On 12/16/2012 8:36 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Are monads tokens ?  I'm going to say yes, because each monad
refers to a corporeal body as a whole (so it is nonreductive at the physical end)
even though each monad, being specific about what it refers to,
identifies the type of object it refers to.

Dear Roger,

Does the type-token duality <http://books.google.com/books?id=Mawadg55eg4C&pg=PA79&lpg=PA79&dq=type-token+duality&source=bl&ots=IsD7gVmcsY&sig=BuCeos5M9XLPDJ_dDF8dgl2KppU&hl=en&sa=X&ei=GSDOUKiBA5DY9AT_lIHYDw&ved=0CFEQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=type-token%20duality&f=false>apply?

Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net]>
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

    ----- Receiving the following content -----
    *From:* Roger Clough <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>
    *Receiver:* everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>
    *Time:* 2012-12-16, 08:17:27
    *Subject:* Davidson on truth


    *Donald Davidson on truth *
    I don't think you can do any better on understanding truth than
    studying Donald Davidson.
    As I understand him, in
    1) he justifies comp (the use of tokens, because they are
    nonreductive) as long as we allow for
    (a) mental causation of physical events; (b) that there is a
    strict exceptionless relation
    (iff)  between the events; (c) that we use tokens and not types to
    relate mental  to
    physical events
    2) He narrows down what form of language can be used.
    Not sure but this seems to allow only finite, learnable
    context-free expressions only
    3) He clarifies the meaning and use of 1p vs 3p. Observed that
    Hume accepted only 1p
    knowledege, the logical positivists accepted only 3p knowledge,
    where 1p is knowledge by
    acquaintance and 3p is knowledge by description.  I might add that
    IMHO 1p is Kierkegaard's
    view that truth is subjective, so K is close to Hume.

    *"1. Token Mental events ( A justification of token physicalism:
    these being comp and purely token functionalism)*

    In "Mental Events" (1970) Davidson advanced a form of token
    _identity theory_
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_theory>about the mind:
    token _mental events_
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mental_event>are identical to token
    physical events. One previous difficulty with such a view was that
    it did not seem feasible to provide laws relating mental
    states—for example, believing that the sky is blue, or wanting a
    hamburger—to physical states, such as patterns of neural activity
    in the brain. Davidson argued that such a reduction would not be
    necessary to a token identity thesis: it is possible that each
    individual mental event just is the corresponding physical event,
    without there being laws relating /types/ (as opposed to tokens)
    of mental events to /types/ of physical events. But, Davidson
    argued, the fact that we could not have such a reduction does not
    entail that the mind is anything /more/ than the brain. Hence,
    Davidson called his position _anomalous monism_
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anomalous_monism>: monism, because
    it claims that only one thing is at issue in questions of mental
    and physical events; anomalous (from /a-/, "not," and /omalos/,
    "regular") because mental and physical event /types/ could not be
    connected by strict laws (laws without exceptions).

    Davidson argued that anomalous monism _follows from_
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_consequence>three plausible
    theses. First, he assumes the /denial of //_epiphenomenalism_/
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism>—that is, the
    denial of the view that mental events do not cause physical
    events. Second, he assumes a /nomological view of causation/,
    according to which one event causes another if (and only if) there
    is a strict, exceptionless law governing the relation between the
    events. Third, he assumes the principle of the /anomalism of the
    mental/, according to which there are no strict laws that govern
    the relationship between mental event types and physical event
    types. By these three theses, Davidson argued, it follows that the
    causal relations between the mental and the physical hold only
    between mental event tokens, but that mental events as types are
    anomalous. This ultimately secures token physicalism and a
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supervenience>relation between the
    mental and the physical, while respecting the autonomy of the
    mental (Malpas, 2005, §2).

    *2. Truth and meaning (A justification of the use of certain types
    of language--- I think this might mean context-free (finite)

    In 1967 Davidson published "Truth and Meaning," in which he argued
    that any /learnable/ language must be statable in a finite form,
    even if it is capable of a theoretically infinite number of
    expressions—as we may assume that natural human languages are, at
    least in principle. If it could not be stated in a finite way then
    it could not be learned through a finite, empirical method such as
    the way humans learn their languages. It follows that it must be
    possible to give a theoretical semantics for any natural language
    which could give the meanings of an infinite number of sentences
    on the basis of a finite system of axioms. Following, among
    others, Rudolf Carnap (/Introduction to Semantics/, Harvard 1942,
    22) Davidson also argued that "giving the meaning of a sentence"
    was equivalent to stating its truth conditions, so stimulating the
    modern work on _truth-conditional semantics_
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-conditional_semantics>. In
    sum, he proposed that it must be possible to distinguish a finite
    number of distinct grammatical features of a language, and for
    each of them explain its workings in such a way as to generate
    trivial (obviously correct) statements of the truth conditions of
    all the (infinitely many) sentences making use of that feature.
    That is, we can give a finite theory of meaning for a natural
    language; the test of its correctness is that it would generate
    (if applied to the language in which it was formulated) all the
    sentences of the form "'p' is true if and only if p" ("'Snow is
    white' is true if and only if snow is white"). (These are called
    T-sentences: Davidson derives the idea from _Alfred Tarski_

    This work was originally delivered in his _John Locke Lectures_
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Locke_Lectures>at Oxford, and
    launched a large endeavor by many philosophers to develop
    Davidsonian semantical theories for natural language. Davidson
    himself contributed many details to such a theory, in essays on
    quotation, indirect discourse, and descriptions of action.

    *3. Knowledge and belief (The difference between 1p and 3p. Also,
    a triangulation position on solipsism)*

    After the 1970s Davidson's philosophy of mind picked up influences
    from the work of _Saul Kripke_
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saul_Kripke>, _Hilary Putnam_
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilary_Putnam>, and _Keith
    Donnellan_ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keith_Donnellan>, all of
    whom had proposed a number of troubling counter-examples to what
    can be generally described as "descriptivist" theories of content.
    These views, which roughly originate in _Bertrand Russell_
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_Russell>'s _Theory of
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_Descriptions>, held that
    the referent of a name—which object or person that name refers
    to—is determined by the beliefs a person holds about that object.
    Suppose I believe "Aristotle founded the Lyceum" and "Aristotle
    taught Alexander the Great." Whom are my beliefs /about/?
    Aristotle, obviously. But why? Russell would say that my beliefs
    are about whatever object makes the greatest number of them true.
    If two people taught Alexander, but only one founded the Lyceum,
    then my beliefs are about the one who did both. Kripke et al.
    argued that this was not a tenable theory, and that in fact whom
    or what a person's beliefs were about was in large part (or
    entirely) a matter of how they had acquired those beliefs, and
    those names, and how if at all the use of those names could be
    traced "causally" from their original referents to the current

    Davidson picked up this theory, and his work in the 1980s dealt
    with the problems in relating first-person beliefs to second- and
    third-person beliefs. It seems that first person beliefs ("I am
    hungry") are acquired in very different ways from third person
    beliefs (someone else's belief, of me, that "He is hungry") How
    can it be that they have the same content?

    Davidson approached this question by connecting it with another
    one: how can two people have beliefs about the same external
    object? He offers, in answer, a picture of triangulation: Beliefs
    about oneself, beliefs about other people, and beliefs about the
    world come into existence jointly.

    Many philosophers throughout history had, arguably, been tempted
    to reduce two of these kinds of belief and knowledge to the other
    one: _Descartes_
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Descartes>and _Hume_
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hume>thought that the only
    knowledge we start with is self-knowledge. Some of the _logical
    positivists_ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_positivism>,
    (and some would say Wittgenstein, or _Wilfrid Sellars_
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilfrid_Sellars>), held that we
    start with beliefs only about the external world. (And arguably
    _Friedrich Schelling_
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Schelling>and _Emmanuel
    Levinas_ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emmanuel_Levinas>held that
    we start with beliefs only about other people). It is not
    possible, on Davidson's view, for a person to have only one of
    these three kinds of mental content; anyone who has beliefs of one
    of the kinds must have beliefs of the other two kinds."

    [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
    "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen




You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to