On Sunday, December 16, 2012 8:36:55 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote: > > > Are monads tokens ? I'm going to say yes, because each monad > refers to a corporeal body as a whole (so it is nonreductive at the > physical end) > even though each monad, being specific about what it refers to, > identifies the type of object it refers to. >
Monads are self-tokenizing tokenizers but not actually tokens (tokens of what? other Monads?). Tokens don't 'exist', they are figures of computation, which is semiosis, a sensory-motive experience within the cognitive symbolic ranges of awareness. Craig > > Roger Clough], [[email protected]] <javascript:> > 12/16/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Roger Clough <javascript:> > *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> > *Time:* 2012-12-16, 08:17:27 > *Subject:* Davidson on truth > > ** > *Donald Davidson on truth * > > I don't think you can do any better on understanding truth than studying > Donald Davidson. > > As I understand him, in > > 1) he justifies comp (the use of tokens, because they are nonreductive) as > long as we allow for > (a) mental causation of physical events; (b) that there is a strict > exceptionless relation > (iff) between the events; (c) that we use tokens and not types to relate > mental to > physical events > > 2) He narrows down what form of language can be used. > Not sure but this seems to allow only finite, learnable context-free > expressions only > > 3) He clarifies the meaning and use of 1p vs 3p. Observed that Hume > accepted only 1p > knowledege, the logical positivists accepted only 3p knowledge, where 1p > is knowledge by > acquaintance and 3p is knowledge by description. I might add that IMHO 1p > is Kierkegaard's > view that truth is subjective, so K is close to Hume. > > > * > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Davidson_%28philosopher%29#Mental_events > *<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Davidson_%28philosopher%29/lMental_events> > > > *"1. Token Mental events ( A justification of token physicalism: these > being comp and purely token functionalism)* > > In "Mental Events" (1970) Davidson advanced a form of token *identity > theory* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_theory> > about the mind: token *mental > events*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mental_event>are identical to token > physical events. One previous difficulty with such a > view was that it did not seem feasible to provide laws relating mental > states--for example, believing that the sky is blue, or wanting a > hamburger--to physical states, such as patterns of neural activity in the > brain. Davidson argued that such a reduction would not be necessary to a > token identity thesis: it is possible that each individual mental event > just is the corresponding physical event, without there being laws relating > *types* (as opposed to tokens) of mental events to *types* of physical > events. But, Davidson argued, the fact that we could not have such a > reduction does not entail that the mind is anything *more* than the > brain. Hence, Davidson called his position *anomalous > monism*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anomalous_monism>: > monism, because it claims that only one thing is at issue in questions of > mental and physical events; anomalous (from *a-*, "not," and *omalos*, > "regular") because mental and physical event *types* could not be > connected by strict laws (laws without exceptions). > > Davidson argued that anomalous monism *follows > from*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_consequence>three plausible > theses. First, he assumes the > *denial of > **epiphenomenalism*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism>--that > is, the denial of the view that mental events do not cause physical events. > Second, he assumes a *nomological view of causation*, according to which > one event causes another if (and only if) there is a strict, exceptionless > law governing the relation between the events. Third, he assumes the > principle of the *anomalism of the mental*, according to which there are > no strict laws that govern the relationship between mental event types and > physical event types. By these three theses, Davidson argued, it follows > that the causal relations between the mental and the physical hold only > between mental event tokens, but that mental events as types are anomalous. > This ultimately secures token physicalism and a > *supervenience*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supervenience>relation between > the mental and the physical, while respecting the autonomy > of the mental (Malpas, 2005, ยง2). > > *2. Truth and meaning (A justification of the use of certain types of > language--- I think this might mean context-free (finite) language)* > > In 1967 Davidson published "Truth and Meaning," in which he argued that > any *learnable* language must be statable in a finite form, even if it is > capable of a theoretically infinite number of expressions--as we may assume > that natural human languages are, at least in principle. If it could not be > stated in a finite way then it could not be learned through a finite, > empirical method such as the way humans learn their languages. It follows > that it must be possible to give a theoretical semantics for any natural > language which could give the meanings of an infinite number of sentences > on the basis of a finite system of axioms. Following, among others, Rudolf > Carnap (*Introduction to Semantics*, Harvard 1942, 22) Davidson also > argued that "giving the meaning of a sentence" was equivalent to stating > its truth conditions, so stimulating the modern work on *truth-conditional > semantics* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-conditional_semantics>. In > sum, he proposed that it must be possible to distinguish a finite number of > distinct grammatical features of a language, and for each of them explain > its workings in such a way as to generate trivial (obviously correct) > statements of the truth conditions of all the (infinitely many) sentences > making use of that feature. That is, we can give a finite theory of meaning > for a natural language; the test of its correctness is that it would > generate (if applied to the language in which it was formulated) all the > sentences of the form "'p' is true if and only if p" ("'Snow is white' is > true if and only if snow is white"). (These are called T-sentences: > Davidson derives the idea from *Alfred > Tarski*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Tarski> > .) > > This work was originally delivered in his *John Locke > Lectures*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Locke_Lectures>at Oxford, and > launched a large endeavor by many philosophers to develop > Davidsonian semantical theories for natural language. Davidson himself > contributed many details to such a theory, in essays on quotation, indirect > discourse, and descriptions of action. > > *3. Knowledge and belief (The difference between 1p and 3p. Also, a > triangulation position on solipsism)* > > After the 1970s Davidson's philosophy of mind picked up influences from > the work of *Saul Kripke* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saul_Kripke>, *Hilary > Putnam* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilary_Putnam>, and *Keith Donnellan > * <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keith_Donnellan>, all of whom had > proposed a number of troubling counter-examples to what can be generally > described as "descriptivist" theories of content. These views, which > roughly originate in *Bertrand > Russell*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_Russell>'s > *Theory of > Descriptions*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Descriptions>, > held that the referent of a name--which object or person that name refers > to--is determined by the beliefs a person holds about that object. Suppose I > believe "Aristotle founded the Lyceum" and "Aristotle taught Alexander the > Great." Whom are my beliefs *about*? Aristotle, obviously. But why? > Russell would say that my beliefs are about whatever object makes the > greatest number of them true. If two people taught Alexander, but only one > founded the Lyceum, then my beliefs are about the one who did both. Kripke > et al. argued that this was not a tenable theory, and that in fact whom or > what a person's beliefs were about was in large part (or entirely) a matter > of how they had acquired those beliefs, and those names, and how if at all > the use of those names could be traced "causally" from their original > referents to the current speaker. > > Davidson picked up this theory, and his work in the 1980s dealt with the > problems in relating first-person beliefs to second- and third-person > beliefs. It seems that first person beliefs ("I am hungry") are acquired in > very different ways from third person beliefs (someone else's belief, of > me, that "He is hungry") How can it be that they have the same content? > > Davidson approached this question by connecting it with another one: how > can two people have beliefs about the same external object? He offers, in > answer, a picture of triangulation: Beliefs about oneself, beliefs about > other people, and beliefs about the world come into existence jointly. > > Many philosophers throughout history had, arguably, been tempted to reduce > two of these kinds of belief and knowledge to the other one: > *Descartes*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes>and > *Hume* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hume> thought that the only > knowledge we start with is self-knowledge. Some of the *logical > positivists* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_positivism>, (and some > would say Wittgenstein, or *Wilfrid > Sellars*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilfrid_Sellars>), > held that we start with beliefs only about the external world. (And > arguably *Friedrich > Schelling*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Schelling>and > *Emmanuel Levinas* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emmanuel_Levinas> held > that we start with beliefs only about other people). It is not possible, on > Davidson's view, for a person to have only one of these three kinds of > mental content; anyone who has beliefs of one of the kinds must have > beliefs of the other two kinds." > > [Roger Clough], [[email protected] <javascript:>] > 12/16/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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