNIP> 


No problem for comp here. We have discovered that machine, when looking inward 
tend to perceive, or experience many truth which are beyond words. There is a 
logic (S4Grz) which formalize at the meta-level that non-formalizable (at the 
ontological level) informal process of though. I wrote (and published) recently 
a paper on this, (the mystical machine, in french) but it is what I try to 
explain here since a long time. Machines have already a non formalizable (by 
themselves) intuition. Indeed self-referentally correct machine have a rich, 
neoplatonist-like, theology. On my url front page, you can download my paper on 
an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, made possible (and necessary in 
some sense) by computer science.


Bruno







Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/17/2012 
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Craig Weinberg 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-14, 21:13:06
Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model




On Saturday, August 11, 2012 3:01:41 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: 
Roger, 


You say computers are quantitative instruments which cannot have a self or 
feelings, but might you be attributing things at the wrong level?  For example, 
a computer can simulate some particle interactions, a sufficiently big computer 
could simulate the behavior of any arbitrarily large amount of matter.  The 
matter in the simulation could be arranged in the form of a human being sitting 
in a room.

Does that mean that if I carefully scooped some salt or iron filings into a 
cymatic pattern, that we should have an expectation of a sound being produced 
automatically?
 



Do you think this simulated human made of simulated matter, all run within the 
computer not have a self, feelings, and intuition?

The simulated human won't even have an 'it'-ness. The simulation only exists 
for us because it is designed specifically to exploit our expectations. There 
is no simulation, just millions of little salt scoopers.
 

 After all, we are made up of material which lacks feelings, nonetheless, we 
have feelings.

That's like saying that a photograph is made up of pixels which lack image. 
Since the nature of consciousness is privacy, we are not the best judge of 
non-human consciousness. There is no reason to trust our naive realism in 
assuming that non-humans lack proto-feelings.


"Complex behavior is not confined to metazoans. Both amoebae and ciliates show 
purposive coordinated behaviour, as do individual human cells, such as 
macrophages. The multi-nucleate slime mould Physarum polycephalum can solve 
shortest path mazes and demonstrate a memory of a rhythmic series of stimuli, 
apparently using a biological clock to predict the next pulse (Nakagaki et. al. 
2000, Ball 2008)." - http://www.dhushara.com/cosfcos/cosfcos2.html


 
 Where do you believe these feelings originate?

Feelings may not originate, but like the colors of the spectrum are accessed 
privately but have no public origination. As long as we assume that experience 
is something which occurs as the product of a mechanism, then we are limited to 
making sense of the universe as a meaningless mechanism of objects. If we think 
of time and space as the experiential cancellations, I think we have a better 
chance of understanding how it all fits together.

Craig
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