# Re: An additional observation-- But only the prime numbers can be monads. Cool.

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On 07 Dec 2012, at 14:57, Roger Clough wrote:```
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Here's an additional observation-- Only the prime numbers can be monads, because all other integers can not be subdivided and still remain integers.
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Hmm... numbers are monad when seen as index of a partial computable function. the monad are the program, which you can see as a number relative to a universal number. Keep in mind I use comp (renamed CTM for Computationalist theory of Mind).
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Bruno

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Cool.

----- Have received the following content -----
Sender: Roger Clough
Time: 2012-12-07, 08:33:37
Subject: Fw: Whoopie ! The natural INTEGERS are indeed monads

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Obviously, I meant the natural integers, not the natural numbers, whatever they be.
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----- Have received the following content -----
Sender: Roger Clough
Time: 2012-12-07, 08:18:36
Subject: Whoopie ! The natural numbers are indeed monads

Hi Bruno Marchal

1) We in fact agree about what 1p is, except IMHO it is the
Supreme Monad viewing the world THROUGH an individual's
1p that I would call the inner God. Or any God.

2) Previously I dismissed numbers as being monads because I

But natural numbers are different because
even though they are only mental substances, they're still
substances, by virtue of the fact that they can't be subdivided.
So they are of one part each.

Thus the natural numbers are monads, even though they have no
physical correlates. Sorry I've be so slow to see that.

That reallyiopens doors Then numbers can see each other with 1p.

WHOOPEE !

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/7/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Time: 2012-12-06, 12:44:46
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Subject: Re: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling the mind
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On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon
itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive
theory has done.

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On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the diary) the the self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is enough to understand that physics emerge from the way the "numbers see themselves".
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But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the incompleteness phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp & p definition. It is a bit technical.
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Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower, and it plays the key role for consciousness and matter.
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We can replace [1p] by its actions -
those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object).
You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective.

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That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is the 1p, that we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by machines. I describe the 3p and the 1ps (singular and plural), and indeed their necessary statistical relation at some level.
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That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or
interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations.
Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find
again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument
for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive
theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize
cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work
when living breathing humans are concerned.

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I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage of comp. You have computer science.
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IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent
computer calculations from emulating the mind.

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The 1p is not left out. Eventually comp singles out eight person points of view. If you think comp left out the person, you miss the meaning of the comp hope, or the comp fear.
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Bruno

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12
Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth

On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual machines knows already that, and can justified that If there are machine (and from outside we can know this to correct) then the 1p- truth is not codable. The 1p truth are more related to the relation between belief and reality (not necessarily physical reality, except for observation and sensation).
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Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp & p is NOT codable.
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Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are not codable.
```Many things true about us is not codable either.

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Let me see if I understand that. I think you are saying that p, i.e. that "p" describes a fact about the world, a meta-level above the coding of a machine.
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No, p is for some statement at the base level, like 1+1 = 2.

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That the Mars Rover believes it is south of it's landing point is implicit in its state and might be inferred from its behavior, but there is no part of the state corresponding to "I *believe* I am south of my landing point."
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Then Mars Rover is not L?ian. But I am not even sure that Mars Rover is Turing universal, or that it exploits its Turing universality.
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But PA and ZF can represent "I believe". So we can study the logic of a new 'knowledge" operator defined (at the meta level, for each arithmetical proposition) by Bp & p. For example if p is "1+1=2", it is
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Believe"("1+1=2") & 1+1 = 2.

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We cannot define such operator in arithmetic. We would need something like Believe"("1+1=2") & True("1+1 = 2"), but True, in general cannot defined in arithmetic. Yet, we can metadefine it and study its logic, which obeys a soprt of temporal intuionistic logic (interpreting the S4Grz logic obtained).
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One could include such second-level states (which one might want to communicate to Pasadena) but then that state would be just another first-level state. Right?
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Not sure I see what you mean. The meta, available by the machine is in the "I believe". It is the 3-I. The presentation of myself to myself. The 1-I will be the non definable operator above. We connect the believer to the truth. It is easy to do for the sound correct machine.
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Bruno

Brent

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