Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> 2012/9/10 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com>
>> > > No program can determine its hardware.  This is a consequence of the
>> > > Church
>> > > Turing thesis.  The particular machine at the lowest level has no
>> > bearing
>> > > (from the program's perspective).
>> > If that is true, we can show that CT must be false, because we *can*
>> > define
>> > a "meta-program" that has access to (part of) its own hardware (which
>> > still
>> > is intuitively computable - we can even implement it on a computer).
>> >
>> It's false, the program *can't* know that the hardware it has access to
>> is
>> the *real* hardware and not a simulated hardware. The program has only
>> access to hardware through IO, and it can't tell (as never ever) from
>> that
>> interface if what's outside is the *real* outside or simulated outside.
>> <\quote>
>> Yes that is true. If anything it is true because the hardware is not even
>> clearly determined at the base level (quantum uncertainty).
>> I should have expressed myself more accurately and written " "hardware" "
>> or
>> "relative 'hardware'". We can define a (meta-)programs that have access
>> to
>> their "hardware" in the sense of knowing what they are running on
>> relative
>> to some notion of "hardware". They cannot be emulated using universal
>> turing
>> machines
> Then it's not a program if it can't run on a universal turing machine.
The funny thing is, it *can* run on a universal turing machine. Just that it
may lose relative correctness if we do that. We can still use a turing
machine to "run" it and interpret what the result means.

So for all intents and purposes it is quite like a program. Maybe not a
program as such, OK, but it certainly can be used precisely in a
step-by-step manner, and I think this is what CT thesis means by
algorithmically computable.
Maybe not, but in this case CT is just a statement about specific forms of

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