On Sunday, December 16, 2012 8:36:55 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
>
>   
> Are monads tokens ?  I'm going to say yes, because each monad
> refers to a corporeal body as a whole (so it is nonreductive at the 
> physical end)
> even though each monad, being specific about what it refers to,
> identifies the type of object it refers to.
>

Monads are self-tokenizing tokenizers but not actually tokens (tokens of 
what? other Monads?). Tokens don't 'exist', they are figures of 
computation, which is semiosis, a sensory-motive experience within the 
cognitive symbolic ranges of awareness.

Craig
 

>  
> Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net] <javascript:>
> 12/16/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>  
>
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> *From:* Roger Clough <javascript:> 
> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
> *Time:* 2012-12-16, 08:17:27
> *Subject:* Davidson on truth
>
>   **
> *Donald Davidson on truth *
>  
> I don't think you can do any better on understanding truth than studying 
> Donald Davidson. 
>  
> As I understand him, in 
>  
> 1) he justifies comp (the use of tokens, because they are nonreductive) as 
> long as we allow for
> (a) mental causation of physical events; (b) that there is a strict 
> exceptionless relation 
> (iff)  between the events; (c) that we use tokens and not types to relate 
> mental  to
> physical events  
>  
> 2) He narrows down what form of language can be used.
> Not sure but this seems to allow only finite, learnable context-free 
> expressions only
>  
> 3) He clarifies the meaning and use of 1p vs 3p. Observed that Hume 
> accepted only 1p 
> knowledege, the logical positivists accepted only 3p knowledge, where 1p 
> is knowledge by
> acquaintance and 3p is knowledge by description.  I might add that IMHO 1p 
> is Kierkegaard's
> view that truth is subjective, so K is close to Hume. 
>  
>  
> *
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Davidson_%28philosopher%29#Mental_events
> *<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Davidson_%28philosopher%29/lMental_events>
>  
>  
> *"1. Token Mental events ( A justification of token physicalism: these 
> being comp and purely token functionalism)*
>
> In "Mental Events" (1970) Davidson advanced a form of token *identity 
> theory* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_theory>
> about the mind: token *mental 
> events*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mental_event>are identical to token 
> physical events. One previous difficulty with such a 
> view was that it did not seem feasible to provide laws relating mental 
> states--for example, believing that the sky is blue, or wanting a 
> hamburger--to physical states, such as patterns of neural activity in the 
> brain. Davidson argued that such a reduction would not be necessary to a 
> token identity thesis: it is possible that each individual mental event 
> just is the corresponding physical event, without there being laws relating 
> *types* (as opposed to tokens) of mental events to *types* of physical 
> events. But, Davidson argued, the fact that we could not have such a 
> reduction does not entail that the mind is anything *more* than the 
> brain. Hence, Davidson called his position *anomalous 
> monism*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anomalous_monism>: 
> monism, because it claims that only one thing is at issue in questions of 
> mental and physical events; anomalous (from *a-*, "not," and *omalos*, 
> "regular") because mental and physical event *types* could not be 
> connected by strict laws (laws without exceptions). 
>
> Davidson argued that anomalous monism *follows 
> from*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_consequence>three plausible 
> theses. First, he assumes the 
> *denial of 
> **epiphenomenalism*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism>--that 
> is, the denial of the view that mental events do not cause physical events. 
> Second, he assumes a *nomological view of causation*, according to which 
> one event causes another if (and only if) there is a strict, exceptionless 
> law governing the relation between the events. Third, he assumes the 
> principle of the *anomalism of the mental*, according to which there are 
> no strict laws that govern the relationship between mental event types and 
> physical event types. By these three theses, Davidson argued, it follows 
> that the causal relations between the mental and the physical hold only 
> between mental event tokens, but that mental events as types are anomalous. 
> This ultimately secures token physicalism and a 
> *supervenience*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supervenience>relation between 
> the mental and the physical, while respecting the autonomy 
> of the mental (Malpas, 2005, ยง2).
>
> *2. Truth and meaning (A justification of the use of certain types of 
> language--- I think this might mean context-free (finite) language)*
>
> In 1967 Davidson published "Truth and Meaning," in which he argued that 
> any *learnable* language must be statable in a finite form, even if it is 
> capable of a theoretically infinite number of expressions--as we may assume 
> that natural human languages are, at least in principle. If it could not be 
> stated in a finite way then it could not be learned through a finite, 
> empirical method such as the way humans learn their languages. It follows 
> that it must be possible to give a theoretical semantics for any natural 
> language which could give the meanings of an infinite number of sentences 
> on the basis of a finite system of axioms. Following, among others, Rudolf 
> Carnap (*Introduction to Semantics*, Harvard 1942, 22) Davidson also 
> argued that "giving the meaning of a sentence" was equivalent to stating 
> its truth conditions, so stimulating the modern work on *truth-conditional 
> semantics* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-conditional_semantics>. In 
> sum, he proposed that it must be possible to distinguish a finite number of 
> distinct grammatical features of a language, and for each of them explain 
> its workings in such a way as to generate trivial (obviously correct) 
> statements of the truth conditions of all the (infinitely many) sentences 
> making use of that feature. That is, we can give a finite theory of meaning 
> for a natural language; the test of its correctness is that it would 
> generate (if applied to the language in which it was formulated) all the 
> sentences of the form "'p' is true if and only if p" ("'Snow is white' is 
> true if and only if snow is white"). (These are called T-sentences: 
> Davidson derives the idea from *Alfred 
> Tarski*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Tarski>
> .)
>
> This work was originally delivered in his *John Locke 
> Lectures*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Locke_Lectures>at Oxford, and 
> launched a large endeavor by many philosophers to develop 
> Davidsonian semantical theories for natural language. Davidson himself 
> contributed many details to such a theory, in essays on quotation, indirect 
> discourse, and descriptions of action.
>
> *3. Knowledge and belief (The difference between 1p and 3p. Also, a 
> triangulation position on solipsism)*
>
> After the 1970s Davidson's philosophy of mind picked up influences from 
> the work of *Saul Kripke* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saul_Kripke>, *Hilary 
> Putnam* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilary_Putnam>, and *Keith Donnellan
> * <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keith_Donnellan>, all of whom had 
> proposed a number of troubling counter-examples to what can be generally 
> described as "descriptivist" theories of content. These views, which 
> roughly originate in *Bertrand 
> Russell*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_Russell>'s 
> *Theory of 
> Descriptions*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Descriptions>, 
> held that the referent of a name--which object or person that name refers 
> to--is determined by the beliefs a person holds about that object. Suppose I 
> believe "Aristotle founded the Lyceum" and "Aristotle taught Alexander the 
> Great." Whom are my beliefs *about*? Aristotle, obviously. But why? 
> Russell would say that my beliefs are about whatever object makes the 
> greatest number of them true. If two people taught Alexander, but only one 
> founded the Lyceum, then my beliefs are about the one who did both. Kripke 
> et al. argued that this was not a tenable theory, and that in fact whom or 
> what a person's beliefs were about was in large part (or entirely) a matter 
> of how they had acquired those beliefs, and those names, and how if at all 
> the use of those names could be traced "causally" from their original 
> referents to the current speaker.
>
> Davidson picked up this theory, and his work in the 1980s dealt with the 
> problems in relating first-person beliefs to second- and third-person 
> beliefs. It seems that first person beliefs ("I am hungry") are acquired in 
> very different ways from third person beliefs (someone else's belief, of 
> me, that "He is hungry") How can it be that they have the same content?
>
> Davidson approached this question by connecting it with another one: how 
> can two people have beliefs about the same external object? He offers, in 
> answer, a picture of triangulation: Beliefs about oneself, beliefs about 
> other people, and beliefs about the world come into existence jointly.
>
> Many philosophers throughout history had, arguably, been tempted to reduce 
> two of these kinds of belief and knowledge to the other one: 
> *Descartes*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes>and 
> *Hume* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hume> thought that the only 
> knowledge we start with is self-knowledge. Some of the *logical 
> positivists* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_positivism>, (and some 
> would say Wittgenstein, or *Wilfrid 
> Sellars*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilfrid_Sellars>), 
> held that we start with beliefs only about the external world. (And 
> arguably *Friedrich 
> Schelling*<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Schelling>and 
> *Emmanuel Levinas* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emmanuel_Levinas> held 
> that we start with beliefs only about other people). It is not possible, on 
> Davidson's view, for a person to have only one of these three kinds of 
> mental content; anyone who has beliefs of one of the kinds must have 
> beliefs of the other two kinds."
>
> [Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>] 
> 12/16/2012  
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>

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