On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able to talk > about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon. The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying qualia. By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without causal efficacy of its own. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
