On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able to talk
> about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.
The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely
as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying
qualia. By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball
entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or
some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this
property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without
causal efficacy of its own.
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