Leibniz's primitive is the monad or substance, which is non-extended in space.
A complete concept. This would make Leibniz's monad
semantic, semiotic, not merely logical. But not all objects
are monads, only unitary corporeal bodies.

It contains present as well as future properties, so it is time-portable.

Monads are unique nondivisible (therefore nonextended) 
corporeal bodies which have no parts, but may have variations within. 

  
http://www.iep.utm.edu/leib-met/#H8
  

"8. Substance as Monad  

   
"Around the end of the Seventeenth Century, Leibniz famously began to use the 
word monad 
as his name for substance. Monad means that which is one, has no  
parts and is therefore indivisible. These are the fundamental existing things, 
according to Leibniz.  His theory of monads is meant to be a superior 
alternative to the 
theory of atoms that was becoming popular in natural philosophy at the time.  
Leibniz has many reasons for distinguishing monads from atoms. The easiest to 
understand is perhaps that while atoms are meant to be  
the smallest unit of extension out of which all larger extended things are 
built, 
monads are non-extended (recall that space is an illusion on Leibniz's view).  

Monads and Complete Concepts  

We must begin to understand what a monad is by beginning from the idea of a 
complete concept.  
previously stated, a substance (that is, monad) is that reality which the 
complete concept represents.  
A complete concept contains within itself all the predicates of the subject of 
which it is the concept, 
and these predicates are related by  sufficient reasons into a vast single 
network of explanation. 

So, relatedly, the monad must not only exhibit properties, but contain within 
itself virtually or potentially all the properties  
it will exhibit in the future, as well as contain the trace of all the 
properties it did exhibit in the past.
 In Leibniz's extraordinary phrase, found frequently in his later work, the 
monad is pregnant  
with the future and laden with the past (see, for example, Monadology 22). All 
these properties are 
folded up within the monad; they unfold when they have sufficient reason to do 
so  
(see, for example,Monadology 61). Furthermore, the network of explanation is 
indivisible; 
to divide it would either leave some predicates without a  
sufficient reason or merely separate two substances that never belonged 
together in 
the first place. Correspondingly, the monad is one, simple and indivisible."  

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net  
10/12/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  

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