On 08 Dec 2012, at 14:23, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

By "universal numbers" are you referring to the numbers
as seen by Pythagoras ? I'm a little hesistant to get
into that stuff or anything esoteric since becoming a Christian.

Good!

No, by universal numbers I mean a code for a universal Turing machine (what a physical computers approximate very well).

Enumerate all the programs in some fixed universal programming language: p_0, p_1, p_2, p_3, ... Call phi_i the corresponding partial computable function. u is said to be a universal number if phi_u(<x,y>) = phi_x(y). u is the computer, x is the program, and y is the data. <x,y> is a bijection from NXN to N, so as to keep the phi_i having all one input/variable.

Nothing esoteric here, it is computer science.

Bruno



There is a short video of these at

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i7AyNFpJ6DA


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/8/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-08, 05:09:15
Subject: Re: An additional observation-- But only the prime numbers can bemonads. Cool.

On 07 Dec 2012, at 14:57, Roger Clough wrote:

>
>
> Here's an additional observation-- Only the prime numbers can be
> monads,
> because all other integers can not be subdivided and still remain
> integers.






Hmm... numbers are monad when seen as index of a partial computable
function. the monad are the program, which you can see as a number
relative to a universal number. Keep in mind I use comp (renamed CTM
for Computationalist theory of Mind).

Bruno



>
> Cool.
>
>
>
> ----- Have received the following content -----
> Sender: Roger Clough
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-07, 08:33:37
> Subject: Fw: Whoopie ! The natural INTEGERS are indeed monads
>
>
>
> Obviously, I meant the natural integers, not the natural numbers,
> whatever they be.
>
>
> ----- Have received the following content -----
> Sender: Roger Clough
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-07, 08:18:36
> Subject: Whoopie ! The natural numbers are indeed monads
>
>
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
>
> 1) We in fact agree about what 1p is, except IMHO it is the
> Supreme Monad viewing the world THROUGH an individual's
> 1p that I would call the inner God. Or any God.
>
> 2) Previously I dismissed numbers as being monads because I
> thought that all monads had to refer to physical substances.
>
> But natural numbers are different because
> even though they are only mental substances, they're still
> substances, by virtue of the fact that they can't be subdivided.
> So they are of one part each.
>
> Thus the natural numbers are monads, even though they have no
> physical correlates. Sorry I've be so slow to see that.
>
> That reallyiopens doors Then numbers can see each other with 1p.
>
> WHOOPEE !
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/7/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-06, 12:44:46
> Subject: Re: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling
> the mind
>
>
>
>
> On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon
> itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive
> theory has done.
>
>
> On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the
> diary) the the self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is
> enough to understand that physics emerge from the way the "numbers
> see themselves".
>
>
> But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the
> incompleteness phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp
> & p definition. It is a bit technical.
>
>
> Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower,
> and it plays the key role for consciousness and matter.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> We can replace [1p] by its actions -
> those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object).
> You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective.
>
>
> That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is
> the 1p, that we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by
> machines. I describe the 3p and the 1ps (singular and plural), and
> indeed their necessary statistical relation at some level.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or
> interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations.
> Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find
> again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument
> for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive
> theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize
> cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work
> when living breathing humans are concerned.
>
>
> I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage
> of comp. You have computer science.
>
>
>
>
>
> IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent
> computer calculations from emulating the mind.
>
>
> The 1p is not left out. Eventually comp singles out eight person
> points of view. If you think comp left out the person, you miss the
> meaning of the comp hope, or the comp fear.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/5/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12
> Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth
>
>
>
>
> On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote:
>
>
> On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual
> machines knows already that, and can justified that If there are
> machine (and from outside we can know this to correct) then the 1p-
> truth is not codable. The 1p truth are more related to the relation
> between belief and reality (not necessarily physical reality, except
> for observation and sensation).
>
>
> Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp & p is NOT codable.
> Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are not
> codable.
> Many things true about us is not codable either.
>
> Let me see if I understand that. I think you are saying that p, i.e.
> that "p" describes a fact about the world, a meta-level above the
> coding of a machine.
>
>
> No, p is for some statement at the base level, like 1+1 = 2.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> That the Mars Rover believes it is south of it's landing point is
> implicit in its state and might be inferred from its behavior, but
> there is no part of the state corresponding to "I *believe* I am
> south of my landing point."
>
>
> Then Mars Rover is not L?ian. But I am not even sure that Mars Rover
> is Turing universal, or that it exploits its Turing universality.
>
>
> But PA and ZF can represent "I believe". So we can study the logic
> of a new 'knowledge" operator defined (at the meta level, for each
> arithmetical proposition) by Bp & p. For example if p is "1+1=2", it
> is
>
>
> Believe"("1+1=2") & 1+1 = 2.
>
>
> We cannot define such operator in arithmetic. We would need
> something like Believe"("1+1=2") & True("1+1 = 2"), but True, in
> general cannot defined in arithmetic. Yet, we can metadefine it and
> study its logic, which obeys a soprt of temporal intuionistic logic
> (interpreting the S4Grz logic obtained).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> One could include such second-level states (which one might want to
> communicate to Pasadena) but then that state would be just another
> first-level state. Right?
>
>
>
> Not sure I see what you mean. The meta, available by the machine is
> in the "I believe". It is the 3-I. The presentation of myself to
> myself. The 1-I will be the non definable operator above. We connect
> the believer to the truth. It is easy to do for the sound correct
> machine.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Brent
>
>
>
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